Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 33-53

  Bond, Eric W ^a   Gresik, Thomas A ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common agency; Intergovernment competition; Multinational regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029689997     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01493-0     Document Type: Article

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