Economic mechanism design for computerized agents

1st USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, EC 1995

Volumn , Issue , 1995, Pages

  Varian, Hal R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN;

ACTIVE AREA; ECONOMIC MECHANISMS; ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS; RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 85094637842     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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