Subscription mechanisms for network formation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 106, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 242-264

  Mutuswami, Suresh ^a   Winter, Eyal ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Networks; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036816893     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2920     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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