Network formation with sequential demands

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 229-249

  Currarini, Sergio ^a   Morelli, Massimo ^b  

^a CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Efficient networks; Link formation; Payoff division

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012011296     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00013689     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Dutta, B., Mutuswami, S. (1997) Stable networks. Journal of Economic Theory 76: 322-344
4. Harris, C. (1985) Existence and characterization of perfect equilibrium in games of perfect information. Econometrica 53: 613-628
5. Jackson, M.O., Watts, A. (1996) The evolution of social and economic networks. mimeo, Virginia Tech
6. Jackson, M.O., Wolinsky, A. (1996) A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory 71: 44-74
7. Slikker, M., Van Den Nouweland, A. (1998) A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division. Working Paper, Tilburg University
8. Quin. (1996) Endogenous formation of cooperation structures. Journal of Economic Theory 69: 218-226