Different least square values, different rankings

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 533-550

  Laruelle, Annick ^a   Merlin, Vincent ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036629378     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100130     Document Type: Article

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