Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 491-512

  Calvo, Emilio ^a   García, Iñaki ^b   Gutiérrez, Esther ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033411806     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050157     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Arrow KJ (1963) Social Choice and individual values, 2nd. edn. John Wiley and Sons, New York
2. Banzhaf JF (1965) Weighted voting doesn't work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Rev. 19: 317-343
3. Borda JC (1781) Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin. Histoire de l'Academie Royale des Sciences, Paris
4. Dubey P, Neyman A, Weber RJ (1981) Value Theory without efficiency. Math Operat Res 6: 122-128
5. Gillies DB (1959) Solutions to General Non-Zero-Sum Games. In: Tucker AW, Luce RD (eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematical Studies, 40) Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 47-85
6. Hart S, Mas-Colell A (1996) Bargaining and Value. Econometrica 64: 357-380
7. Moulin H (1994) Social Choice. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of Game Theory, Vol 2. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp 1091-1125
8. Nash JF (1951) Non-Cooperative Games. Ann Math 54: 286-295
9. Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50: 97-109
10. Ruiz L, Valenciano F, Zarzuelo JM (1995) The family of least square values for TU games. Working paper Economia Aplicada No. 5/1995, Universidad del País Vasco/EHU, Bilbao. Games Econ Beh (forthcoming)
11. Ruiz L, Valenciano F, Zarzuelo JM (1996) The Least Square Prenucleolus and the Least Square Nucleolus. Two Values for TU Games based on the Excess Vector. Int J Game Theory 25: 113-134
12. Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-Person Games. Ann Math Study 28: 307-317
13. Young HP (1974) An Axiomatization of Borda's rule. J Econ Theory 9: 43-52