Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 65-83

  Sertel, Murat R ^a   Özkal Sanver, Ipek ^b  

^a BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^b ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Endowments; Manipulation; Matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036347179     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00007-0     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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18. The Many-Person Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary
19. Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
20. The Equilibrium Allocations of Walras and Lindahl Manipulation Games
21. Monotonic Allocation Mechanisms
22. Monotonic Allocation Mechanisms in Economies with Public Goods