Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 287-311

  Douglas, Alan V S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Bondholder incentive conflicts; Corporate efficiency; Information asymmetries; Manager; Managerial rents; Shareholder

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036344357     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00048-7     Document Type: Article

References (55)

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