Estimation of an efficient tomato contract

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 237-253

  Hueth, Brent ^a   Ligon, Ethan ^b  

^a IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agricultural contracts; Contract estimation; Mechanism design; Processing tomatoes

Indexed keywords

LYCOPERSICON ESCULENTUM;

EID: 0036306487     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/eurrag/29.2.237     Document Type: Article

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