Producer price risk and quality measurement

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 512-524

  Hueth, Brent ^b   Ligon, Ethan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Agricultural contracts; Private information; Quality measurement; Tomatoes

Indexed keywords

LYCOPERSICON ESCULENTUM;

EID: 0040370747     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1244011     Document Type: Article

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