Executive compensation: A calibration approach

Economic Theory

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 561-581

  Haubrich, Joseph G ^a   Popova, Ivilina ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Calibration; Executive compensation; Principal agent

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032219890     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050235     Document Type: Article

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