Separating contract from governance

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 47-61

  James Jr, Harvey S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HARTFORD   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008624077     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/1099-1468(200003)21:2<47::AID-MDE967>3.0.CO;2-5     Document Type: Article

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