An evolutionary game theoretical approach to the theory of international regimes

Defence and Peace Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 225-246

  Garoupa, Nuno R ^a   Gata, João E ^b  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Anarchy; Conflict; Evolutionary game theory; International regime

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141509615     PISSN: 10242694     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10430719908404925     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Axelrod , R. and Keohane, R. (1986) Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. In Cooperation Under Anarchy, edited by K. Oye. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 226-254.
2. Börgers, T. and Sarin, R. (1995) Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics. Mimeo, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory.
3. Brams , S. (1975) Game Theory and Politics. New York, NY: The Free Press/ Macmillan Publishing Co.
4. Brams, S. and Kilgour, D.M. (1988) National Security Games. Synthese 76, 185-200.
5. Brams, S. and Togman, J. (1996) The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Conflict. Oxford International Review 7(2), 50-54.
6. Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Lalman, D. (1988) Arms Races and the Opportunity for Peace. Synthese 76, 263-283.
7. Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Siverson, R. (1995) War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability. American Political Science Review 89(4), 841-855.
8. Diehl, P., Reifschneider, J., and Hensel, P. (1996) United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict. International Organization 50(4), 683-700.
9. Downs, G. W. and Rocke, D.M. (1990) Tacit Bargaining. Arms Race and Arms Control. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
10. Fearon, J. (1995) Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49(3), 379-414.
11. Fontanel, J. (1994) The Economics of Disarmament: a Survey. Defence and Peace Economics 5, 87-120.
12. Grunberg, I. (1990) Exploring the 'Myth' of Hegemonic Stability. International Organization 44, 431-477.
13. Haggard, S. and Simmons, B. (1987) Theories of International Regimes. International Organization 41(3), 491-517.
14. Helbing, D. (1996) A Stochastic Behavioral Model and a Microscopic Foundation of Evolutionary Game Theory. Theory and Decision 38, 149-179.
15. Hirshleifer, J. (1995) Theorizing about Conflict. In Handbook of Defense Economics, edited by K. Hartley and T. Sandler. North-Holland/Elsevier Science, 165-189.
16. Intriligator, M.D. (1994) Economic Aspects of Disarmament: Arms Race and Arms Control Issues. Defence and Peace Economics 5, 121-130.
17. Keohane, R.O. (1983) The Demand for International Regimes. In International Regimes, edited by S.D. Krasner. Cornell Studies in Political Economy: Cornell University Press, 141-171.
18. Keohane, R.O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
19. Kissinger, H. (1957) A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822. Sentry Editions.
20. Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
21. Kleiboer, M. (1996) Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(2), 360-389.
22. Krasner, S.D. (1983) Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. In International Regimes, edited by S.D. Krasner. Cornell Studies in Political Economy: Cornell University Press, 1-21.
23. Kydd, A. and Snidal, D. (1995) Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regimes. In Regime Theory and International Relations, edited by V. Rittberger. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 112-135.
24. Lalman, D. (1988) Conflict Resolution and Peace. American Journal of Political Science 32(3), 590-615.
25. Langlois, J.P. (1991) Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability. American Journal of Political Science 35(4), 801-832.
26. Levy, J. (1994) Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield. International Organization 48(3), 279-312.
27. Lewis, J. (1996) Angola 1995: The Road to Peace. International Relations 13(1), 81-98.
28. Licklider, R. (1995) The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars. American Political Science Review 89(3), 681-690.
29. Moravcsik, A. (1993) Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining. In Double-Edged Diplomacy, edited by P.B. Evans, H.K. Jacobson and R.D. Putnam. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 3-42.
30. Morrow, J. (1994) Modelling the Forms of International Cooperation. International Organization 48(3), 387-423.
31. Nelson, R. (1995) Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change. Journal of Economic Literature 33, 48-90.
32. Niou, E. and Ordeshook, P. (1990) Stability in Anarchic International Systems. American Political Science Review 84(4), 1207-1234.
33. Powell, R. (1990) Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
34. Putnam, R.D. (1988) Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42(3), 427-460.
35. Sandler, T. (1992) Collective Action: Theory and Applications. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
36. Sandler, T. and Sargent, K. (1995) Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation. Land Economics 71(2), 145-162.
37. Selten, R. (1991) Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior. Games and Economic Behavior 3, 3-24.
38. Snidal, D. (1985) Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. International Organization 39, 579-614.
39. Snidal, D. (1986) The Game Theory of International Politics. In Cooperation Under Anarchy, edited by K. Oye. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 25-57.
40. Snidal, D. (1991) Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation. American Political Science Review 85(3), 701-726.
41. Stein, A.A. (1983) Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. In International Regimes, edited by S.D. Krasner. Cornell Studies in Political Economy: Cornell University Press, 115-140.
42. Strange, S. (1983) Cave! Hic Dragones: a Critique of Regime Analysis. In International Regimes, edited by S.D. Krasner. Cornell Studies in Political Economy: Cornell University Press, 337-354.
43. Strange, S. (1987) The Persistence Myth of Lost Hegemony. International Organization 41, 551-574.
44. Wagner, R. (1986) The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power. World Politics 38, 546-576.
45. Wagner, R. (1994) Peace, War, and the Balance of Power. American Political Science Review 88(3), 593-607.
46. Weibull, J. (1994) The 'as if' Approach to Game Theory: Three Positive Results and Four Obstacles. European Economic Review 38, 868-881.
47. Weibull, J. (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
48. White, N. (1994) United Nations Peacekeeping - Development or Destruction? International Relations 12, 129-158.