Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection

Economic Theory

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 525-548

  Inderst, Roman ^a   Wambach, Achim ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Capacity constraints; Competitive equilibrium; Labor markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036003982     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990000155     Document Type: Article

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