Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection

Economic Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 207-235

  Gale, Douglas ^a  

^a Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030304296     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213903     Document Type: Article

References (39)

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