On the likelihood of condorcet's profiles

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 193-206

  Merlin, Vincent ^a   Tataru, Monica ^b   Valognes, Fabrice ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NAMUR   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036002528     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s355-002-8332-y     Document Type: Article

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