Team production, sequential investments, and stochastic payoffs

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 157, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 430-442

  Lülfesmann, Christoph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035647218     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456013621288     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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3. -AND - [2000], "Contract Renegotiations and Options in Agency Problems," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16, 395-423.
4. -AND - [2001], "Implementing the First Best in an Agency Relationship with Renegotiation: A Corrigendum," Econometrica, forthcoming.
5. HERMALIN, B. E., AND M. L. KATZ [1991], "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, 59, 1735-1753.
6. HOLMSTRÖM, B. [1982], "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324-340.
7. NÖLDEKE, G., AND K. M. SCHMIDT [1998], "Sequential Investments and Option to Own," RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 633-653.
8. SCHMIDT, K. M. [2000], "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Working Paper, University of Munich and CEPR.
9. STRAUSZ, R. [1999], "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, 85, 140-156.