Implementing the first best in an agency relationship with renegotiation: A corrigendum

Econometrica

Volumn 69, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 1391-1395

  Edlin, Aaron S ^a   Hermalin, Benjamin E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13444299621     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00248     Document Type: Article

References (4)

1. EDLIN, AARON S., and BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN (1997): "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper W6086.
2. GROSSMAN, SANFORD, AND OLIVER D. HART (1986): "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719.
3. HERMALIN, BENJAMIN E., and MICHAEL L. KATZ (1991): "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, 59, 1735-1753.
4. ISHIGURO, SHINGO (1998): "A Note on the Effects of Renegotiation and Verifiability in Agency," Working Paper, School of Business Administration, Nanzan University.