Indirect evolution vs. strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 281-295

  Dufwenberg, Martin ^a   Güth, Werner ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agency theory; C72; Commitment; D21; D43; Duopoly market; Indirect evolution; Strategic delegation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007133542     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(99)00006-3     Document Type: Article

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