Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 737-746

  Ben Yashar, Ruth ^a   Paroush, Jacob ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035631520     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000080     Document Type: Article

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