Do reciprocal strategies work in social dilemmas?

Personality and Social Psychology Review

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 278-288

  De Heus, Peter ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034346004     PISSN: 10888683     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0403_5     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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14. Weibull, J. (1995). Evolutionary game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.