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Volumn 157, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 568-590

On the costs and benefits of delegation in organizations

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0035528342     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456012974495     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (8)

References (18)
  • 1
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    • Formal and real authority in organizations
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    • (1997) Journal of Political Economy , vol.105 , pp. 1-29
    • Aghion, P.1    Tirole, J.2
  • 2
    • 0003634111 scopus 로고
    • Harper and Row: London
    • CHILD, J. [1984], Organization, Harper and Row: London.
    • (1984) Organization
    • Child, J.1
  • 4
    • 0001510595 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The economics of career concerns, part I: Comparing information structures
    • DEWATRIPONT, M., I. JEWITT, AND J. TIROLE [1999a], "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, 66, 183-198.
    • (1999) Review of Economic Studies , vol.66 , pp. 183-198
    • Dewatripont, M.1    Jewitt, I.2    Tirole, J.3
  • 5
    • 17944376558 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The economics of career concerns, part II: Application to missions and accountability of government agencies
    • -, -, AND - [1999b], "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, 66, 199-207.
    • (1999) Review of Economic Studies , vol.66 , pp. 199-207
  • 6
    • 0000806744 scopus 로고
    • Agency problems and the theory of the firm
    • FAMA, E. [1980], "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
    • (1980) Journal of Political Economy , vol.88 , pp. 288-307
    • Fama, E.1
  • 7
    • 84897711429 scopus 로고
    • Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence
    • GIBBONS, R., AND J. K. MURPHY [1992], "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100, 468-505.
    • (1992) Journal of Political Economy , vol.100 , pp. 468-505
    • Gibbons, R.1    Murphy, J.K.2
  • 9
    • 0001098065 scopus 로고
    • Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective
    • Swedish School of Economics: Helsinki
    • HOLMSTRöM, B. [1982], "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," pp. 209-230 in: Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, Swedish School of Economics: Helsinki.
    • (1982) Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck , pp. 209-230
    • Holmström, B.1
  • 10
    • 0000827401 scopus 로고
    • Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process
    • KLEIN, B., R. G. CRAWFORD, AND A. ALCHIAN [1978], "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 297-326.
    • (1978) Journal of Law and Economics , vol.21 , pp. 297-326
    • Klein, B.1    Crawford, R.G.2    Alchian, A.3
  • 13
    • 21844483522 scopus 로고
    • The dynamics of learning with team production: Implications for task assignment
    • MEYER, M. [1994], "The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1157-1184.
    • (1994) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.109 , pp. 1157-1184
    • Meyer, M.1
  • 17
    • 0029822255 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Organizational design and technology choice under intra-firm bargaining
    • STOLE, L., AND J. ZWIEBEL [1996], "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intra-Firm Bargaining," American Economic Review, 86, 195-222.
    • (1996) American Economic Review , vol.86 , pp. 195-222
    • Stole, L.1    Zwiebel, J.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.