On the costs and benefits of delegation in organizations

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 157, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 568-590

  Sliwka, Dirk ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035528342     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456012974495     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. AGHION, P., AND J. TIROLE [1997], "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1-29.
2. CHILD, J. [1984], Organization, Harper and Row: London.
3. CRÉMER, J. [1995], "Arm's Length Relationships," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 275-295.
4. DEWATRIPONT, M., I. JEWITT, AND J. TIROLE [1999a], "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, 66, 183-198.
5. -, -, AND - [1999b], "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, 66, 199-207.
6. FAMA, E. [1980], "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
7. GIBBONS, R., AND J. K. MURPHY [1992], "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100, 468-505.
8. HART, O. D. [1995], Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
9. HOLMSTRöM, B. [1982], "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," pp. 209-230 in: Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, Swedish School of Economics: Helsinki.
10. KLEIN, B., R. G. CRAWFORD, AND A. ALCHIAN [1978], "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 297-326.
11. LAFFONT, J.-J., AND D. MARTIMORT [1998], "Collusion and Delegation," RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 280-305.
12. MELUMAD, N., D. MOOKHERJEE, AND S. REICHELSTEIN [1995], "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, 26, 654-672.
13. MEYER, M. [1994], "The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1157-1184.
14. POITEVIN, M. [1994], "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," CIRANO Montréal Discussion Paper #95s-3, CIRANO, Montréal, Canada.
15. RAJAN, R. G., AND L. ZINGALES [1998], "Power in a Theory of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 387-432.
16. SLIWKA, D. [2001], "Delegation and Power in Hierarchies," Mimeo, University of Bonn, Germany.
17. STOLE, L., AND J. ZWIEBEL [1996], "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intra-Firm Bargaining," American Economic Review, 86, 195-222.
18. WILLIAMSON, O. E. [1985], The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, The Free Press: New York.