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Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 459-473
Delegated bargaining and renegotiation
Author keywords

Bargaining; Commitment; Delegation; Renegotiation; Search
Indexed keywords

EID: 0035430122     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00157-3     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (15)
References (19)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.