A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 134-152

  Muthoo, Abhinay ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030115733     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0041     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. 1. K. G. BINMORE, Nash bargaining theory II, in "The Economics of Bargaining" (K. G. Binmore and P. S. Dasgupta, Eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
2. 2. K. G. BINMORE, Nash bargaining and incomplete information, in "The Economics of Bargaining" (K. G. Binmore and P. S. Dasgupta, Eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
3. 3. H. CARLSSON, A bargaining model where parties make errors, Econometrica 59 (1991), 1487-1496.
4. 4. V. CRAWFORD, A theory of disagreement in bargaining, Econometrica 50 (1982), 607-638.
5. 5. J. NASH, Two-person cooperative games, Econometrica 21 (1953), 128-140.
6. 6. T. C. SCHELLING, An essay on bargaining, in "The Strategy of Conflict" (T. C. Schelling, Ed.), 2nd ed., Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.
7. 7. E. VAN DAMME, "Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria," 2nd ed., Springer-Verlag, Berlin/New York, 1991.