Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game

Economic Theory

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 57-77

  Bolt, Wilko ^a   Houba, Harold ^b  

^a DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK   (Netherlands)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032221340     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050178     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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