Quagmires in the periphery: Foreign wars and escalating commitment in international conflict

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 94-144

  Taliaferro, Jeffrey W ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003183529     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419808429352     Document Type: Article

References (241)

1. William T. R. Fox, "The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 392, special issue (November 1970): 1-13, at 1.
2. See, for example, Donald Wittman, "How Wars End: A Rational Model Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 4 (December 1979): 743-63; Fred C. Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Christopher R. Mitchell, "Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgment, Rationality and Entrapment," International Social Science Journal 43, no. 1 (February 1991): 35-56; William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
3. See, for example, Donald Wittman, "How Wars End: A Rational Model Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 4 (December 1979): 743-63; Fred C. Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Christopher R. Mitchell, "Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgment, Rationality and Entrapment," International Social Science Journal 43, no. 1 (February 1991): 35-56; William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
4. See, for example, Donald Wittman, "How Wars End: A Rational Model Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 4 (December 1979): 743-63; Fred C. Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Christopher R. Mitchell, "Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgment, Rationality and Entrapment," International Social Science Journal 43, no. 1 (February 1991): 35-56; William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
5. See, for example, Donald Wittman, "How Wars End: A Rational Model Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 4 (December 1979): 743-63; Fred C. Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Christopher R. Mitchell, "Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgment, Rationality and Entrapment," International Social Science Journal 43, no. 1 (February 1991): 35-56; William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
6. On the rationality assumption in neorealist theory, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 91-92, 118; Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312, at 296-98; João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 193-260, at 209 n. 56. On the rationality assumption in neoclassical economics, see Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 1, passim; and Richard R. Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1982).
7. On the rationality assumption in neorealist theory, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 91-92, 118; Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312, at 296-98; João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 193-260, at 209 n. 56. On the rationality assumption in neoclassical economics, see Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 1, passim; and Richard R. Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1982).
8. On the rationality assumption in neorealist theory, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 91-92, 118; Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312, at 296-98; João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 193-260, at 209 n. 56. On the rationality assumption in neoclassical economics, see Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 1, passim; and Richard R. Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1982).
9. On the rationality assumption in neorealist theory, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 91-92, 118; Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312, at 296-98; João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 193-260, at 209 n. 56. On the rationality assumption in neoclassical economics, see Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 1, passim; and Richard R. Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1982).
10. On the rationality assumption in neorealist theory, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 91-92, 118; Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 279-312, at 296-98; João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 193-260, at 209 n. 56. On the rationality assumption in neoclassical economics, see Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 1, passim; and Richard R. Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1982).
11. Examples of "offensive realism" include Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 1-49; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107; Farced Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-88; and, arguably, James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-14.
12. Examples of "offensive realism" include Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 1-49; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107; Farced Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-88; and, arguably, James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-14.
13. Examples of "offensive realism" include Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 1-49; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107; Farced Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-88; and, arguably, James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-14.
14. Examples of "offensive realism" include Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 1-49; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107; Farced Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-88; and, arguably, James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-14.
15. Examples of "offensive realism" include Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 1-49; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107; Farced Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-88; and, arguably, James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-14.
16. Examples of "offensive realism" include Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 1-49; John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107; Farced Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-88; and, arguably, James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 379-14.
17. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tvetsky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," Econometrica 47, no. 2 (March 1979): 263-91.
18. Glen Whyte, "Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory Approach." Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 54, no. 3 (April 1993): 430-55; Robert W. Rutledge, "Escalation of Commitment in Groups and the Effects of Information Framing," Journal of Applied Business 11, no. 2 (spring 1995): 17-23.
19. Glen Whyte, "Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory Approach." Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 54, no. 3 (April 1993): 430-55; Robert W. Rutledge, "Escalation of Commitment in Groups and the Effects of Information Framing," Journal of Applied Business 11, no. 2 (spring 1995): 17-23.
20. On case selection see Harry Eckstein, "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7, Strategies of Inquiry, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-138; Stephen Van Evera, "Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science," Occasional Paper (Cambridge: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, MIT, 1996), 25-49.
21. On case selection see Harry Eckstein, "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7, Strategies of Inquiry, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-138; Stephen Van Evera, "Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science," Occasional Paper (Cambridge: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, MIT, 1996), 25-49.
22. Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory," 119-20; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sydney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 120-21.
23. Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory," 119-20; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sydney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 120-21.
24. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 84-85.
25. Previous applications of prospect-theoretic hypotheses in international relations include Barbara R. Farnham, ed., Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1994); Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly, eds., Choosing to Co-operate: Horn States Avoid Losses (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Kurt Weyland, "Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 2 (June 1996): 185-208.
26. Previous applications of prospect-theoretic hypotheses in international relations include Barbara R. Farnham, ed., Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1994); Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly, eds., Choosing to Co-operate: Horn States Avoid Losses (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Kurt Weyland, "Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 2 (June 1996): 185-208.
27. Previous applications of prospect-theoretic hypotheses in international relations include Barbara R. Farnham, ed., Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1994); Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly, eds., Choosing to Co-operate: Horn States Avoid Losses (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Kurt Weyland, "Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 2 (June 1996): 185-208.
28. Admittedly prospect theory does not fit neatly into the "cognitive-rational debate." See Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 87-122, at 101. The term "cognitive realism," however, is somewhat more tractable than the more descriptively accurate "behavioral decision-theoretic realism."
29. For the core assumptions of realism see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978), 5; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (New York: Cambridge: University Press, 1989), 39-52; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): ix-xx.
30. For the core assumptions of realism see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978), 5; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (New York: Cambridge: University Press, 1989), 39-52; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): ix-xx.
31. For the core assumptions of realism see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978), 5; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (New York: Cambridge: University Press, 1989), 39-52; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): ix-xx.
32. Robert Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 3-26, at 6.
33. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 73-74.
34. On methodological individualism see Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 1; and Ashley J. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory," Security Studies 5, no. 2 (winter 1995/96): 3-104, at 7-9.
35. On methodological individualism see Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 1; and Ashley J. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory," Security Studies 5, no. 2 (winter 1995/96): 3-104, at 7-9.
36. For a similar argument see Thomas J. Christensen, "Alliances and Perceptions in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization 52, no. 1 (winter 1997): 65-97; and James M. Goldgeier, "Psychology and Security," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 137-66.
37. For a similar argument see Thomas J. Christensen, "Alliances and Perceptions in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization 52, no. 1 (winter 1997): 65-97; and James M. Goldgeier, "Psychology and Security," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (summer 1997): 137-66.
38. This definition differs from the distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty" found in microeconomic theory. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28-33. The study of risk (at least in business, sociology, and international relations) is evolving away from the economic focus on probability and utility, and moving toward a focus on loss and uncertainty. See J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone, "Risk Appraisal," in Risk-taking Behavior, ed. J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone (New York Wiley, 1992); and Mary Douglas, "Risk as a Forensic Resource," Dœdalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 119, no. 4 (fall 1990): 1-16. Two recent efforts in international relations to reconceptualize "risk" along these lines are Yaacov Vertzberger, "Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Sociocognitive Approach," Political Psychology 16, no. 2 (June 1995): 347-80; and William A. Boettcher, "Prudence or Peril: Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 1997).
39. This definition differs from the distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty" found in microeconomic theory. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28-33. The study of risk (at least in business, sociology, and international relations) is evolving away from the economic focus on probability and utility, and moving toward a focus on loss and uncertainty. See J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone, "Risk Appraisal," in Risk-taking Behavior, ed. J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone (New York Wiley, 1992); and Mary Douglas, "Risk as a Forensic Resource," Dœdalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 119, no. 4 (fall 1990): 1-16. Two recent efforts in international relations to reconceptualize "risk" along these lines are Yaacov Vertzberger, "Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Sociocognitive Approach," Political Psychology 16, no. 2 (June 1995): 347-80; and William A. Boettcher, "Prudence or Peril: Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 1997).
40. This definition differs from the distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty" found in microeconomic theory. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28-33. The study of risk (at least in business, sociology, and international relations) is evolving away from the economic focus on probability and utility, and moving toward a focus on loss and uncertainty. See J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone, "Risk Appraisal," in Risk-taking Behavior, ed. J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone (New York Wiley, 1992); and Mary Douglas, "Risk as a Forensic Resource," Dœdalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 119, no. 4 (fall 1990): 1-16. Two recent efforts in international relations to reconceptualize "risk" along these lines are Yaacov Vertzberger, "Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Sociocognitive Approach," Political Psychology 16, no. 2 (June 1995): 347-80; and William A. Boettcher, "Prudence or Peril: Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 1997).
41. This definition differs from the distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty" found in microeconomic theory. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28-33. The study of risk (at least in business, sociology, and international relations) is evolving away from the economic focus on probability and utility, and moving toward a focus on loss and uncertainty. See J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone, "Risk Appraisal," in Risk-taking Behavior, ed. J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone (New York Wiley, 1992); and Mary Douglas, "Risk as a Forensic Resource," Dœdalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 119, no. 4 (fall 1990): 1-16. Two recent efforts in international relations to reconceptualize "risk" along these lines are Yaacov Vertzberger, "Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Sociocognitive Approach," Political Psychology 16, no. 2 (June 1995): 347-80; and William A. Boettcher, "Prudence or Peril: Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 1997).
42. This definition differs from the distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty" found in microeconomic theory. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28-33. The study of risk (at least in business, sociology, and international relations) is evolving away from the economic focus on probability and utility, and moving toward a focus on loss and uncertainty. See J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone, "Risk Appraisal," in Risk-taking Behavior, ed. J. Frank Yates and Edward Stone (New York Wiley, 1992); and Mary Douglas, "Risk as a Forensic Resource," Dœdalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 119, no. 4 (fall 1990): 1-16. Two recent efforts in international relations to reconceptualize "risk" along these lines are Yaacov Vertzberger, "Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Sociocognitive Approach," Political Psychology 16, no. 2 (June 1995): 347-80; and William A. Boettcher, "Prudence or Peril: Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 1997).
43. On this point see William A. Boettcher, "Context, Methods, Numbers and Words: Prospect Theory in International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (September 1995): 561-83.
44. See Boettcher, "Prudence or Peril," 10-12. Vertzberger, on the other hand, draws a distinction between real risk, perceived risk, and acceptable risk. In his "sociocognitive" framework, risk acceptance occurs when perceived risk is ≤ acceptable risk, while risk aversion occurs when perceived risk > acceptable risk. See Vertzberger, "Reconceptualizing Risk," 355-56, and n. 6. As Boettcher does, I, too, reject Vertzberger's distinction between real risk and perceived risk. I do this for three reasons. The first concerns the problem of outcome contamination. The term real risk denotes the estimates of costs, benefits, and probabilities that a fully informed neutral observer would make. This approach, however, invariably leads one to code the riskiness of options based on international outcomes. The theory-driven researcher, who presumably has full knowledge of how history actually unfolded, may fall prey to coding particular options that resulted in disasters as "risk acceptant" and those that resulted in success as "risk averse." See Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, introduction to Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 33-34. The second objection to the real/perceived risk distinction is empirical. Focusing on the perceived risks associated with particular options poses a harder test for my hypothesis.
45. See Boettcher, "Prudence or Peril," 10-12. Vertzberger, on the other hand, draws a distinction between real risk, perceived risk, and acceptable risk. In his "sociocognitive" framework, risk acceptance occurs when perceived risk is ≤ acceptable risk, while risk aversion occurs when perceived risk > acceptable risk. See Vertzberger, "Reconceptualizing Risk," 355-56, and n. 6. As Boettcher does, I, too, reject Vertzberger's distinction between real risk and perceived risk. I do this for three reasons. The first concerns the problem of outcome contamination. The term real risk denotes the estimates of costs, benefits, and probabilities that a fully informed neutral observer would make. This approach, however, invariably leads one to code the riskiness of options based on international outcomes. The theory-driven researcher, who presumably has full knowledge of how history actually unfolded, may fall prey to coding particular options that resulted in disasters as "risk acceptant" and those that resulted in success as "risk averse." See Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, introduction to Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 33-34. The second objection to the real/perceived risk distinction is empirical. Focusing on the perceived risks associated with particular options poses a harder test for my hypothesis.
46. See Boettcher, "Prudence or Peril," 10-12. Vertzberger, on the other hand, draws a distinction between real risk, perceived risk, and acceptable risk. In his "sociocognitive" framework, risk acceptance occurs when perceived risk is ≤ acceptable risk, while risk aversion occurs when perceived risk > acceptable risk. See Vertzberger, "Reconceptualizing Risk," 355-56, and n. 6. As Boettcher does, I, too, reject Vertzberger's distinction between real risk and perceived risk. I do this for three reasons. The first concerns the problem of outcome contamination. The term real risk denotes the estimates of costs, benefits, and probabilities that a fully informed neutral observer would make. This approach, however, invariably leads one to code the riskiness of options based on international outcomes. The theory-driven researcher, who presumably has full knowledge of how history actually unfolded, may fall prey to coding particular options that resulted in disasters as "risk acceptant" and those that resulted in success as "risk averse." See Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, introduction to Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 33-34. The second objection to the real/perceived risk distinction is empirical. Focusing on the perceived risks associated with particular options poses a harder test for my hypothesis.
47. Whereas others draw a distinction between the "periphery" and "core" based solely on geographic distance, I have tried to incorporate the relative distribution of capabilities into the definition. A region is "peripheral" vis-à-vis a great power based on a combination of: (1) its geographical distance from the core, and (2) the inability of the peripheral state (or other political actors in the area) to inflict damage on the great power's homeland. This is not to say that control of a peripheral region cannot enhance a state's power. The Philippines, for example, constituted a periphery for the United States, both because of the islands' geographic distance from the mainland and the tremendous imbalance of relative capabilities. The occupation of the Philippines (1898-1946) and four decades of American military presence after independence, however, enhanced the United States' relative capabilities. Specifically it allowed the United States to project naval power in the Pacific. One could make a similar argument about British rule in India. Some may, nonetheless, disagree with my classification of the China Incident or second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) as a peripheral war. In the case of prewar Japan, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the core and the periphery. I classify the Japanese home islands (including the northern territories) and possibly Korea as the core. China (including its five northern provinces and Manchuria), however, was arguably part of Japan's periphery. During the 1920s and 1930s, China lacked the military and economic capabilities to threaten the security of the Japanese islands. Nonetheless, control of China's economic resources would have enhanced Japan's relative capabilities. See Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 313-14 n. 62. On the inverse relationship between power and distance, see Kenneth A. Boulding, Conflit and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 229-30, 245-47.
48. Whereas others draw a distinction between the "periphery" and "core" based solely on geographic distance, I have tried to incorporate the relative distribution of capabilities into the definition. A region is "peripheral" vis-à-vis a great power based on a combination of: (1) its geographical distance from the core, and (2) the inability of the peripheral state (or other political actors in the area) to inflict damage on the great power's homeland. This is not to say that control of a peripheral region cannot enhance a state's power. The Philippines, for example, constituted a periphery for the United States, both because of the islands' geographic distance from the mainland and the tremendous imbalance of relative capabilities. The occupation of the Philippines (1898-1946) and four decades of American military presence after independence, however, enhanced the United States' relative capabilities. Specifically it allowed the United States to project naval power in the Pacific. One could make a similar argument about British rule in India. Some may, nonetheless, disagree with my classification of the China Incident or second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) as a peripheral war. In the case of prewar Japan, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the core and the periphery. I classify the Japanese home islands (including the northern territories) and possibly Korea as the core. China (including its five northern provinces and Manchuria), however, was arguably part of Japan's periphery. During the 1920s and 1930s, China lacked the military and economic capabilities to threaten the security of the Japanese islands. Nonetheless, control of China's economic resources would have enhanced Japan's relative capabilities. See Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 313-14 n. 62. On the inverse relationship between power and distance, see Kenneth A. Boulding, Conflit and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 229-30, 245-47.
49. For a distinction between theories of foreign policy and theories of international politics see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 8-128; and, more recently, Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" Security Studies 6, no. 2 (autumn 1996): 5-53.
50. For a distinction between theories of foreign policy and theories of international politics see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 8-128; and, more recently, Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" Security Studies 6, no. 2 (autumn 1996): 5-53.
51. See George Quattrone and Amos Tversky, "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analysis of Political Choice," American Political Science Review 82, no. 3 (September 1988): 719-36; Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic, and Daniel Kahneman, "The Causes of Preference Reversal," American Economic Review 80, no. 1 (March 1990): 204-24.
52. See George Quattrone and Amos Tversky, "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analysis of Political Choice," American Political Science Review 82, no. 3 (September 1988): 719-36; Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic, and Daniel Kahneman, "The Causes of Preference Reversal," American Economic Review 80, no. 1 (March 1990): 204-24.
53. Decisionmakers can also frame options around an aspiration level that does not reflect the status quo. See Sandra L. Schneider, "Framing and Conflict: Aspiration Level Contingency, the Status Quo, and Current Theories of Risky Choice," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 18, no. 5 (September 1992): 1040-57. When an earlier status or prior outcome is preferable to the status quo, the decisionmaker will generally adopt the status quo ante as a reference point. See Robin Gregory, Sarah Litchenstein, and Donald Mc Gregor, "The Role of Past States in Determining Reference Points," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 55, no. 3 (June 1993): 1905-206.
54. Decisionmakers can also frame options around an aspiration level that does not reflect the status quo. See Sandra L. Schneider, "Framing and Conflict: Aspiration Level Contingency, the Status Quo, and Current Theories of Risky Choice," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 18, no. 5 (September 1992): 1040-57. When an earlier status or prior outcome is preferable to the status quo, the decisionmaker will generally adopt the status quo ante as a reference point. See Robin Gregory, Sarah Litchenstein, and Donald Mc Gregor, "The Role of Past States in Determining Reference Points," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 55, no. 3 (June 1993): 1905-206.
55. The pain of losing $1000, for example, exceeds the pleasure of unexpectedly finding $1000. In simple gambles or lotteries, individuals rarely accept symmetric gambles that involve a 50 percent probability of winning x and a 50 percent probability of losing x. See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference Dependent Model," Quarterly Journal of Economics 41, no. 4 (November 1991): 1039-69.
56. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sara Lichtenstein, "Response Mode, Framing, and Information-Processing Effects in Risk Assessment," in Question Framing and Response Consistency, no. 11, New Directions for the Methodology of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, ed. Robin M. Hogarth (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1982), 24-25.
57. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," in Question Framing and Response Consistency, 8.
58. See Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems," in Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks, 119-59.
59. Eldar Shafir, "Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psychological Perspective," in Avoiding Lossts/Taking Risks, 147-58, at 149.
60. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations," 34.
61. The extrapolation from laboratory studies to "real world" political phenomena raises interesting epistemological questions that are best addressed elsewhere.
62. Herbert Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: The Question of Relevance," in Kelman, International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rienhart and Winston, 1966), 597-98.
63. See, for example, William J. Qualls, "Organizational Climate and Decision Framing: An Integrated Approach to Analyzing Industrial Buying Decisions," Journal of Marketing Research 26, no. 2 (May 1989): 179-92; and Howard Garland, "Throwing Good Money After Bad: The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Decision to Escalate Commitment to an Ongoing Project," Journal of Applied Psycholoy 75, no. 6 (December 1990): 728-31.
64. See, for example, William J. Qualls, "Organizational Climate and Decision Framing: An Integrated Approach to Analyzing Industrial Buying Decisions," Journal of Marketing Research 26, no. 2 (May 1989): 179-92; and Howard Garland, "Throwing Good Money After Bad: The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Decision to Escalate Commitment to an Ongoing Project," Journal of Applied Psycholoy 75, no. 6 (December 1990): 728-31.
65. Sunk costs are any costs that decisionmakers have incurred in the past which cannot be changed by any current or future action. Jervis, "The Political Implications of Loss Aversion," 26-27.
66. Glen Whyte, "Escalating Commitment," 311-21; Also see David V. Budescu and Wendy Weiss, "Reflection of Transitive and Intransitive Preferences: A Test of Prospect Theory," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39, no. 2 (April 1987): 184-202.
67. Glen Whyte, "Escalating Commitment," 311-21; Also see David V. Budescu and Wendy Weiss, "Reflection of Transitive and Intransitive Preferences: A Test of Prospect Theory," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39, no. 2 (April 1987): 184-202.
68. Tatsuya Kameda and James H. Davis, "The Function of the Reference Point in Individual and Group Risk Taking," Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 46, no. 1 (June 1990): 55-76.; and Sandra J. Hartman and Beverly H. Nelson, "Group Decision Making in the Negative Domain," Group and Organization Management 21, no. 2 (June 1996): 146-62.
69. Tatsuya Kameda and James H. Davis, "The Function of the Reference Point in Individual and Group Risk Taking," Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 46, no. 1 (June 1990): 55-76.; and Sandra J. Hartman and Beverly H. Nelson, "Group Decision Making in the Negative Domain," Group and Organization Management 21, no. 2 (June 1996): 146-62.
70. Max H. Bazerman, "Escalation of Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 33, no. 2 (April 1984): 141-52. Also see John Shaubroeck and Elaine Davis, "Prospect Theory Predictions When Escalation is Not the Only Chance to Recover Sunk Costs," Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 57, no. 1 (January 1994): 59-82.
71. Max H. Bazerman, "Escalation of Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 33, no. 2 (April 1984): 141-52. Also see John Shaubroeck and Elaine Davis, "Prospect Theory Predictions When Escalation is Not the Only Chance to Recover Sunk Costs," Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 57, no. 1 (January 1994): 59-82.
72. Whyte, "Escalating Commitment," and Hal R. Arkes and Catherine Blumer, "The Psychology of Sunk Costs," Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 35, no. 1 (February 1985): 124-40.
73. Whyte, "Escalating Commitment," and Hal R. Arkes and Catherine Blumer, "The Psychology of Sunk Costs," Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 35, no. 1 (February 1985): 124-40.
74. Rutledge, "Escalation of Commitment in Groups," 17-23; Devine and O'Clock, "The Effects of Sunk Costs," 28; D. E. Caldwell and C. A. O'Really, "Responses to Failure: The Effects of Choice and Responsibility on Impression Management," Academy of Management 25, no. 1 (March 1982): 121-36.
75. Rutledge, "Escalation of Commitment in Groups," 17-23; Devine and O'Clock, "The Effects of Sunk Costs," 28; D. E. Caldwell and C. A. O'Really, "Responses to Failure: The Effects of Choice and Responsibility on Impression Management," Academy of Management 25, no. 1 (March 1982): 121-36.
76. Rutledge, "Escalation of Commitment in Groups," 17-23; Devine and O'Clock, "The Effects of Sunk Costs," 28; D. E. Caldwell and C. A. O'Really, "Responses to Failure: The Effects of Choice and Responsibility on Impression Management," Academy of Management 25, no. 1 (March 1982): 121-36.
77. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Choices, Values and Frames," American Psychology 39, no. 2 (April 1984): 341-50.
78. David G. Myers and Helmut Lamm, "The Group Polarization Phenomena," Psychological Bulletin 83, no. 4 (July 1976): 602-27; David G. Myers and Paul J. Bach, "Discussion Effects on Militarism-Pacifism: A Test of the Group Polarization Hypothesis," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30, no. 6 (December 1974): 741-47; Marilynn B. Brewer and Roderick M. Kramer, "Choice Behavior in Social Dilemmas: Effects of Social Identity, Group Size, and Decision Framing," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50, no. 3 (March 1986): 543-49.
79. David G. Myers and Helmut Lamm, "The Group Polarization Phenomena," Psychological Bulletin 83, no. 4 (July 1976): 602-27; David G. Myers and Paul J. Bach, "Discussion Effects on Militarism-Pacifism: A Test of the Group Polarization Hypothesis," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30, no. 6 (December 1974): 741-47; Marilynn B. Brewer and Roderick M. Kramer, "Choice Behavior in Social Dilemmas: Effects of Social Identity, Group Size, and Decision Framing," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50, no. 3 (March 1986): 543-49.
80. David G. Myers and Helmut Lamm, "The Group Polarization Phenomena," Psychological Bulletin 83, no. 4 (July 1976): 602-27; David G. Myers and Paul J. Bach, "Discussion Effects on Militarism-Pacifism: A Test of the Group Polarization Hypothesis," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30, no. 6 (December 1974): 741-47; Marilynn B. Brewer and Roderick M. Kramer, "Choice Behavior in Social Dilemmas: Effects of Social Identity, Group Size, and Decision Framing," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50, no. 3 (March 1986): 543-49.
81. See Philip E. Tetlock, et al., "Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63, no. 3 (March 1992): 403-25; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982); Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981); E. M. Fodor and T. Smith, "The Power Motive as an Influence in Group Decision Making," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42, no. 1 (January 1982): 178-85; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder Westview, 1980); Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interests: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," World Politics 43, no. 1 (October 1990): 73-110.
82. See Philip E. Tetlock, et al., "Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63, no. 3 (March 1992): 403-25; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982); Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981); E. M. Fodor and T. Smith, "The Power Motive as an Influence in Group Decision Making," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42, no. 1 (January 1982): 178-85; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder Westview, 1980); Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interests: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," World Politics 43, no. 1 (October 1990): 73-110.
83. See Philip E. Tetlock, et al., "Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63, no. 3 (March 1992): 403-25; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982); Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981); E. M. Fodor and T. Smith, "The Power Motive as an Influence in Group Decision Making," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42, no. 1 (January 1982): 178-85; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder Westview, 1980); Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interests: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," World Politics 43, no. 1 (October 1990): 73-110.
84. See Philip E. Tetlock, et al., "Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63, no. 3 (March 1992): 403-25; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982); Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981); E. M. Fodor and T. Smith, "The Power Motive as an Influence in Group Decision Making," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42, no. 1 (January 1982): 178-85; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder Westview, 1980); Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interests: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," World Politics 43, no. 1 (October 1990): 73-110.
85. See Philip E. Tetlock, et al., "Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63, no. 3 (March 1992): 403-25; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982); Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981); E. M. Fodor and T. Smith, "The Power Motive as an Influence in Group Decision Making," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42, no. 1 (January 1982): 178-85; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder Westview, 1980); Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interests: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," World Politics 43, no. 1 (October 1990): 73-110.
86. See Philip E. Tetlock, et al., "Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63, no. 3 (March 1992): 403-25; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982); Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981); E. M. Fodor and T. Smith, "The Power Motive as an Influence in Group Decision Making," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42, no. 1 (January 1982): 178-85; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder Westview, 1980); Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interests: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," World Politics 43, no. 1 (October 1990): 73-110.
87. Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Study and Theories of Organization Decisionmaking," in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 36.
88. See Chaim D. Kaufmann, "Out Of The Lab And Into The Archives: A Method For Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 4 (December 1994): 557-86.
89. Scott D. Sagan develops this argument in "The Origins of the Pacific War," in Origins and Prevention of Major Wars, 323-52; and earlier in "Deterrence and Decision: A Historical Critique of Modern Deterrence Theory" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1983).
90. Scott D. Sagan develops this argument in "The Origins of the Pacific War," in Origins and Prevention of Major Wars, 323-52; and earlier in "Deterrence and Decision: A Historical Critique of Modern Deterrence Theory" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1983).
91. Several readers may ask whether domestic politics theories explain Japan's 1940-41 war decisions. Space constraints prevent me from fully addressing these arguments in the text. Briefly, there are two variants of the domestic politics argument. First, competition for scarce resources and budget-share led the Imperial army and navy to each base their force requirements on particularly ambitious missions. In order to secure its material needs, however, each service needed the tacit approval of the other. This produced a log-rolling dynamic in which the military establishment pursued a series of overly ambitious policies that neither the army nor the navy independently desired. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 112-52; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). The second variant of the domestic politics argument centers on national leaders' calculations about their own careers. Various nationalist cliques of mid-level army officers, the zaibatsu, and segments of the public all supported an expansionist foreign policy. By scaling back their war aims in China or making concessions to the Americans, Japanese leaders would risk their continued tenure in office or even the stability of the entire political system. At best, Japan's expansionist policies would be discredited in the eyes of the public and the opposition parties. At worst, concessions may have prompted a repeat of the 26 February 1936 incident an abortive coup in which right-wing junior officers succeeded in overturning civilian authority and murdering the emperor's grand chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, ex-prime minister and lord privy seal Saito Makoto and several other officials. See Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, 1930-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, tr. Fank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978). In my dissertation I address these two domestic politics hypotheses in greater detail. See Taliaferro, "Cognitive Realism: Loss Aversion and the Psychology of Risk-Taking in Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1996). I am not persuaded that either domestic politics hypothesis explains the 1940-41 war decisions. First, the interservice log-rolling explanation begs the question: why would either military service ultimately prefer a self-destructive war to sacrificing some of its institutional influence and resources? Such behavior is anomalous from the standpoint of collective action theory and organization theory. See Kupchan, Myths of Empire, 355. Second, none of the proponents of the second argument has been able to make the direct causal link between domestic considerations and the policies the leadership adopted. References to the possibility of a coup or the loss of office through legitimate means are largely absent from leaders' private statements and deliberations in 1940-41. Third, the 26 February 1936 coup "succeeded" (to the extent it did) largely because the plotters had the tacit support of senior army leaders. There is little evidence to suggest that senior army leaders would have supported such a coup in 1940-41. Furthermore, most of the senior army leaders who tacitly supported the 1936 coup had been relieved of their duties by 1937.
92. Several readers may ask whether domestic politics theories explain Japan's 1940-41 war decisions. Space constraints prevent me from fully addressing these arguments in the text. Briefly, there are two variants of the domestic politics argument. First, competition for scarce resources and budget-share led the Imperial army and navy to each base their force requirements on particularly ambitious missions. In order to secure its material needs, however, each service needed the tacit approval of the other. This produced a log-rolling dynamic in which the military establishment pursued a series of overly ambitious policies that neither the army nor the navy independently desired. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 112-52; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). The second variant of the domestic politics argument centers on national leaders' calculations about their own careers. Various nationalist cliques of mid-level army officers, the zaibatsu, and segments of the public all supported an expansionist foreign policy. By scaling back their war aims in China or making concessions to the Americans, Japanese leaders would risk their continued tenure in office or even the stability of the entire political system. At best, Japan's expansionist policies would be discredited in the eyes of the public and the opposition parties. At worst, concessions may have prompted a repeat of the 26 February 1936 incident an abortive coup in which right-wing junior officers succeeded in overturning civilian authority and murdering the emperor's grand chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, ex-prime minister and lord privy seal Saito Makoto and several other officials. See Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, 1930-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, tr. Fank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978). In my dissertation I address these two domestic politics hypotheses in greater detail. See Taliaferro, "Cognitive Realism: Loss Aversion and the Psychology of Risk-Taking in Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1996). I am not persuaded that either domestic politics hypothesis explains the 1940-41 war decisions. First, the interservice log-rolling explanation begs the question: why would either military service ultimately prefer a self-destructive war to sacrificing some of its institutional influence and resources? Such behavior is anomalous from the standpoint of collective action theory and organization theory. See Kupchan, Myths of Empire, 355. Second, none of the proponents of the second argument has been able to make the direct causal link between domestic considerations and the policies the leadership adopted. References to the possibility of a coup or the loss of office through legitimate means are largely absent from leaders' private statements and deliberations in 1940-41. Third, the 26 February 1936 coup "succeeded" (to the extent it did) largely because the plotters had the tacit support of senior army leaders. There is little evidence to suggest that senior army leaders would have supported such a coup in 1940-41. Furthermore, most of the senior army leaders who tacitly supported the 1936 coup had been relieved of their duties by 1937.
93. Several readers may ask whether domestic politics theories explain Japan's 1940-41 war decisions. Space constraints prevent me from fully addressing these arguments in the text. Briefly, there are two variants of the domestic politics argument. First, competition for scarce resources and budget-share led the Imperial army and navy to each base their force requirements on particularly ambitious missions. In order to secure its material needs, however, each service needed the tacit approval of the other. This produced a log-rolling dynamic in which the military establishment pursued a series of overly ambitious policies that neither the army nor the navy independently desired. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 112-52; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). The second variant of the domestic politics argument centers on national leaders' calculations about their own careers. Various nationalist cliques of mid-level army officers, the zaibatsu, and segments of the public all supported an expansionist foreign policy. By scaling back their war aims in China or making concessions to the Americans, Japanese leaders would risk their continued tenure in office or even the stability of the entire political system. At best, Japan's expansionist policies would be discredited in the eyes of the public and the opposition parties. At worst, concessions may have prompted a repeat of the 26 February 1936 incident an abortive coup in which right-wing junior officers succeeded in overturning civilian authority and murdering the emperor's grand chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, ex-prime minister and lord privy seal Saito Makoto and several other officials. See Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, 1930-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, tr. Fank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978). In my dissertation I address these two domestic politics hypotheses in greater detail. See Taliaferro, "Cognitive Realism: Loss Aversion and the Psychology of Risk-Taking in Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1996). I am not persuaded that either domestic politics hypothesis explains the 1940-41 war decisions. First, the interservice log-rolling explanation begs the question: why would either military service ultimately prefer a self-destructive war to sacrificing some of its institutional influence and resources? Such behavior is anomalous from the standpoint of collective action theory and organization theory. See Kupchan, Myths of Empire, 355. Second, none of the proponents of the second argument has been able to make the direct causal link between domestic considerations and the policies the leadership adopted. References to the possibility of a coup or the loss of office through legitimate means are largely absent from leaders' private statements and deliberations in 1940-41. Third, the 26 February 1936 coup "succeeded" (to the extent it did) largely because the plotters had the tacit support of senior army leaders. There is little evidence to suggest that senior army leaders would have supported such a coup in 1940-41. Furthermore, most of the senior army leaders who tacitly supported the 1936 coup had been relieved of their duties by 1937.
94. Several readers may ask whether domestic politics theories explain Japan's 1940-41 war decisions. Space constraints prevent me from fully addressing these arguments in the text. Briefly, there are two variants of the domestic politics argument. First, competition for scarce resources and budget-share led the Imperial army and navy to each base their force requirements on particularly ambitious missions. In order to secure its material needs, however, each service needed the tacit approval of the other. This produced a log-rolling dynamic in which the military establishment pursued a series of overly ambitious policies that neither the army nor the navy independently desired. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 112-52; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). The second variant of the domestic politics argument centers on national leaders' calculations about their own careers. Various nationalist cliques of mid-level army officers, the zaibatsu, and segments of the public all supported an expansionist foreign policy. By scaling back their war aims in China or making concessions to the Americans, Japanese leaders would risk their continued tenure in office or even the stability of the entire political system. At best, Japan's expansionist policies would be discredited in the eyes of the public and the opposition parties. At worst, concessions may have prompted a repeat of the 26 February 1936 incident an abortive coup in which right-wing junior officers succeeded in overturning civilian authority and murdering the emperor's grand chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, ex-prime minister and lord privy seal Saito Makoto and several other officials. See Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, 1930-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, tr. Fank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978). In my dissertation I address these two domestic politics hypotheses in greater detail. See Taliaferro, "Cognitive Realism: Loss Aversion and the Psychology of Risk-Taking in Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1996). I am not persuaded that either domestic politics hypothesis explains the 1940-41 war decisions. First, the interservice log-rolling explanation begs the question: why would either military service ultimately prefer a self-destructive war to sacrificing some of its institutional influence and resources? Such behavior is anomalous from the standpoint of collective action theory and organization theory. See Kupchan, Myths of Empire, 355. Second, none of the proponents of the second argument has been able to make the direct causal link between domestic considerations and the policies the leadership adopted. References to the possibility of a coup or the loss of office through legitimate means are largely absent from leaders' private statements and deliberations in 1940-41. Third, the 26 February 1936 coup "succeeded" (to the extent it did) largely because the plotters had the tacit support of senior army leaders. There is little evidence to suggest that senior army leaders would have supported such a coup in 1940-41. Furthermore, most of the senior army leaders who tacitly supported the 1936 coup had been relieved of their duties by 1937.
95. Several readers may ask whether domestic politics theories explain Japan's 1940-41 war decisions. Space constraints prevent me from fully addressing these arguments in the text. Briefly, there are two variants of the domestic politics argument. First, competition for scarce resources and budget-share led the Imperial army and navy to each base their force requirements on particularly ambitious missions. In order to secure its material needs, however, each service needed the tacit approval of the other. This produced a log-rolling dynamic in which the military establishment pursued a series of overly ambitious policies that neither the army nor the navy independently desired. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 112-52; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). The second variant of the domestic politics argument centers on national leaders' calculations about their own careers. Various nationalist cliques of mid-level army officers, the zaibatsu, and segments of the public all supported an expansionist foreign policy. By scaling back their war aims in China or making concessions to the Americans, Japanese leaders would risk their continued tenure in office or even the stability of the entire political system. At best, Japan's expansionist policies would be discredited in the eyes of the public and the opposition parties. At worst, concessions may have prompted a repeat of the 26 February 1936 incident an abortive coup in which right-wing junior officers succeeded in overturning civilian authority and murdering the emperor's grand chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, ex-prime minister and lord privy seal Saito Makoto and several other officials. See Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, 1930-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, tr. Fank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978). In my dissertation I address these two domestic politics hypotheses in greater detail. See Taliaferro, "Cognitive Realism: Loss Aversion and the Psychology of Risk-Taking in Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1996). I am not persuaded that either domestic politics hypothesis explains the 1940-41 war decisions. First, the interservice log-rolling explanation begs the question: why would either military service ultimately prefer a self-destructive war to sacrificing some of its institutional influence and resources? Such behavior is anomalous from the standpoint of collective action theory and organization theory. See Kupchan, Myths of Empire, 355. Second, none of the proponents of the second argument has been able to make the direct causal link between domestic considerations and the policies the leadership adopted. References to the possibility of a coup or the loss of office through legitimate means are largely absent from leaders' private statements and deliberations in 1940-41. Third, the 26 February 1936 coup "succeeded" (to the extent it did) largely because the plotters had the tacit support of senior army leaders. There is little evidence to suggest that senior army leaders would have supported such a coup in 1940-41. Furthermore, most of the senior army leaders who tacitly supported the 1936 coup had been relieved of their duties by 1937.
96. Several readers may ask whether domestic politics theories explain Japan's 1940-41 war decisions. Space constraints prevent me from fully addressing these arguments in the text. Briefly, there are two variants of the domestic politics argument. First, competition for scarce resources and budget-share led the Imperial army and navy to each base their force requirements on particularly ambitious missions. In order to secure its material needs, however, each service needed the tacit approval of the other. This produced a log-rolling dynamic in which the military establishment pursued a series of overly ambitious policies that neither the army nor the navy independently desired. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 112-52; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). The second variant of the domestic politics argument centers on national leaders' calculations about their own careers. Various nationalist cliques of mid-level army officers, the zaibatsu, and segments of the public all supported an expansionist foreign policy. By scaling back their war aims in China or making concessions to the Americans, Japanese leaders would risk their continued tenure in office or even the stability of the entire political system. At best, Japan's expansionist policies would be discredited in the eyes of the public and the opposition parties. At worst, concessions may have prompted a repeat of the 26 February 1936 incident an abortive coup in which right-wing junior officers succeeded in overturning civilian authority and murdering the emperor's grand chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, ex-prime minister and lord privy seal Saito Makoto and several other officials. See Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, 1930-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, tr. Fank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978). In my dissertation I address these two domestic politics hypotheses in greater detail. See Taliaferro, "Cognitive Realism: Loss Aversion and the Psychology of Risk-Taking in Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1996). I am not persuaded that either domestic politics hypothesis explains the 1940-41 war decisions. First, the interservice log-rolling explanation begs the question: why would either military service ultimately prefer a self-destructive war to sacrificing some of its institutional influence and resources? Such behavior is anomalous from the standpoint of collective action theory and organization theory. See Kupchan, Myths of Empire, 355. Second, none of the proponents of the second argument has been able to make the direct causal link between domestic considerations and the policies the leadership adopted. References to the possibility of a coup or the loss of office through legitimate means are largely absent from leaders' private statements and deliberations in 1940-41. Third, the 26 February 1936 coup "succeeded" (to the extent it did) largely because the plotters had the tacit support of senior army leaders. There is little evidence to suggest that senior army leaders would have supported such a coup in 1940-41. Furthermore, most of the senior army leaders who tacitly supported the 1936 coup had been relieved of their duties by 1937.
97. Several readers may ask whether domestic politics theories explain Japan's 1940-41 war decisions. Space constraints prevent me from fully addressing these arguments in the text. Briefly, there are two variants of the domestic politics argument. First, competition for scarce resources and budget-share led the Imperial army and navy to each base their force requirements on particularly ambitious missions. In order to secure its material needs, however, each service needed the tacit approval of the other. This produced a log-rolling dynamic in which the military establishment pursued a series of overly ambitious policies that neither the army nor the navy independently desired. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 112-52; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). The second variant of the domestic politics argument centers on national leaders' calculations about their own careers. Various nationalist cliques of mid-level army officers, the zaibatsu, and segments of the public all supported an expansionist foreign policy. By scaling back their war aims in China or making concessions to the Americans, Japanese leaders would risk their continued tenure in office or even the stability of the entire political system. At best, Japan's expansionist policies would be discredited in the eyes of the public and the opposition parties. At worst, concessions may have prompted a repeat of the 26 February 1936 incident an abortive coup in which right-wing junior officers succeeded in overturning civilian authority and murdering the emperor's grand chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, ex-prime minister and lord privy seal Saito Makoto and several other officials. See Yale C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study in Civil-Military Relations, 1930-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, tr. Fank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978). In my dissertation I address these two domestic politics hypotheses in greater detail. See Taliaferro, "Cognitive Realism: Loss Aversion and the Psychology of Risk-Taking in Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1996). I am not persuaded that either domestic politics hypothesis explains the 1940-41 war decisions. First, the interservice log-rolling explanation begs the question: why would either military service ultimately prefer a self-destructive war to sacrificing some of its institutional influence and resources? Such behavior is anomalous from the standpoint of collective action theory and organization theory. See Kupchan, Myths of Empire, 355. Second, none of the proponents of the second argument has been able to make the direct causal link between domestic considerations and the policies the leadership adopted. References to the possibility of a coup or the loss of office through legitimate means are largely absent from leaders' private statements and deliberations in 1940-41. Third, the 26 February 1936 coup "succeeded" (to the extent it did) largely because the plotters had the tacit support of senior army leaders. There is little evidence to suggest that senior army leaders would have supported such a coup in 1940-41. Furthermore, most of the senior army leaders who tacitly supported the 1936 coup had been relieved of their duties by 1937.
98. On the origins of "total war" planning within the Imperial Army see Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, 22-49.
99. See Seki Hiroharu, "The Manchurian Incident, 1931," in Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932, ed. James William Morely (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 143-70. For an analysis of the "north China autonomy" movement see Shimada Toshikiko, "Designs on North China," in The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933-1941, ed. James William Morely (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 135-56.
100. See Seki Hiroharu, "The Manchurian Incident, 1931," in Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932, ed. James William Morely (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 143-70. For an analysis of the "north China autonomy" movement see Shimada Toshikiko, "Designs on North China," in The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933-1941, ed. James William Morely (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 135-56.
101. See James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 353. Konoe Fumimaro served three terms as prime minister: 4 June 1937 to 5 January 1939, 22 July 1940 to 18 July 1941, and 18 July to 18 October 1941. General (later Field Marshal) Sugiyama Gen served as war minister from 4 June 1937 to 4 June 1938, and army chief of staff from 3 October 1940 to 21 February 1944. Field Marshal Imperial Prince Kan'in Kotohito, the great uncle of the emperor's wife (Empress Nagako), was army chief of staff from 5 November 1931 to 3 October 1940.
102. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, 91; Also see Hata Ikuhiko, "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident," in Morely, The China Quagmire, 254-68.
103. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, 91; Also see Hata Ikuhiko, "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident," in Morely, The China Quagmire, 254-68.
104. In 1938 the civilian sector's allotment of steel fell from 5 million to 3.5 million tons. The imported fuel quota fell from ¥556 million to ¥510 million. Factories had to reduce their fuel consumption by 37 percent and their shipping by 10 to 15 percent. See Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, 109-10.
105. Usui Katsumi, "The Politics of War," in Morely, The China Quagmire.
106. See Memo by the secretary of state (Cordell Hull), 13 July 1937; The Japanese foreign minister (Hirota Koki) to the American ambassador in Japan (Joseph Grew), 31 August 1937, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 318-21, and 358 (hereafter cited as FRUS: Japan).
107. Ambassador in Japan to the secretary of state, 12 December 1937; Press Release by the Department of State, 28 January 1937; American ambassador in Japan to the Japanese foreign minister (Hirota), 4 February 1938; Japanese foreign minister to the American ambassador in Japan, 12 February 1938, in ibid., 570-73, 578-82.
108. For the actual figures see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1988), chap. 6.
109. The secretary of state to the Japanese ambassador (Horinouchi Kensuke), 26 July 1939, in U.S. Department of State, The Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 558-59 (hereafter cited as FRUS).
110. W. G. Beasley states that the term "Greater East Ask Co-prosperity Sphere," first appeared in a Japanese foreign ministry press release dated 1 August 1940. See Beasley, Japanese Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 227. Since Japanese planning documents (particularly after 1939) used the terms "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" and "New Order in East Asia" interchangeably, I have chosen to use the latter term here.
111. Statement by the Japanese Government, 3 November 1938, U.S. Department of State, FRUS: Japan, vol. 1, 11-12.
112. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, 106.
113. Usui Katsumi, "The Politics of War," 243-435. Also see David J. Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961).
114. Usui Katsumi, "The Politics of War," 243-435. Also see David J. Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Japan's Entry into World War II (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961).
115. Army Military History Group, "China Area Operations Record, July 1937-November 1941," in War in Asia and the Pacific, vol. 8, Center for Military History, Department of the Army and the National Archives, ed. Donald S. Detwiller and Charles B. Burdick (New York and London: Garland, 1980) (hereafter cited as WIAP).
116. Technically Japanese decisionmakers framed options around a level of aspiration (that is, the New Order in East Asia) that did not reflect the status quo. For the sake of simplicity and clarity I use the term "reference point."
117. "General Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation," 27 July 1940, reprinted in Appendix no. 2, "Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War," pt. 2, WIAP, vol. 8, 42-15.
118. For the text of the army proposed draft of "Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation," see Army History Group, "Political Situation Prior to War," pt. 2, WIAP, vol. 2, 14.
119. Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," in The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941, ed. James William Morely (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 248.
120. Army History Group, "Political Situation Prior to War," pt. 2, WIAP, vol. 2, 14.
121. Tsunoda, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," 246.
122. Ibid., 245.
123. Ibid., 246 (emphasis added).
124. Ibid., 245-46.
125. Ibid, 257.
126. On Prince Fushimi's report to his cousin, the emperor Showa (Hirohito), see the entry for 10 August 1940 in Kichio Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931-45, vol. 2 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), 814. As lord keeper of the privy seal, Marquis Kido Kichio was the emperor's principal political advisor and the liaison between the government and the Imperial Household. Recent historiography in both Japan and the West shows that, contrary to popular belief, the emperor (tenno) was not the locus of political power in prewar Japan. Despite the sweeping language of the 1889 Meiji Constitution, the throne actually had little independent political or military authority. The emperor presided over a complex web of political institutions (the genro, cabinet, Imperial Diet, Privy Council, army and naval general staffs) with little ability to either make policy or veto policies undertaken in his name. His primary function in the political system was to legitimate decisions already made by the cabinet, the Privy Council and the military leadership. See Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 15 and 96-124; Masatka Kosaka, "The Showa Era (1926-1989)," in Showa: The Japan of Hirohito ed. Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard (New York: Norton, 1992), 27-49; Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
127. On Prince Fushimi's report to his cousin, the emperor Showa (Hirohito), see the entry for 10 August 1940 in Kichio Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931-45, vol. 2 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), 814. As lord keeper of the privy seal, Marquis Kido Kichio was the emperor's principal political advisor and the liaison between the government and the Imperial Household. Recent historiography in both Japan and the West shows that, contrary to popular belief, the emperor (tenno) was not the locus of political power in prewar Japan. Despite the sweeping language of the 1889 Meiji Constitution, the throne actually had little independent political or military authority. The emperor presided over a complex web of political institutions (the genro, cabinet, Imperial Diet, Privy Council, army and naval general staffs) with little ability to either make policy or veto policies undertaken in his name. His primary function in the political system was to legitimate decisions already made by the cabinet, the Privy Council and the military leadership. See Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 15 and 96-124; Masatka Kosaka, "The Showa Era (1926-1989)," in Showa: The Japan of Hirohito ed. Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard (New York: Norton, 1992), 27-49; Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
128. On Prince Fushimi's report to his cousin, the emperor Showa (Hirohito), see the entry for 10 August 1940 in Kichio Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931-45, vol. 2 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), 814. As lord keeper of the privy seal, Marquis Kido Kichio was the emperor's principal political advisor and the liaison between the government and the Imperial Household. Recent historiography in both Japan and the West shows that, contrary to popular belief, the emperor (tenno) was not the locus of political power in prewar Japan. Despite the sweeping language of the 1889 Meiji Constitution, the throne actually had little independent political or military authority. The emperor presided over a complex web of political institutions (the genro, cabinet, Imperial Diet, Privy Council, army and naval general staffs) with little ability to either make policy or veto policies undertaken in his name. His primary function in the political system was to legitimate decisions already made by the cabinet, the Privy Council and the military leadership. See Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 15 and 96-124; Masatka Kosaka, "The Showa Era (1926-1989)," in Showa: The Japan of Hirohito ed. Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard (New York: Norton, 1992), 27-49; Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
129. On Prince Fushimi's report to his cousin, the emperor Showa (Hirohito), see the entry for 10 August 1940 in Kichio Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931-45, vol. 2 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), 814. As lord keeper of the privy seal, Marquis Kido Kichio was the emperor's principal political advisor and the liaison between the government and the Imperial Household. Recent historiography in both Japan and the West shows that, contrary to popular belief, the emperor (tenno) was not the locus of political power in prewar Japan. Despite the sweeping language of the 1889 Meiji Constitution, the throne actually had little independent political or military authority. The emperor presided over a complex web of political institutions (the genro, cabinet, Imperial Diet, Privy Council, army and naval general staffs) with little ability to either make policy or veto policies undertaken in his name. His primary function in the political system was to legitimate decisions already made by the cabinet, the Privy Council and the military leadership. See Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 15 and 96-124; Masatka Kosaka, "The Showa Era (1926-1989)," in Showa: The Japan of Hirohito ed. Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard (New York: Norton, 1992), 27-49; Ben-Ami Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
130. "Press Release by the White House," 31 July 1939; "Japanese Embassy to the Department of State," 3 August 1939 FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 218-20; See also Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, 149.
131. "Press Release by the White House," 31 July 1939; "Japanese Embassy to the Department of State," 3 August 1939 FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 218-20; See also Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, 149.
132. See the minutes of the Imperial conference, 19 September 1940, in Japan's Decisions for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences, trans. and ed. Nobutaka Ike (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 6-8. Unless otherwise noted, all citations from the liaison and Imperial conference deliberations are from Ike.
133. Quoted in Tsunoda, 256.
134. For the details of these negotiations see Nagaoka Shinjiro, "Economic Demands and the Dutch East Indies," in Merely, Fateful Choice.
135. Statement to the press by the secretary of state, 17 April 1940; diplomatic interviews at the Japanese foreign ministry, May 1940, reprinted in Documents on American Foreign Policy, July 1939-June 1940, ed. S. Shepard Jones and Denys S. Meyers (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1948), 305-6.
136. Secretary of state to the American ambassador in Japan, 30 May 1940; ambassador in Japan to the secretary of state, 3 June 1940, in FRUS, 1940, vol. 4,334-42. Also see Robert J. Quinlin, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy and the Allocation of Ships (1940-1941)," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963), 158.
137. Secretary of state to the American ambassador in Japan, 30 May 1940; ambassador in Japan to the secretary of state, 3 June 1940, in FRUS, 1940, vol. 4,334-42. Also see Robert J. Quinlin, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy and the Allocation of Ships (1940-1941)," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963), 158.
138. Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact, 1939-1940," in Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935-1940, ed. James William Morely (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 208-9.
139. Hata Ikuhiko, "The Army's Move into Northern Indochina," in Morely The Fateful Choice, 155-208.
140. See "Appendix 2: The Matsouka-Henry [sic] Pact, 30 August 1940," ibid., 301-2.
141. Statements by the ambassador in Japan to the Japanese foreign minister, 19 September 1940; secretary of state to the ambassador in Japan, 19 September 1940, in FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 295-97.
142. Army History Group, "Political Situation Prior to War," pt. 2, WIAP, vol. 2, 14; Also see Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 152-53.
143. Army History Group, "Political Situation Prior to War," pt. 2, WIAP, vol. 2, 14; Also see Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 152-53.
144. Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact," 191-212.
145. Statement by Konoe to the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council, 26 September 1940, in "Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of the War," pt. 2, WIAP, vol. 2, 25.
146. Imperial conference, 19 September 1940, 12-13. Also see Tojo's affidavit in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Court Papers, Exhibits, Interrogations, Trial Transcripts and Judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 1946-1948 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), S 342: 15; T 36194-95 (hereafter cited as IMTFE).
147. Liaison conference, 14 September 1940, quoted in Hosoya, "The Tripartite Pact," 239 (emphasis added).
148. See Appendix no. 5, "Notes on Conference with Admiral T. Takata, former chief of the 1st Section, Naval Affairs Bureau, 17 February 1953"; and "Notes on Conference with Admiral Kondo, former deputy chief of the Naval Staff, 17 February 1953," in "Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War," pt. 2, WIAP, vol. 2.
149. Imperial conference, 19 September 1940, 5.
150. Prince Fushimi's statement to the liaison conference quoted in "Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War," pt. 2, WIAP, vol. 2.
151. Kondo's remarks quoted in "Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War," pt. 2 in WIAP, vol. 2.
152. On Yoshida's opposition to the Tripartite Pact see Tsunoda, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," in Morely, The Fateful Choice, 263-65; Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, 167.
153. On Yoshida's opposition to the Tripartite Pact see Tsunoda, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," in Morely, The Fateful Choice, 263-65; Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, 167.
154. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, 195-96.
155. Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967), 201-10.
156. See Nagaoka Shinjioro, "Economic Demands and the Dutch East Indies," in Morely, Fateful Choice, 125-55.
157. See "Principles for Negotiations with the Dutch East Indies," approved by the Konoe cabinet on 27 August 1940; Quoted in Nagaoka, "Economic Demands and the Dutch East Indies," 143-44.
158. Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), vol. 2, 779-842.
159. "Text of Semi-Official Communication from Foreign Minister Matsouka to Foreign Commissar Molotov," 13 April 1941, in Morely, Fateful Choice, 299-300.
160. American Draft Proposal handed to the Japanese ambassador (Nomura), 31 May 1941, FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 446-54.
161. Nagaoka, "Economic Demands and the Dutch East Indies," in Fateful Choice, 151-53.
162. 29th liaison conference, 11 June 1941.
163. As early as March 1941 Ribbentrop told Matsouka that relations between Berlin and Moscow had so deteriorated that war might break out at any time. See Matsouka-Ribbentrop conference, 27 March 1941, in IMTFE Records, exhibits 578-80; Tsunoda Jun, "Leaning Toward War," in Japan's Raod to the Pacific War: The Final Confrontation, ed. James William Morely, trans. David Titus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 123-24.
164. As early as March 1941 Ribbentrop told Matsouka that relations between Berlin and Moscow had so deteriorated that war might break out at any time. See Matsouka-Ribbentrop conference, 27 March 1941, in IMTFE Records, exhibits 578-80; Tsunoda Jun, "Leaning Toward War," in Japan's Raod to the Pacific War: The Final Confrontation, ed. James William Morely, trans. David Titus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 123-24.
165. 32nd liaison conference, 25 June 1941, 58; also see Matsouka's report to the emperor, 22 June 1941, quoted in Tsunoda, "Leaning Toward War," in The Final Confrontation, 136.
166. 32nd liaison conference, 25 June 1941, 58; also see Matsouka's report to the emperor, 22 June 1941, quoted in Tsunoda, "Leaning Toward War," in The Final Confrontation, 136.
167. 34th liaison conference, 27 June 1941, 66.
168. Imperial conference, 2 July 1941, 88.
169. 34th liaison conference, 27 June 1941, 67.
170. 33rd liaison conference, 26 June 1941, 62.
171. Imperial conference, 2 July 1941, 90; see also Coox, Nomonhan, vol. 2, 1039-40.
172. Imperial conference, 2 July 1941, 90; see also Coox, Nomonhan, vol. 2, 1039-40.
173. 32nd liaison conference, 25 June 1941, 59.
174. Ibid., 59.
175. Statement by Navy Chief of Staff Nagano, Imperial conference, 2 July 1941, 81.
176. Michael A. Barnhart, "Japanese Intelligence Before the Second World War: 'Best Case' Analysis," in Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessments before the Two World Wars, ed. Ernest R. May (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 438-39.
177. The announcement of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (23 August 1939), for example, shocked the Japanese government, IGHQ, the Imperial Diet and public. This led to the fall of the Hiranuma cabinet. See Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation," in Deterrent Diplomacy, ed. Morely, trans. Alvin D. Coox, 177-78.
178. Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, 106.
179. Cited in Tsunoda, "Leaning Toward War," 159.
180. Statement by the acting secretary of state (Sumner Welles), 24 July 1941, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), 71.
181. Quoted in Tsunoda, "Leaning Toward War," 142.
182. Cited in Tsunoda, "Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," 294.
183. Quoted in Tsunoda, "Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," 292.
184. Quoted in Tsunoda, "Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," 254.
185. 37th liaison conference, 1 July 1941, 76-77.
186. Imperial conference, 2 July 1941, 94.
187. Ibid., 94.
188. Ibid, 95.
189. 41st liaison conference, 24 July 1941, 108-9. The resignation of the second Konoe cabinet was an elaborate move to oust Matsouka (who was popular with certain radical cliques in the army) as foreign minister. Upon accepting the cabinet's resignation, the emperor promptly asked outgoing Prime Minister Konoe to form a new government. The following day Konoe submitted the same ministerial list, but with Admiral Toyoda Teijiro as foreign minister. See Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War, 230-33.
190. 41st liaison conference, 24 July 1941, 108-9. The resignation of the second Konoe cabinet was an elaborate move to oust Matsouka (who was popular with certain radical cliques in the army) as foreign minister. Upon accepting the cabinet's resignation, the emperor promptly asked outgoing Prime Minister Konoe to form a new government. The following day Konoe submitted the same ministerial list, but with Admiral Toyoda Teijiro as foreign minister. See Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War, 230-33.
191. 40th liaison conference, 21 July 1941, 106.
192. "The Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies," Imperial conference, 6 September 1941, 135.
193. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14-15 and 23-24. He writes, "Actually the attacker's aim at the conventional level is not merely success but also rapid achievement of objectives on the battlefield. Short conventional wars are more desirable than lengthy ones because the former generally entail lower costs." Although Mearsheimer claims his theory only applies to conventional battlefield operations, the underlying logic of his argument should apply to conventional naval and air warfare as well.
194. 46th liaison conference, 14 August 1941, 120; 49th liaison conference, 30 August 1941, 127.
195. 46th liaison conference, 14 August 1941, 120; 49th liaison conference, 30 August 1941, 127.
196. 40th liaison conference, 21 July 1941, 105.
197. 22nd liaison conference, 8 May 1941, 30.
198. Imperial conference, 6 September 1941, 153.
199. Ibid., 153.
200. Ibid., 148.
201. Ibid., 139 (emphasis added).
202. Memorandum by the ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese foreign minister (Toyoda), 10 October 1941, FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 677. Also see Memorandum by the secretary of state (Hull) to the Japanese ambassador (Nomura), 9 October 1941, ibid., 270.
203. Memorandum by the ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese foreign minister (Toyoda), 10 October 1941, FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 677. Also see Memorandum by the secretary of state (Hull) to the Japanese ambassador (Nomura), 9 October 1941, ibid., 270.
204. For the circumstances surrounding Konoe's resignation and Tojo's appointment as prime minister, see IPS Doc. no. 497, "Facts pertaining to the resignation of the third Konoe cabinet," IMTFE, Reel WT9; "Memoirs of Prince Konoe," in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings, pt. 20, Exhibit no. 173 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 3985-4029; Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War, 285-90; and Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 312-13.
205. For the circumstances surrounding Konoe's resignation and Tojo's appointment as prime minister, see IPS Doc. no. 497, "Facts pertaining to the resignation of the third Konoe cabinet," IMTFE, Reel WT9; "Memoirs of Prince Konoe," in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings, pt. 20, Exhibit no. 173 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 3985-4029; Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War, 285-90; and Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 312-13.
206. For the circumstances surrounding Konoe's resignation and Tojo's appointment as prime minister, see IPS Doc. no. 497, "Facts pertaining to the resignation of the third Konoe cabinet," IMTFE, Reel WT9; "Memoirs of Prince Konoe," in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings, pt. 20, Exhibit no. 173 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 3985-4029; Butow, Tojo and the Coming of War, 285-90; and Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 312-13.
207. See "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies," approved by the Imperial conference, 6 September 1941, 135.
208. The list of questions appear in the minutes from the 60th and 61st liaison conferences, 24 and 25 October 1941, 187-96.
209. 59th liaison conference, 23 October 1941, 186.
210. 62nd liaison conference, 27 October 1941, 191.
211. 63rd liaison conference, 28 October 1941, 192.
212. Ibid., 191.
213. 66th liaison conference, 1 November 1941; also see Tsunoda Jun, "The Decision for War," in Morely, Japan's Road to Pearl Harbor, 168.
214. 66th liaison conference, 1 November 1941; also see Tsunoda Jun, "The Decision for War," in Morely, Japan's Road to Pearl Harbor, 168.
215. 66th liaison conference, 1 November 1941, 202.
216. Quoted in Tsunoda, "The Decision for War," 258.
217. 66th liaison conference, 1 November 1941, 203.
218. Ibid., 207.
219. Ibid., 204.
220. For the text of proposals A and B, see Imperial conference, 5 November 1941, 209; and IPS, "Proposals A and B," 7 November 1941, IMTFE, Exhibit 770.
221. 66th liaison conference, 1 November 1941, 205.
222. Tsunoda, "The Decision for War," in Japan's Road to Pearl Harbor, 329-30.
223. Hull to Nomura, 7 November 1941, FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 706-10.
224. 66th liaison conference, 15 November 1941, 245; Hull to Nomura, 15 November 1941, FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 731-37.
225. 66th liaison conference, 15 November 1941, 245; Hull to Nomura, 15 November 1941, FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 731-37.
226. Oral Statement handed by the secretary of state to the Japanese ambassador, 26 November 1941, FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 766-68; Hull to Nomura, 26 November 1941, ibid., 787-92.
227. Oral Statement handed by the secretary of state to the Japanese ambassador, 26 November 1941, FRUS: Japan, vol. 2, 766-68; Hull to Nomura, 26 November 1941, ibid., 787-92.
228. Statement by Prime Minister Tojo, Imperial conference, 1 December 1941, quoted in Tsunoda, "The Decision to War," 321.
229. Statement by Prime Minister Tojo, Imperial conference, 1 December 1941, quoted in Tsunoda, "The Decision to War," 321.
230. Jervis, "The Political Implications of Loss Aversion," in Avoiding Lasses/Taking Risks, 27.
231. On the usefulness of plausibility probes and limitations of single observation crucial cases see, King et al., Designing Social Inquiry, 209-12.
232. Boettcher, "Context, Methods, Numbers and Word," 578-79; Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations," 100-101.
233. Boettcher, "Context, Methods, Numbers and Word," 578-79; Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations," 100-101.
234. Kahneman and Tversky, "Prospect Theory," 275.
235. Caldwell and O'Really, "Responses to Failure," 124-26.
236. See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgments by and of Representativeness," in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 84-100; and Shelly E. Taylor, "The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction," in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 190-200.
237. See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgments by and of Representativeness," in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 84-100; and Shelly E. Taylor, "The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction," in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 190-200.
238. See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgments by and of Representativeness," in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 84-100; and Shelly E. Taylor, "The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction," in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 190-200.
239. See Jervis, "The Political Implications of Loss Aversion."
240. James W. Davis Jr. examines the efficacy of promise-based and threat-based deterrent strategies on gains-seeking or loss-avoiding targets. See Davis, "The Forgotten Variable: The Role of Promises in Deterrence" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1994).
241. Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict," International Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (April 1996): 179-95, at 191.