Taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalry: The rivalry approach to war and peace

International Interactions

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1995, Pages 291-308

  Goertz, Gary ^a   Diehl, Paul F ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000203551     PISSN: 03050629     EISSN: 15477444     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03050629508434870     Document Type: Article

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