Litigation life: Law-science knowledge construction in (Bendectin) mass toxic tort litigation

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 265-316

  Edmond, Gary ^a   Mercer, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG   (Australia)

Author keywords

Court; Expert evidence; Junk science; Law; Product liability; Scientific controversy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034410353     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631200030002003     Document Type: Article

References (221)

1. Louis Lasagna and Sheila R. Shulman, 'Bendectin and the Language of Causation', in Kenneth Foster, David E. Bernstein and Peter W. Huber (eds), Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 101-22, at 116.
2. This, now ubiquitous, statement was made by Judge Jack Weinstein, who presided over the Agent Orange litigation, in a law review article: J. Weinstein, 'Improving Expert Testimony', Richmond Law Review, Vol. 20 (1986), 473-99, at 482.
3. Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 114-37; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Keeping Junk History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 20 (1997), 48-100; Edmond and Mercer, 'The Secret Life of (Mass) Torts', ibid., 666-706; Edmond and Mercer, 'Manifest Destiny: Law and Science in America', Metascience, Vol. 10 (1996), 40-58; Edmond and Mercer, 'Trashing "Junk" Science', Stanford Technology Law Review (1998) [http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Core_Page/ index.html]. More generally, consider: Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
4. Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 114-37; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Keeping Junk History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 20 (1997), 48-100; Edmond and Mercer, 'The Secret Life of (Mass) Torts', ibid., 666-706; Edmond and Mercer, 'Manifest Destiny: Law and Science in America', Metascience, Vol. 10 (1996), 40-58; Edmond and Mercer, 'Trashing "Junk" Science', Stanford Technology Law Review (1998) [http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Core_Page/ index.html]. More generally, consider: Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
5. Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 114-37; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Keeping Junk History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 20 (1997), 48-100; Edmond and Mercer, 'The Secret Life of (Mass) Torts', ibid., 666-706; Edmond and Mercer, 'Manifest Destiny: Law and Science in America', Metascience, Vol. 10 (1996), 40-58; Edmond and Mercer, 'Trashing "Junk" Science', Stanford Technology Law Review (1998) [http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Core_Page/ index.html]. More generally, consider: Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
6. Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 114-37; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Keeping Junk History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 20 (1997), 48-100; Edmond and Mercer, 'The Secret Life of (Mass) Torts', ibid., 666-706; Edmond and Mercer, 'Manifest Destiny: Law and Science in America', Metascience, Vol. 10 (1996), 40-58; Edmond and Mercer, 'Trashing "Junk" Science', Stanford Technology Law Review (1998) [http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Core_Page/ index.html]. More generally, consider: Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
7. Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 114-37; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Keeping Junk History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 20 (1997), 48-100; Edmond and Mercer, 'The Secret Life of (Mass) Torts', ibid., 666-706; Edmond and Mercer, 'Manifest Destiny: Law and Science in America', Metascience, Vol. 10 (1996), 40-58; Edmond and Mercer, 'Trashing "Junk" Science', Stanford Technology Law Review (1998) [http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Core_Page/ index.html]. More generally, consider: Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
8. Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 114-37; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Keeping Junk History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 20 (1997), 48-100; Edmond and Mercer, 'The Secret Life of (Mass) Torts', ibid., 666-706; Edmond and Mercer, 'Manifest Destiny: Law and Science in America', Metascience, Vol. 10 (1996), 40-58; Edmond and Mercer, 'Trashing "Junk" Science', Stanford Technology Law Review (1998) [http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Core_Page/ index.html]. More generally, consider: Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
9. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
10. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
11. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
12. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
13. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
14. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
15. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
16. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
17. Dan Quayle, 'Civil Justice Reform', American University Law Review, Vol. 41 (1992), 559-69; Marc Galanter, 'Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don't Know (and think we know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31 (1983), 4-71; Galanter, 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion', Maryland Law Review, Vol. 46 (1986), 3-62; Michael J. Saks, 'If there Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?', ibid., 63-77; Saks, 'Do We Really Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 140 (1992), 1147-291; James A. Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg, 'The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change', UCLA Law Review, Vol. 37 (1990), 479-553; Eisenberg and Henderson, 'Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability', ibid., Vol. 39 (1992), 731-810; John A. Siliciano, 'Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 80 (1995), 990-1013; Alice Youmans, 'Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion', Law Library Journal, Vol. 79 (1987), 707-19.
18. For the foundational argument for sociology of science to move beyond a sociology of error and develop analytically symmetrical explanations (with the same types of causes used to explain both true and false beliefs), see David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn, 1991), 3-18, 175-79.
19. Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Representing the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Law', Science Communication, Vol. 19 (1998), 307-27.
20. Bert Black, 'A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence', Fordham Law Review, Vol. 56 (1988), 595-695, hereafter cited in the text as '[Black]'.
21. Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (NewYork: Basic Books, 1991), hereafter cited as '[Huber]'.
22. Lasagna & Shulman, op. cit. note 1, hereafter cited as '[L&S]'.
23. Joseph Sanders, 'The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in Life Cycles of Mass Torts', Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 43 (1992), 301-418; Sanders, 'From Science to Evidence: The Testimony of Causation in the Bendectin Cases', Stanford Law Review, Vol. 46 (1993), 1-86; Sanders, 'Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert', Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 78 (1994), 1387-1441; Sanders, Bendectin on Trial: A Study of Mass Tort Litigation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). The latter book (1998) will be cited in the text as '[Sanders]'.
24. Joseph Sanders, 'The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in Life Cycles of Mass Torts', Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 43 (1992), 301-418; Sanders, 'From Science to Evidence: The Testimony of Causation in the Bendectin Cases', Stanford Law Review, Vol. 46 (1993), 1-86; Sanders, 'Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert', Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 78 (1994), 1387-1441; Sanders, Bendectin on Trial: A Study of Mass Tort Litigation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). The latter book (1998) will be cited in the text as '[Sanders]'.
25. Joseph Sanders, 'The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in Life Cycles of Mass Torts', Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 43 (1992), 301-418; Sanders, 'From Science to Evidence: The Testimony of Causation in the Bendectin Cases', Stanford Law Review, Vol. 46 (1993), 1-86; Sanders, 'Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert', Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 78 (1994), 1387-1441; Sanders, Bendectin on Trial: A Study of Mass Tort Litigation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). The latter book (1998) will be cited in the text as '[Sanders]'.
26. Joseph Sanders, 'The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in Life Cycles of Mass Torts', Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 43 (1992), 301-418; Sanders, 'From Science to Evidence: The Testimony of Causation in the Bendectin Cases', Stanford Law Review, Vol. 46 (1993), 1-86; Sanders, 'Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert', Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 78 (1994), 1387-1441; Sanders, Bendectin on Trial: A Study of Mass Tort Litigation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). The latter book (1998) will be cited in the text as '[Sanders]'.
27. Michael D. Green, 'Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation', Northwestern Law Review, Vol. 86 (1992), 643-99; Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of Mass Toxic Substances Litigation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). The latter book (1996) will be cited in the text as '[Green]'.
28. Michael D. Green, 'Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation', Northwestern Law Review, Vol. 86 (1992), 643-99; Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of Mass Toxic Substances Litigation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). The latter book (1996) will be cited in the text as '[Green]'.
29. For a polemical discussion of the 'evidence' provided by William McBride and Alan Done, see [Huber, 112-29]. For a more detailed examination of McBride, see Bill Nicol, McBride: Behind the Myth (Sydney: ABC Enterprises, 1989) and McBride's response, Killing the Messenger: An Autobiography (Sydney: Eldorado, 1994). The credibility and qualifications of Dr Alan Done, one-time Professor of Paediatrics and Pharmacology in the Medical Faculty of Wayne State University, are discussed in some detail in Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 563 A.2d 330 (D.C. App. 1989).
30. For a polemical discussion of the 'evidence' provided by William McBride and Alan Done, see [Huber, 112-29]. For a more detailed examination of McBride, see Bill Nicol, McBride: Behind the Myth (Sydney: ABC Enterprises, 1989) and McBride's response, Killing the Messenger: An Autobiography (Sydney: Eldorado, 1994). The credibility and qualifications of Dr Alan Done, one-time Professor of Paediatrics and Pharmacology in the Medical Faculty of Wayne State University, are discussed in some detail in Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 563 A.2d 330 (D.C. App. 1989).
31. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740 (D.C. N.Y. 1984); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1221 (D.C. N.Y. 1985); ibid., 1267; In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145 (2nd Cir. 1987).
32. 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
33. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
34. Cf. Jasanoff, op cit. note 3, 44, 50-52; Sheila Jasanoff, 'What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 32 (1992), 345-59.
35. Cf. Jasanoff, op cit. note 3, 44, 50-52; Sheila Jasanoff, 'What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 32 (1992), 345-59.
36. Cf. Sanders (1992), op. cit. note 10, 331-48.
37. For a discussion of this reversal, see Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 563 A.2d 330 (D.C. App. 1989).
38. Gary Edmond, 'Judicial Representations of Scientific Evidence', Modern Law Review, Vol. 63 (2000), forthcoming.
39. For some foundational discussions of the use by scientists of these types of rhetorical strategies see, for example: H.M. Collins and Trevor Pinch, 'The Construction of the Paranormal: Nothing Unscientific is Happening', in Roy Wallis (ed.), On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge (Keele, Staffs.: Sociological Review Monograph 27, 1982), 237-70; G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John Schuster and Richard Yeo (eds), The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986).
40. For some foundational discussions of the use by scientists of these types of rhetorical strategies see, for example: H.M. Collins and Trevor Pinch, 'The Construction of the Paranormal: Nothing Unscientific is Happening', in Roy Wallis (ed.), On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge (Keele, Staffs.: Sociological Review Monograph 27, 1982), 237-70; G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John Schuster and Richard Yeo (eds), The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986).
41. For some foundational discussions of the use by scientists of these types of rhetorical strategies see, for example: H.M. Collins and Trevor Pinch, 'The Construction of the Paranormal: Nothing Unscientific is Happening', in Roy Wallis (ed.), On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge (Keele, Staffs.: Sociological Review Monograph 27, 1982), 237-70; G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John Schuster and Richard Yeo (eds), The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986).
42. Cf. John Abraham, 'Scientific Standards and Institutional Interests: Carcinogenic Risk Assessment of Benoxaprofen in the UK and US', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, No. 3 (August 1993), 387-444; Abraham, 'Distributing the Benefit of the Doubt: Scientists, Regulators, and Drug Safety', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), 493-522; Abraham and Julie Sheppard, 'Democracy, Technocracy, and the Secret State of Medicines Control: Expert and Nonexpert Perspectives', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring 1997), 139-67; Abraham and Sheppard, 'Complacent and Conflicting Scientific Expertise in British and American Drug Regulation: Clinical Risk Assessment of Triazolam', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, No. 6 (December 1999), 803-43.
43. Cf. John Abraham, 'Scientific Standards and Institutional Interests: Carcinogenic Risk Assessment of Benoxaprofen in the UK and US', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, No. 3 (August 1993), 387-444; Abraham, 'Distributing the Benefit of the Doubt: Scientists, Regulators, and Drug Safety', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), 493-522; Abraham and Julie Sheppard, 'Democracy, Technocracy, and the Secret State of Medicines Control: Expert and Nonexpert Perspectives', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring 1997), 139-67; Abraham and Sheppard, 'Complacent and Conflicting Scientific Expertise in British and American Drug Regulation: Clinical Risk Assessment of Triazolam', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, No. 6 (December 1999), 803-43.
44. Cf. John Abraham, 'Scientific Standards and Institutional Interests: Carcinogenic Risk Assessment of Benoxaprofen in the UK and US', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, No. 3 (August 1993), 387-444; Abraham, 'Distributing the Benefit of the Doubt: Scientists, Regulators, and Drug Safety', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), 493-522; Abraham and Julie Sheppard, 'Democracy, Technocracy, and the Secret State of Medicines Control: Expert and Nonexpert Perspectives', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring 1997), 139-67; Abraham and Sheppard, 'Complacent and Conflicting Scientific Expertise in British and American Drug Regulation: Clinical Risk Assessment of Triazolam', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, No. 6 (December 1999), 803-43.
45. Cf. John Abraham, 'Scientific Standards and Institutional Interests: Carcinogenic Risk Assessment of Benoxaprofen in the UK and US', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, No. 3 (August 1993), 387-444; Abraham, 'Distributing the Benefit of the Doubt: Scientists, Regulators, and Drug Safety', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), 493-522; Abraham and Julie Sheppard, 'Democracy, Technocracy, and the Secret State of Medicines Control: Expert and Nonexpert Perspectives', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring 1997), 139-67; Abraham and Sheppard, 'Complacent and Conflicting Scientific Expertise in British and American Drug Regulation: Clinical Risk Assessment of Triazolam', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, No. 6 (December 1999), 803-43.
46. Kenneth Foster and Peter Huber, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), esp. 12, 36, 63-67, 133, 160, 171, 182, 193, 204-05, 213, 217-21, 233, 241, 253-55, 257: cf. Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Juggling Science: From Polemic to Pastiche', Social Epistemology, Vol. 13 (1999), 215-34.
47. Kenneth Foster and Peter Huber, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), esp. 12, 36, 63-67, 133, 160, 171, 182, 193, 204-05, 213, 217-21, 233, 241, 253-55, 257: cf. Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Juggling Science: From Polemic to Pastiche', Social Epistemology, Vol. 13 (1999), 215-34.
48. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 (1993).
49. For more complex accounts noting that the closure of scientific controversies involves the interplay of social-epistemological factors, rather than a simple case of 'rationality' prevailing, see H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985), 129-57; Trevor Pinch, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Neutrino Detection (Dordecht: Reidel, 1986); Evelleen Richards, Vitamin C and Cancer: Medicine or Politics? (London: Macmillan, 1991), 1-14, 171-91; Brian Martin, Scientific Knowledge in Controversy: The Social Dynamics of the Fluoridation Debate (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 148-60; Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone should Know About Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27-55, 106-07.
50. For more complex accounts noting that the closure of scientific controversies involves the interplay of social-epistemological factors, rather than a simple case of 'rationality' prevailing, see H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985), 129-57; Trevor Pinch, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Neutrino Detection (Dordecht: Reidel, 1986); Evelleen Richards, Vitamin C and Cancer: Medicine or Politics? (London: Macmillan, 1991), 1-14, 171-91; Brian Martin, Scientific Knowledge in Controversy: The Social Dynamics of the Fluoridation Debate (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 148-60; Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone should Know About Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27-55, 106-07.
51. For more complex accounts noting that the closure of scientific controversies involves the interplay of social-epistemological factors, rather than a simple case of 'rationality' prevailing, see H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985), 129-57; Trevor Pinch, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Neutrino Detection (Dordecht: Reidel, 1986); Evelleen Richards, Vitamin C and Cancer: Medicine or Politics? (London: Macmillan, 1991), 1-14, 171-91; Brian Martin, Scientific Knowledge in Controversy: The Social Dynamics of the Fluoridation Debate (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 148-60; Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone should Know About Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27-55, 106-07.
52. For more complex accounts noting that the closure of scientific controversies involves the interplay of social-epistemological factors, rather than a simple case of 'rationality' prevailing, see H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985), 129-57; Trevor Pinch, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Neutrino Detection (Dordecht: Reidel, 1986); Evelleen Richards, Vitamin C and Cancer: Medicine or Politics? (London: Macmillan, 1991), 1-14, 171-91; Brian Martin, Scientific Knowledge in Controversy: The Social Dynamics of the Fluoridation Debate (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 148-60; Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone should Know About Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27-55, 106-07.
53. For more complex accounts noting that the closure of scientific controversies involves the interplay of social-epistemological factors, rather than a simple case of 'rationality' prevailing, see H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985), 129-57; Trevor Pinch, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Neutrino Detection (Dordecht: Reidel, 1986); Evelleen Richards, Vitamin C and Cancer: Medicine or Politics? (London: Macmillan, 1991), 1-14, 171-91; Brian Martin, Scientific Knowledge in Controversy: The Social Dynamics of the Fluoridation Debate (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 148-60; Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone should Know About Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27-55, 106-07.
54. 'Bifurcation' or 'polyfurcation' involves splitting a trial into different components, and treating them separately. For example, the issue of causation might be separated from the consideration of damages, to prevent what tends to be perceived as the inappropriate combination of discrete factors. Commonly, the emotional response to deformed children should not be allowed unduly to interfere with an assessment of whether a drug actually produced the deformities.
55. For a largely generic account, see Richard Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts: Scientific Evidence and Medicinal Product Liability (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999), 102-31.
56. [Sanders] provides some sense of the many factors which seem to have influenced the shape and volume of the litigation. Some of these include: the emerging body of scientific evidence; strategic decisions about the case to put to juries, trial judges and appellate courts; the types of injuries (limb reductions) which are most likely to be pursued through the legal system because of the potentially large damages [35, 41, 158]; use of the media [10]; variations among the plaintiffs; some jurisdictions (like Washington DC) having a reputation favouring plaintiffs [28]; the commitment maintained by some scientists and lawyers [116]; judicial scepticism of the litigation; a perception of a judicial logistic crisis, and the threat of an influx of 'junk science' in the federal courts.
57. See note 10.
58. Yet this is ostensibly [Sanders'] purpose. At the beginning of a chapter descriptively entitled 'The Science', he explains: 'My purpose is to provide a sense of how most people in the scientific community made up their minds that Bendectin was not a teratogen' [46]. Interestingly, this does not seem to be derived from research among scientists. Rather, Sanders has assumed, as did the Federal Courts, that, based on the primacy of epidemiology, there was little evidence which might impugn the safety of the drug.
59. The basis of these statements seems to be the lack of study rather than any community-wide statement, although scientists and journals did certainly make statements, as did regulatory bodies in the USA and the UK, Canada, Switzerland, West Germany and Australia.
60. For an important discussion of the heterogeneity of scientific work, see: Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, 'Institutional Ecology, Translations and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 387-420; Karin Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
61. For an important discussion of the heterogeneity of scientific work, see: Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, 'Institutional Ecology, Translations and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 387-420; Karin Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
62. Kenneth S. Brown, John M. DeSesso, John Hassell, Norman W. Klein, Jon M. Rowland, A.J. Steffek, Betsy D. Carlton, Cas. Grabowski, William Slikker, Jr and David Walsh, 'Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', Teratology, Vol. 31 (1985), 431. These authors were responding to Lewis B. Holmes, 'Teratogen Update: Bendectin', ibid., Vol. 27 (1983), 277-81. See also: Robert L. Brent, 'Editorial Comment on Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', ibid., Vol. 31 (1985), 429-30; L.B. Holmes, 'Response to Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', ibid., 432.
63. Kenneth S. Brown, John M. DeSesso, John Hassell, Norman W. Klein, Jon M. Rowland, A.J. Steffek, Betsy D. Carlton, Cas. Grabowski, William Slikker, Jr and David Walsh, 'Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', Teratology, Vol. 31 (1985), 431. These authors were responding to Lewis B. Holmes, 'Teratogen Update: Bendectin', ibid., Vol. 27 (1983), 277-81. See also: Robert L. Brent, 'Editorial Comment on Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', ibid., Vol. 31 (1985), 429-30; L.B. Holmes, 'Response to Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', ibid., 432.
64. Kenneth S. Brown, John M. DeSesso, John Hassell, Norman W. Klein, Jon M. Rowland, A.J. Steffek, Betsy D. Carlton, Cas. Grabowski, William Slikker, Jr and David Walsh, 'Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', Teratology, Vol. 31 (1985), 431. These authors were responding to Lewis B. Holmes, 'Teratogen Update: Bendectin', ibid., Vol. 27 (1983), 277-81. See also: Robert L. Brent, 'Editorial Comment on Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', ibid., Vol. 31 (1985), 429-30; L.B. Holmes, 'Response to Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', ibid., 432.
65. Kenneth S. Brown, John M. DeSesso, John Hassell, Norman W. Klein, Jon M. Rowland, A.J. Steffek, Betsy D. Carlton, Cas. Grabowski, William Slikker, Jr and David Walsh, 'Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', Teratology, Vol. 31 (1985), 431. These authors were responding to Lewis B. Holmes, 'Teratogen Update: Bendectin', ibid., Vol. 27 (1983), 277-81. See also: Robert L. Brent, 'Editorial Comment on Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', ibid., Vol. 31 (1985), 429-30; L.B. Holmes, 'Response to Comments on "Teratogen Update: Bendectin" ', ibid., 432.
66. For a more expansive discussion of the contrasting approach, see Collins (1985), op. cit. note 24, 129-57, and, Collins & Pinch (1993), op. cit. note 24.
67. For a more expansive discussion of the contrasting approach, see Collins (1985), op. cit. note 24, 129-57, and, Collins & Pinch (1993), op. cit. note 24.
68. 'Complete' in relation to the amount of research done, and in relation to the total body of research dedicated exclusively to Bendectin. This research is not equivalent to certainty, and the processes involved in erasing modalities and translating the body of research to stand for the safety of Bendectin are not apparent in Sanders' account. Elsewhere, Sanders describes the Bendectin controversy using Weinberg's concept of 'trans-science'. Resort to trans-science has become relatively popular among a number of legal scholars: see Alvin Weinberg, 'Science and Trans-Science', Minerva, Vol. 10 (1972), 209-22; Wendy E. Wagner, 'Trans-Science in Torts', Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96 (1986), 428-449; Wagner, 'The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95 (1995), 1613-723. For a critical appraisal of the use of 'trans-science', see Sheila S. Jasanoff, 'Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May 1987), 195-230.
69. 'Complete' in relation to the amount of research done, and in relation to the total body of research dedicated exclusively to Bendectin. This research is not equivalent to certainty, and the processes involved in erasing modalities and translating the body of research to stand for the safety of Bendectin are not apparent in Sanders' account. Elsewhere, Sanders describes the Bendectin controversy using Weinberg's concept of 'trans-science'. Resort to trans-science has become relatively popular among a number of legal scholars: see Alvin Weinberg, 'Science and Trans-Science', Minerva, Vol. 10 (1972), 209-22; Wendy E. Wagner, 'Trans-Science in Torts', Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96 (1986), 428-449; Wagner, 'The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95 (1995), 1613-723. For a critical appraisal of the use of 'trans-science', see Sheila S. Jasanoff, 'Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May 1987), 195-230.
70. 'Complete' in relation to the amount of research done, and in relation to the total body of research dedicated exclusively to Bendectin. This research is not equivalent to certainty, and the processes involved in erasing modalities and translating the body of research to stand for the safety of Bendectin are not apparent in Sanders' account. Elsewhere, Sanders describes the Bendectin controversy using Weinberg's concept of 'trans-science'. Resort to trans-science has become relatively popular among a number of legal scholars: see Alvin Weinberg, 'Science and Trans-Science', Minerva, Vol. 10 (1972), 209-22; Wendy E. Wagner, 'Trans-Science in Torts', Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96 (1986), 428-449; Wagner, 'The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95 (1995), 1613-723. For a critical appraisal of the use of 'trans-science', see Sheila S. Jasanoff, 'Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May 1987), 195-230.
71. 'Complete' in relation to the amount of research done, and in relation to the total body of research dedicated exclusively to Bendectin. This research is not equivalent to certainty, and the processes involved in erasing modalities and translating the body of research to stand for the safety of Bendectin are not apparent in Sanders' account. Elsewhere, Sanders describes the Bendectin controversy using Weinberg's concept of 'trans-science'. Resort to trans-science has become relatively popular among a number of legal scholars: see Alvin Weinberg, 'Science and Trans-Science', Minerva, Vol. 10 (1972), 209-22; Wendy E. Wagner, 'Trans-Science in Torts', Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96 (1986), 428-449; Wagner, 'The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 95 (1995), 1613-723. For a critical appraisal of the use of 'trans-science', see Sheila S. Jasanoff, 'Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May 1987), 195-230.
72. This is very similar to the approach advocated by Foster & Huber in Judging Science, op. cit. note 22.
73. Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Recognising Daubert: What Judges Should Know About Falsificationism', Expert Evidence, Vol. 5 (1996), 29-42.
74. The possibility of privileging epidemiological studies pre-dated the onset of the Bendectin litigation. Interestingly, it was not initially adopted by judges, and was subsequently modified to prioritize published epidemiological studies in ways that were favourable to the evidence produced by Merrell.
75. This is even stranger given that Sanders [106] alleges that experts on both sides 'seemed to agree' that epidemiology provided the best evidence of whether a drug was a human teratogen, and he was conscientiously studying the changes in the use and distribution of expertise across time.
76. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
77. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
78. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
79. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
80. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
81. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
82. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
83. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of
84. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
85. For some similar observations, see: J.S. Oteri, M.G. Weinberg and M.S. Pinales, 'Cross-Examination of Chemists in Drugs Cases', in Barry Barnes and David Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science (Milton Keynes, Bucks.: The Open University Press, 1982), 250-59. There have been many more nuanced discussions of legal deconstruction of science outside of the main body of legal scholarship: see Steven Yearley, 'Bog Standards: Science and Conservation at a Public Inquiry', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 421-38; Stephan Fuchs and Steven Ward, 'What is Deconstruction, and Where and When does it Take Place? Making Facts in Science, Building Cases in Law', American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (August 1994), 481-500; Brian Wynne, Rationality or Ritual? Nuclear Decision-Making and the Windscale Inquiry (Chalfont St Giles, Bucks.: British Society for the History of Science, 1982); Roger Smith and Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Gary Edmond, 'Science in Court: Negotiating the Meaning of a "Scientific" Experiment during a Murder Trial and some Limits to Legal Deconstruction for the Public Understanding of Law and Science', Sydney Law Review, Vol. 20 (1998), 361-406; Edmond, 'Law, Science and Narrative: Helping the "Facts" to Speak for Themselves', Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 23 (1999), 555-83; Michael Lynch, 'The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson "Dream Team" and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 829-68.
86. It is interesting to note that Merrell seems to have made no request for judges to appoint court-experts. Given the apparent strength of the evidence and opinion in the scientific community, this might appear strange. Sanders dismisses it as a concern with 'losing control' over the litigation. This is typical of Sanders' selective asymmetry. He explains an apparently 'inconsistent' situation - Merrell acting against the weight of the evidence - by resorting to interests and trial strategy [208]. Sanders accepts that Merrell and the plaintiffs were both attempting to persuade juries. The difference, for Sanders, is that he accepts that Merrell's position is fundamentally correct.
87. Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Sheila Jasanoff,'Beyond Epistemology: Relativism and Engagement in the Politics of Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 393-418; Shana M. Solomon and Edward J. Hackett, 'Setting Boundaries between Science and Law: Lessons from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1996), 131-56; Adwina Schwartz, 'A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v United States', Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 10 (1997), 149-237.
88. Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Sheila Jasanoff,'Beyond Epistemology: Relativism and Engagement in the Politics of Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 393-418; Shana M. Solomon and Edward J. Hackett, 'Setting Boundaries between Science and Law: Lessons from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1996), 131-56; Adwina Schwartz, 'A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v United States', Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 10 (1997), 149-237.
89. Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Sheila Jasanoff,'Beyond Epistemology: Relativism and Engagement in the Politics of Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 393-418; Shana M. Solomon and Edward J. Hackett, 'Setting Boundaries between Science and Law: Lessons from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1996), 131-56; Adwina Schwartz, 'A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v United States', Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 10 (1997), 149-237.
90. Edmond & Mercer, opera cit. note 3; Sheila Jasanoff,'Beyond Epistemology: Relativism and Engagement in the Politics of Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 393-418; Shana M. Solomon and Edward J. Hackett, 'Setting Boundaries between Science and Law: Lessons from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1996), 131-56; Adwina Schwartz, 'A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v United States', Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 10 (1997), 149-237.
91. Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39; Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Alberto Cambrosio, Peter Keating and Michael MacKenzie, 'Scientific Practice in the Courtroom: The Construction of Sociotechnical Identities in a Biotechnology Patent Dispute', Social Problems, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 1990), 275-93; Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff, 'Contested Identities: Science, Law and Forensic Practice', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 675-87; Gary Edmond, 'Azaria's Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of Guilt and Innocence', Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 22 (1998), 396-441.
92. Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39; Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Alberto Cambrosio, Peter Keating and Michael MacKenzie, 'Scientific Practice in the Courtroom: The Construction of Sociotechnical Identities in a Biotechnology Patent Dispute', Social Problems, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 1990), 275-93; Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff, 'Contested Identities: Science, Law and Forensic Practice', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 675-87; Gary Edmond, 'Azaria's Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of Guilt and Innocence', Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 22 (1998), 396-441.
93. Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39; Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Alberto Cambrosio, Peter Keating and Michael MacKenzie, 'Scientific Practice in the Courtroom: The Construction of Sociotechnical Identities in a Biotechnology Patent Dispute', Social Problems, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 1990), 275-93; Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff, 'Contested Identities: Science, Law and Forensic Practice', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 675-87; Gary Edmond, 'Azaria's Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of Guilt and Innocence', Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 22 (1998), 396-441.
94. Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39; Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Alberto Cambrosio, Peter Keating and Michael MacKenzie, 'Scientific Practice in the Courtroom: The Construction of Sociotechnical Identities in a Biotechnology Patent Dispute', Social Problems, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 1990), 275-93; Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff, 'Contested Identities: Science, Law and Forensic Practice', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 675-87; Gary Edmond, 'Azaria's Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of Guilt and Innocence', Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 22 (1998), 396-441.
95. Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39; Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3; Alberto Cambrosio, Peter Keating and Michael MacKenzie, 'Scientific Practice in the Courtroom: The Construction of Sociotechnical Identities in a Biotechnology Patent Dispute', Social Problems, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 1990), 275-93; Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff, 'Contested Identities: Science, Law and Forensic Practice', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 675-87; Gary Edmond, 'Azaria's Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of Guilt and Innocence', Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 22 (1998), 396-441.
96. Roger Smith, 'Forensic Pathology, Scientific Expertise, and the Criminal Law', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 56-92; Cambrosio, Keating & Mackenzie, op. cit. note 42; Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3, 50-52.
97. Roger Smith, 'Forensic Pathology, Scientific Expertise, and the Criminal Law', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 56-92; Cambrosio, Keating & Mackenzie, op. cit. note 42; Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3, 50-52.
98. Roger Smith, 'Forensic Pathology, Scientific Expertise, and the Criminal Law', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 56-92; Cambrosio, Keating & Mackenzie, op. cit. note 42; Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3, 50-52.
99. Roger Smith and Brian Wynne, 'Introduction', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 1-22, at 2. Jasanoff (op. cit. note 41, 397) employs the term 'co-production' to capture the intricacies involved with knowledge construction and compatible situated social orders: 'A full-blown political analysis of science and technology seeks to illuminate the co-production of scientific and social order - the production of mutually supporting forms of knowledge and forms of life - with all the details and specificity that such a project entails'.
100. Roger Smith and Brian Wynne, 'Introduction', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 1-22, at 2. Jasanoff (op. cit. note 41, 397) employs the term 'co-production' to capture the intricacies involved with knowledge construction and compatible situated social orders: 'A full-blown political analysis of science and technology seeks to illuminate the co-production of scientific and social order - the production of mutually supporting forms of knowledge and forms of life - with all the details and specificity that such a project entails'.
101. Jane Holder and Sue Elworthy, 'The BSE Crisis: A Study of the Precautionary Principle and the Politics of Science and Law', and Michael King and Felicity Kaganas, 'The Risks and Dangers of Experts in Court', both in Helen Reece (ed.), Law and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 129-52, 221-42.
102. Jane Holder and Sue Elworthy, 'The BSE Crisis: A Study of the Precautionary Principle and the Politics of Science and Law', and Michael King and Felicity Kaganas, 'The Risks and Dangers of Experts in Court', both in Helen Reece (ed.), Law and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 129-52, 221-42.
103. Smith & Wynne, op. cit. note 44, 15.
104. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (London: Sage, 1979), esp. 42-90; Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 21-62.
105. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (London: Sage, 1979), esp. 42-90; Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 21-62.
106. Stephen Hilgartner, 'The Dominant View of Popularization: Conceptual Problems, Political Uses', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August 1990), 519-39; Sheila Jasanoff, 'Judicial Construction of New Scientific Evidence', in Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Critical Perspectives on Nonacademic Science and Engineering (London & Toronto: Lehigh University Press, 1991), 215-38.
107. Stephen Hilgartner, 'The Dominant View of Popularization: Conceptual Problems, Political Uses', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August 1990), 519-39; Sheila Jasanoff, 'Judicial Construction of New Scientific Evidence', in Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Critical Perspectives on Nonacademic Science and Engineering (London & Toronto: Lehigh University Press, 1991), 215-38.
108. The development of the idea of boundary-work can be traced through the work of Thomas F. Gieryn: T.F. Gieryn, 'Boundary-Work and Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists', American Sociological Review, Vol. 48 (1983), 781-95; Gieryn, 'Boundaries of Science', in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen and Trevor Pinch (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (London & Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage/4S, 1995), 393-443; Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).
109. The development of the idea of boundary-work can be traced through the work of Thomas F. Gieryn: T.F. Gieryn, 'Boundary-Work and Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists', American Sociological Review, Vol. 48 (1983), 781-95; Gieryn, 'Boundaries of Science', in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen and Trevor Pinch (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (London & Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage/4S, 1995), 393-443; Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).
110. The development of the idea of boundary-work can be traced through the work of Thomas F. Gieryn: T.F. Gieryn, 'Boundary-Work and Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists', American Sociological Review, Vol. 48 (1983), 781-95; Gieryn, 'Boundaries of Science', in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen and Trevor Pinch (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (London & Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage/4S, 1995), 393-443; Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).
111. Philip Quinn, 'The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness', in James T. Cushing, C.F. Delaney and Gary M. Gutting (eds), Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 32-53, at 43-44; Laurens Laudan, 'Commentary on Ruse: Science at the Bar - Causes for Concern', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 7 (1982), 16-19; Thomas F. Gieryn, George M. Bevins and Stephen Zehr, 'Professionalization of American Scientists: Public Science in the Creation/Evolution Trials', American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (June 1985), 392-409; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Creating (Public) Science in the Noah's Ark Case', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 8 (1999), 317-43. It is of interest that, more recently, historians and philosophers have been engaged in the preparation and litigation over tobacco products, radiation experiments and the involvement of German and Swiss banks and corporations with war slaves and stolen assets.
112. Philip Quinn, 'The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness', in James T. Cushing, C.F. Delaney and Gary M. Gutting (eds), Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 32-53, at 43-44; Laurens Laudan, 'Commentary on Ruse: Science at the Bar - Causes for Concern', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 7 (1982), 16-19; Thomas F. Gieryn, George M. Bevins and Stephen Zehr, 'Professionalization of American Scientists: Public Science in the Creation/Evolution Trials', American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (June 1985), 392-409; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Creating (Public) Science in the Noah's Ark Case', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 8 (1999), 317-43. It is of interest that, more recently, historians and philosophers have been engaged in the preparation and litigation over tobacco products, radiation experiments and the involvement of German and Swiss banks and corporations with war slaves and stolen assets.
113. Philip Quinn, 'The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness', in James T. Cushing, C.F. Delaney and Gary M. Gutting (eds), Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 32-53, at 43-44; Laurens Laudan, 'Commentary on Ruse: Science at the Bar - Causes for Concern', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 7 (1982), 16-19; Thomas F. Gieryn, George M. Bevins and Stephen Zehr, 'Professionalization of American Scientists: Public Science in the Creation/Evolution Trials', American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (June 1985), 392-409; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Creating (Public) Science in the Noah's Ark Case', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 8 (1999), 317-43. It is of interest that, more recently, historians and philosophers have been engaged in the preparation and litigation over tobacco products, radiation experiments and the involvement of German and Swiss banks and corporations with war slaves and stolen assets.
114. Philip Quinn, 'The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness', in James T. Cushing, C.F. Delaney and Gary M. Gutting (eds), Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 32-53, at 43-44; Laurens Laudan, 'Commentary on Ruse: Science at the Bar - Causes for Concern', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 7 (1982), 16-19; Thomas F. Gieryn, George M. Bevins and Stephen Zehr, 'Professionalization of American Scientists: Public Science in the Creation/Evolution Trials', American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (June 1985), 392-409; Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Creating (Public) Science in the Noah's Ark Case', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 8 (1999), 317-43. It is of interest that, more recently, historians and philosophers have been engaged in the preparation and litigation over tobacco products, radiation experiments and the involvement of German and Swiss banks and corporations with war slaves and stolen assets.
115. For a discussion of the use of public inquiries and legal proceedings to attempt to bolster the scientific claims of industry advocates in the debate concerning the possible health effects of Electric and Magnetic Fields (EMF), see David Mercer, 'Strategies and Discourse in the Construction of "EMF Science": Politics and Rhetoric in Scientific Submissions in a Legal/Regulatory Setting', paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for the History, Philosphy and Social Studies of Science (Sunshine Coast University, Queensland, July 1999). See also Lisa M. Mitchell and Alberto Cambrosio, 'The Invisible Topography of Power: Electromagnetic Fields, Bodies and the Environment', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May 1997), 221-71.
116. For a discussion of the use of public inquiries and legal proceedings to attempt to bolster the scientific claims of industry advocates in the debate concerning the possible health effects of Electric and Magnetic Fields (EMF), see David Mercer, 'Strategies and Discourse in the Construction of "EMF Science": Politics and Rhetoric in Scientific Submissions in a Legal/Regulatory Setting', paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for the History, Philosphy and Social Studies of Science (Sunshine Coast University, Queensland, July 1999). See also Lisa M. Mitchell and Alberto Cambrosio, 'The Invisible Topography of Power: Electromagnetic Fields, Bodies and the Environment', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May 1997), 221-71.
117. Under the US Federal Rules of Evidence (1975). Rule 702 states: 'If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or by education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise'. Rule 703 states: 'The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence'.
118. Mekdeci by and through Mekdeci v. Merrell National Labs, Inc., 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983); Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. App. 1986).
119. Henderson & Eisenberg, Saks and Galanter: all opera cit. note 4.
120. We have previously inaugurated some discussion of the jury assessment of complex evidence, drawing upon recent literature in the public understanding of science: Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Scientific Literacy and the Jury: Reconsidering Jury "Competence" ', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1997), 329-57. For an account of a lay response to incriminating scientific evidence in a murder trial, consider Gary Edmond, 'Down by Science: Context and Commitment in the Lay Response to Incriminating Scientific Evidence during a Murder Trial', ibid., Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1998), 83-111; see also, more generally, Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, 'Science, Common Sense and Common Law: Courtroom Inquiries and the Public Understanding of Science', Social Epistemology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April-June 1999), 183-96.
121. We have previously inaugurated some discussion of the jury assessment of complex evidence, drawing upon recent literature in the public understanding of science: Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Scientific Literacy and the Jury: Reconsidering Jury "Competence" ', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1997), 329-57. For an account of a lay response to incriminating scientific evidence in a murder trial, consider Gary Edmond, 'Down by Science: Context and Commitment in the Lay Response to Incriminating Scientific Evidence during a Murder Trial', ibid., Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1998), 83-111; see also, more generally, Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, 'Science, Common Sense and Common Law: Courtroom Inquiries and the Public Understanding of Science', Social Epistemology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April-June 1999), 183-96.
122. We have previously inaugurated some discussion of the jury assessment of complex evidence, drawing upon recent literature in the public understanding of science: Gary Edmond and David Mercer, 'Scientific Literacy and the Jury: Reconsidering Jury "Competence" ', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1997), 329-57. For an account of a lay response to incriminating scientific evidence in a murder trial, consider Gary Edmond, 'Down by Science: Context and Commitment in the Lay Response to Incriminating Scientific Evidence during a Murder Trial', ibid., Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1998), 83-111; see also, more generally, Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally, 'Science, Common Sense and Common Law: Courtroom Inquiries and the Public Understanding of Science', Social Epistemology, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April-June 1999), 183-96.
123. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 'Bendectin' Products Liability Litigation, 624 F.Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985). The judgment of Judge Rubin was upheld by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
124. 624 F.Supp. 1212, 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
125. The attempt to negotiate a settlement need not be seen as recognition of responsibility or admission of liability. Rather, corporations are faced with serious practical decisions stemming from the implications of losing large-scale litigation. Large settlements may actually be cheaper and more predictable than contesting individual cases in protracted litigation, especially where punitive damages may be at issue.
126. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. App. 1986). In the remainder of this paragraph, quotations from this hearing are paginated by bracketed numbers in the text. We will use this convention in later paragraphs that draw quotations, in succession, from specified court documents.
127. 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
128. Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F.Supp. 740 (E.D. N.Y. 1984).
129. 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
130. Compare the reasoning in the subsequent case of Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 737 F.Supp. 1117, 1120 (D. Idaho 1990), where Senior District Court Judge Callister noted limitations to epidemiological studies in explaining causation. He found the approaches in other circuits by Ealy, Richardson and Brock non-compelling: This court does not mean to imply that epidemiological studies are without worth in proving causation. Certainly they play an important role. . . . A jury might find the studies conclusive. But this court cannot - at this stage of the case - find the epidemiological evidence 'overwhelming'. . . . Once the epidemiological evidence is stripped of its 'overwhelming' label, does Rule 703 still preclude plaintiffs' expert testimony? Only if animal studies and chemical analyses are not reasonably relied upon by experts who attempt to investigate the connection between drugs and birth defects. And the court: cannot make such a finding on the basis of the record before it.
131. It is ironic that the court celebrated the value of epidemiology in this context, where there is supposedly no direct evidence, yet at other points (such as in Brock) epidemiology is deemed to be crucial in determining the matter where there is uncertainty, but direct evidence. In the various judgments, the status and use of epidemiology are interpreted in a number of apparently inconsistent ways.
132. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989). Followed in LeBlanc v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 759; Barton v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8010.
133. Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F.Supp. 740 (E.D. N.Y. 1984).
134. Heyman v. United States, 506 F.Supp. 1145 (S.D. F1. 1981).
135. Gulf South Insulation v. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983).
136. This and another paragraph in the judgment were subsequently modified to emphasize the importance of statistically significant epidemiological studies in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 884 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1989). The modified version continued: 'However, we do not wish this case to stand as a bar to future Bendectin cases in the event that new and statistically significant studies emerge which would give a jury a firmer basis on which to determine the issue of causation' (emphasis added).
137. 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Followed in Whelan v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1900 U.S. Dist. 11504 (D.C.): 'First, despite plaintiffs' protestations to the contrary, this Court is bound by the holdings in Richardson and Ealy. This Circuit has found, as a matter of law, that expert opinion testimony, which relies upon chemical structure analysis, in vivo studies, in vitro studies, or reformulated epidemiological data, is not admissible'.
138. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3rd Cir. 1990).
139. In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation, 732 F.Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989).
140. 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992). Followed in Lee v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 8478 (6th Cir. 1992): We conclude that a finding of a causal relationship between Bendectin use and Michael Lee's birth defects based upon this evidence would be conjectural at best in light of this court's recent opinion in Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. . . . In Turpin, another panel of this court reviewed the scientific data on Bendectin in great detail and concluded that the evidence presented by the plaintiff's experts fell short of showing that 'Bendectin more probably than not causes limb defects in children born to mothers who ingested the drug at the prescribed doses during pregnancy'. In Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 996, 998 (1992), the Court of Appeals held that the animal studies relied upon by plaintiff's experts did not prove causation in humans. Here, the recorded explanation of animal studies is simply inadequate: 'although the animal studies themselves may have been scientifically performed, the exact nature of these tests is explained only in general terms'.
141. Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 736 F.Supp. (E.D. Ky. 1990).
142. 959 F.2d 1349, 1350 (6th Cir. 1992).
143. Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 893 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1990); Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 647 F.Supp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1986); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 'Bendectin' Products Liability Litigation, 624 F.Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 788 P.2d 1293 (1990).
144. The court drew on: Brock as a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; Daubert affirming a grant of summary judgment; and Richardson (and Ealy) and Lynch on the grounds that the plaintiff's evidence was inadmissible. Four district courts had granted summary judgment, and eight courts had either denied summary judgment for Merrell or reversed on appeal.
145. See also Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 893 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1990).
146. Dr Palmer testified that he believed Bendectin caused the injuries, but this was deemed to be an improper conclusion based on 'personal belief or opinion'.
147. Jasanoff, op. cit. note 3, esp. 114-37.
148. David Robbins and Ron Johnston, 'The Role of Cognitive and Occupational Differentiation in Scientific Controversies', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 6, Nos 3 & 4 (October 1976), 349-68; Star & Griesemer, op. cit. note 31.
149. David Robbins and Ron Johnston, 'The Role of Cognitive and Occupational Differentiation in Scientific Controversies', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 6, Nos 3 & 4 (October 1976), 349-68; Star & Griesemer, op. cit. note 31.
150. Brief amicus curiae of Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins, Raymond Neutra and Steven Stellman in support of Petitioners (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 [1993]). For some discussion of different approaches to epidemiology in law, see: Melissa Moore Thompson, 'Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation', North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71 (1992), 247-91; Sabrina Strawn and Marvin S. Legator, 'Epidemiology and Toxic Torts: Animal Studies Yield Valid Insights', Trial (April 1991), 61-63; Otto Wong, 'Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease', Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 3 (1988), 20-50; Gary Taubes, 'Epidemiology Faces Its Limits', Science, Vol. 269 (14 July 1995), 164-69; Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217; Bert Black and David E. Lilienfield, 'Epidemiologie Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation', Fordham Law Review, Vol. 52 (1984), 732-85. For an interesting discussion of some of the strategies used by epidemiologists to frame their work for use in broader contexts, including legal contexts, see David A. Rier, 'The Versatile "Caveat" Section of an Epidemiology Paper: Managing Public and Private Risk', Science Communication, Vol. 21 (1999), 3-37.
151. Brief amicus curiae of Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins, Raymond Neutra and Steven Stellman in support of Petitioners (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 [1993]). For some discussion of different approaches to epidemiology in law, see: Melissa Moore Thompson, 'Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation', North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71 (1992), 247-91; Sabrina Strawn and Marvin S. Legator, 'Epidemiology and Toxic Torts: Animal Studies Yield Valid Insights', Trial (April 1991), 61-63; Otto Wong, 'Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease', Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 3 (1988), 20-50; Gary Taubes, 'Epidemiology Faces Its Limits', Science, Vol. 269 (14 July 1995), 164-69; Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217; Bert Black and David E. Lilienfield, 'Epidemiologie Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation', Fordham Law Review, Vol. 52 (1984), 732-85. For an interesting discussion of some of the strategies used by epidemiologists to frame their work for use in broader contexts, including legal contexts, see David A. Rier, 'The Versatile "Caveat" Section of an Epidemiology Paper: Managing Public and Private Risk', Science Communication, Vol. 21 (1999), 3-37.
152. Brief amicus curiae of Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins, Raymond Neutra and Steven Stellman in support of Petitioners (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 [1993]). For some discussion of different approaches to epidemiology in law, see: Melissa Moore Thompson, 'Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation', North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71 (1992), 247-91; Sabrina Strawn and Marvin S. Legator, 'Epidemiology and Toxic Torts: Animal Studies Yield Valid Insights', Trial (April 1991), 61-63; Otto Wong, 'Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease', Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 3 (1988), 20-50; Gary Taubes, 'Epidemiology Faces Its Limits', Science, Vol. 269 (14 July 1995), 164-69; Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217; Bert Black and David E. Lilienfield, 'Epidemiologie Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation', Fordham Law Review, Vol. 52 (1984), 732-85. For an interesting discussion of some of the strategies used by epidemiologists to frame their work for use in broader contexts, including legal contexts, see David A. Rier, 'The Versatile "Caveat" Section of an Epidemiology Paper: Managing Public and Private Risk', Science Communication, Vol. 21 (1999), 3-37.
153. Brief amicus curiae of Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins, Raymond Neutra and Steven Stellman in support of Petitioners (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 [1993]). For some discussion of different approaches to epidemiology in law, see: Melissa Moore Thompson, 'Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation', North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71 (1992), 247-91; Sabrina Strawn and Marvin S. Legator, 'Epidemiology and Toxic Torts: Animal Studies Yield Valid Insights', Trial (April 1991), 61-63; Otto Wong, 'Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease', Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 3 (1988), 20-50; Gary Taubes, 'Epidemiology Faces Its Limits', Science, Vol. 269 (14 July 1995), 164-69; Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217; Bert Black and David E. Lilienfield, 'Epidemiologie Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation', Fordham Law Review, Vol. 52 (1984), 732-85. For an interesting discussion of some of the strategies used by epidemiologists to frame their work for use in broader contexts, including legal contexts, see David A. Rier, 'The Versatile "Caveat" Section of an Epidemiology Paper: Managing Public and Private Risk', Science Communication, Vol. 21 (1999), 3-37.
154. Brief amicus curiae of Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins, Raymond Neutra and Steven Stellman in support of Petitioners (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 [1993]). For some discussion of different approaches to epidemiology in law, see: Melissa Moore Thompson, 'Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation', North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71 (1992), 247-91; Sabrina Strawn and Marvin S. Legator, 'Epidemiology and Toxic Torts: Animal Studies Yield Valid Insights', Trial (April 1991), 61-63; Otto Wong, 'Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease', Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 3 (1988), 20-50; Gary Taubes, 'Epidemiology Faces Its Limits', Science, Vol. 269 (14 July 1995), 164-69; Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217; Bert Black and David E. Lilienfield, 'Epidemiologie Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation', Fordham Law Review, Vol. 52 (1984), 732-85. For an interesting discussion of some of the strategies used by epidemiologists to frame their work for use in broader contexts, including legal contexts, see David A. Rier, 'The Versatile "Caveat" Section of an Epidemiology Paper: Managing Public and Private Risk', Science Communication, Vol. 21 (1999), 3-37.
155. Brief amicus curiae of Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins, Raymond Neutra and Steven Stellman in support of Petitioners (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 [1993]). For some discussion of different approaches to epidemiology in law, see: Melissa Moore Thompson, 'Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation', North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71 (1992), 247-91; Sabrina Strawn and Marvin S. Legator, 'Epidemiology and Toxic Torts: Animal Studies Yield Valid Insights', Trial (April 1991), 61-63; Otto Wong, 'Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease', Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 3 (1988), 20-50; Gary Taubes, 'Epidemiology Faces Its Limits', Science, Vol. 269 (14 July 1995), 164-69; Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217; Bert Black and David E. Lilienfield, 'Epidemiologie Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation', Fordham Law Review, Vol. 52 (1984), 732-85. For an interesting discussion of some of the strategies used by epidemiologists to frame their work for use in broader contexts, including legal contexts, see David A. Rier, 'The Versatile "Caveat" Section of an Epidemiology Paper: Managing Public and Private Risk', Science Communication, Vol. 21 (1999), 3-37.
156. Brief amicus curiae of Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James Robins, Raymond Neutra and Steven Stellman in support of Petitioners (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 [1993]). For some discussion of different approaches to epidemiology in law, see: Melissa Moore Thompson, 'Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation', North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 71 (1992), 247-91; Sabrina Strawn and Marvin S. Legator, 'Epidemiology and Toxic Torts: Animal Studies Yield Valid Insights', Trial (April 1991), 61-63; Otto Wong, 'Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease', Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 3 (1988), 20-50; Gary Taubes, 'Epidemiology Faces Its Limits', Science, Vol. 269 (14 July 1995), 164-69; Margaret G. Farrell, 'Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 2183-217; Bert Black and David E. Lilienfield, 'Epidemiologie Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation', Fordham Law Review, Vol. 52 (1984), 732-85. For an interesting discussion of some of the strategies used by epidemiologists to frame their work for use in broader contexts, including legal contexts, see David A. Rier, 'The Versatile "Caveat" Section of an Epidemiology Paper: Managing Public and Private Risk', Science Communication, Vol. 21 (1999), 3-37.
157. It might be argued that the Supreme Court was merely determining the legal standard of admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence', however, in other evidentiary cases, that has not prevented strong criticism of the expert evidence relevant to the appeal. For example, in Kumho Tire Co v. Kumho 143 L.Ed 2d 238 (1999). Consider Gary Edmond, 'Engineering Knowledge: Contested Representations of Law, Science (and Non-Science) and Society', paper presented at 'Spectres of Law: Legal Theory at the fin de siècle', Birkbeck College, University of London (September 1999); Edmond, 'Deflating Daubert: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Inevitability of General Acceptance (Frye)', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 23 (2000), forthcoming.
158. It might be argued that the Supreme Court was merely determining the legal standard of admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence', however, in other evidentiary cases, that has not prevented strong criticism of the expert evidence relevant to the appeal. For example, in Kumho Tire Co v. Kumho 143 L.Ed 2d 238 (1999). Consider Gary Edmond, 'Engineering Knowledge: Contested Representations of Law, Science (and Non-Science) and Society', paper presented at 'Spectres of Law: Legal Theory at the fin de siècle', Birkbeck College, University of London (September 1999); Edmond, 'Deflating Daubert: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Inevitability of General Acceptance (Frye)', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 23 (2000), forthcoming.
159. Brief amicus curiae of Professor Alvin R. Feinstein in support of respondent: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 (1993).
160. [Rothman] is the Brief amicus curiae cited in note 82. Below is a brief description of the various qualifications of the amici: Amici are teachers and scholars of epidemiology. Dr Rothman, the Editor of the journal Epidemiology, and a member of the Editorial Board of the New England Journal of Medicine, currently serves as Professor of Public Health (Epidemiology and Biostatistics) at the Boston University School of Medicine and Public Health, Adjunct Professor of Epidemiology at the Harvard School of Public Health, and Senior Epidemiologist at Epidemiology Resources Incorporated. Dr Weiss, the author of 185 publications in the field of epidemiology, is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health and Community Medicine, at the University of Washington. Dr Robins, Associate Editor of the American Journal of Epidemiology, is a Professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics at the Harvard School of Public Health. Dr Neutra, a past president of the International Society for Environmental Epidemiology, currently serves as Lecturer in Epidemiology at the University of California School of Public Health, Chief of the Exposure Assessment Section of the California Department of Health Services, and Acting Chief of the Environmental Health Investigations Branch of the California Department of Health Services. Dr Stellman, the author of over 60 papers in epidemiology and health sciences, currently serves as Senior Research Scientist at the American Health Foundation (where he is chief epidemiologist for studies of tobacco-related cancers), an NIH Fogarty International Fellow at the International Agency for Research on Cancer in Lyon, France, and Adjunct Associate Professor of Community Medicine at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine. [Rothman, 2]
161. Re-analysis is strategically described in terms of the admissibility standards being challenged in the Supreme Court appeal. The Daubert decision replaced the 1923 Frye (Frye v. US, 293 F 1013 [D.C. Cir. 1923]) 'general acceptance' test for the admission of expert evidence in federal circuits and some state courts. For some discussion of Frye, consider Paul C. Giannelli, 'The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later', Columbia Law Review, Vol. 80 (1980), 1197-264.
162. Daryl Chubin and Edward J. Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and US Science Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), esp. 32-36, and Chapter 4, 'Peer Review and Regulatory Science', 61-83. Chubin and others submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Daubert court in which they discussed peer review.
163. Daryl Chubin and Edward J. Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and US Science Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), esp. 32-36, and Chapter 4, 'Peer Review and Regulatory Science', 61-83. Chubin and others submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Daubert court in which they discussed peer review.
164. Daryl Chubin and Edward J. Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and US Science Policy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), esp. 32-36, and Chapter 4, 'Peer Review and Regulatory Science', 61-83. Chubin and others submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Daubert court in which they discussed peer review.
165. For Feinstein's brief, see Feinstein, op. cit. note 84 (hereafter '[Feinstein]'). Feinstein had received many honours, had published a number of books and over 300 articles in the previous 40 years.
166. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
167. Compare the following approach adopted by the US Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1985: 'A high-quality negative epidemiological study, while useful, cannot prove the absence of an association between chemical exposure and human cancer': Office of Science and Technology Policy, Chemical Carcinogens: A Review of the Science and its Associated Principles (50 Federal Register 10371, 1985), 10371.
168. See Collins, op. cit. note 24, esp. 127-35.
169. See Gieryn (1998), op. cit. note 49, 1-35.
170. Sheila Jasanoff, 'The Problem of Rationality in American Health and Safety Regulation', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 151-83.
171. For a succinct discussion highlighting similar themes to our analysis, see Richards, op. cit. note 24, 171-91.
172. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Oxendine, 593 A.2d 1023 (D.C. App. 1991).
173. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct 2786 (1993).
174. Though he has approached the issue using a positivist framework, the development of approaches in scientific controversies into coherent positions, almost resembling ideologies, has been well documented by Allan Mazur: A. Mazur, The Dynamics of Technological Controversy (Washington, DC: Communications Press, 1981). For a commentary, see David Mercer, 'Understanding Scientific/Technical Controversy' (Wollongong, NSW: Wollongong University Science and Technology Policy Research Group, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1996). For discussion of the development of evidential credibility over time and the importance of evaluating the authority of various scientists, see Arthur Daemmrich, 'The Evidence Does Not Speak for Itself: Expert Witnesses and the Organization of DNA-Typing Companies', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 741-72. There are many similarities between the diachronic developments of evidence in mass torts and high profile 'miscarriages of justice': see Edmond, opera cit. notes 39, 42; G. Edmond, 'Misunderstanding Miscarriages of Justice', paper presented at the Criminal Justice Discussion Group, School of Law, University of Nottingham (November 1999).
175. Though he has approached the issue using a positivist framework, the development of approaches in scientific controversies into coherent positions, almost resembling ideologies, has been well documented by Allan Mazur: A. Mazur, The Dynamics of Technological Controversy (Washington, DC: Communications Press, 1981). For a commentary, see David Mercer, 'Understanding Scientific/Technical Controversy' (Wollongong, NSW: Wollongong University Science and Technology Policy Research Group, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1996). For discussion of the development of evidential credibility over time and the importance of evaluating the authority of various scientists, see Arthur Daemmrich, 'The Evidence Does Not Speak for Itself: Expert Witnesses and the Organization of DNA-Typing Companies', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 741-72. There are many similarities between the diachronic developments of evidence in mass torts and high profile 'miscarriages of justice': see Edmond, opera cit. notes 39, 42; G. Edmond, 'Misunderstanding Miscarriages of Justice', paper presented at the Criminal Justice Discussion Group, School of Law, University of Nottingham (November 1999).
176. Though he has approached the issue using a positivist framework, the development of approaches in scientific controversies into coherent positions, almost resembling ideologies, has been well documented by Allan Mazur: A. Mazur, The Dynamics of Technological Controversy (Washington, DC: Communications Press, 1981). For a commentary, see David Mercer, 'Understanding Scientific/Technical Controversy' (Wollongong, NSW: Wollongong University Science and Technology Policy Research Group, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1996). For discussion of the development of evidential credibility over time and the importance of evaluating the authority of various scientists, see Arthur Daemmrich, 'The Evidence Does Not Speak for Itself: Expert Witnesses and the Organization of DNA-Typing Companies', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 741-72. There are many similarities between the diachronic developments of evidence in mass torts and high profile 'miscarriages of justice': see Edmond,
177. Though he has approached the issue using a positivist framework, the development of approaches in scientific controversies into coherent positions, almost resembling ideologies, has been well documented by Allan Mazur: A. Mazur, The Dynamics of Technological Controversy (Washington, DC: Communications Press, 1981). For a commentary, see David Mercer, 'Understanding Scientific/Technical Controversy' (Wollongong, NSW: Wollongong University Science and Technology Policy Research Group, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1996). For discussion of the development of evidential credibility over time and the importance of evaluating the authority of various scientists, see Arthur Daemmrich, 'The Evidence Does Not Speak for Itself: Expert Witnesses and the Organization of DNA-Typing Companies', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 741-72. There are many similarities between the diachronic developments of evidence in mass torts and high profile 'miscarriages of justice': see Edmond, opera cit. notes 39, 42; G. Edmond, 'Misunderstanding Miscarriages of Justice', paper presented at the Criminal Justice Discussion Group, School of Law, University of Nottingham (November 1999).
178. Though he has approached the issue using a positivist framework, the development of approaches in scientific controversies into coherent positions, almost resembling ideologies, has been well documented by Allan Mazur: A. Mazur, The Dynamics of Technological Controversy (Washington, DC: Communications Press, 1981). For a commentary, see David Mercer, 'Understanding Scientific/Technical Controversy' (Wollongong, NSW: Wollongong University Science and Technology Policy Research Group, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1996). For discussion of the development of evidential credibility over time and the importance of evaluating the authority of various scientists, see Arthur Daemmrich, 'The Evidence Does Not Speak for Itself: Expert Witnesses and the Organization of DNA-Typing Companies', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 741-72. There are many similarities between the diachronic developments of evidence in mass torts and high profile 'miscarriages of justice': see Edmond, opera cit. notes 39, 42; G. Edmond, 'Misunderstanding Miscarriages of Justice', paper presented at the Criminal Justice Discussion Group, School of Law, University of Nottingham (November 1999).
179. Brian Wynne, 'Public Understanding of Science', in Jasanoff et al. (eds), op. cit. note 49, 361-88; Alan Irwin, Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 1995), esp. 93-101; B. Wynne, 'Knowledges in Context', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1991), 111-21.
180. Brian Wynne, 'Public Understanding of Science', in Jasanoff et al. (eds), op. cit. note 49, 361-88; Alan Irwin, Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 1995), esp. 93-101; B. Wynne, 'Knowledges in Context', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1991), 111-21.
181. Brian Wynne, 'Public Understanding of Science', in Jasanoff et al. (eds), op. cit. note 49, 361-88; Alan Irwin, Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 1995), esp. 93-101; B. Wynne, 'Knowledges in Context', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1991), 111-21.
182. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). Without providing any explanation, in a footnote the court indicated that this reasoning might not apply to the forensic sciences.
183. See Smith & Wynne, op. cit. note 44; Smith, op. cit. note 43; Brian Wynne, 'Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 23-55; Roger Smith, 'The Trials of Forensic Science', Science as Culture, Vol. 4 (1988), 71-94; Edmond, opera cit. note 39. See also Simon Cole, 'Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprinting Evidence and Expert Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 687-712: Cole notes some of the social/professional factors explaining the traditional limited degree of scientific/legal scrutiny applied to fingerprinting techniques in US adversarial settings. For a more general historical perspective in a US context, see Julie Johnson-McGrath, 'Speaking for the Dead: Forensic Pathologists and Criminal Justice in the United States', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), 438-59.
184. See Smith & Wynne, op. cit. note 44; Smith, op. cit. note 43; Brian Wynne, 'Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 23-55; Roger Smith, 'The Trials of Forensic Science', Science as Culture, Vol. 4 (1988), 71-94; Edmond, opera cit. note 39. See also Simon Cole, 'Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprinting Evidence and Expert Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 687-712: Cole notes some of the social/professional factors explaining the traditional limited degree of scientific/legal scrutiny applied to fingerprinting techniques in US adversarial settings. For a more general historical perspective in a US context, see Julie Johnson-McGrath, 'Speaking for the Dead: Forensic Pathologists and Criminal Justice in the United States', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), 438-59.
185. See Smith & Wynne, op. cit. note 44; Smith, op. cit. note 43; Brian Wynne, 'Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 23-55; Roger Smith, 'The Trials of Forensic Science', Science as Culture, Vol. 4 (1988), 71-94; Edmond, opera cit. note 39. See also Simon Cole, 'Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprinting Evidence and Expert Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 687-712: Cole notes some of the social/professional factors explaining the traditional limited degree of scientific/legal scrutiny applied to fingerprinting techniques in US adversarial settings. For a more general historical perspective in a US context, see Julie Johnson-McGrath, 'Speaking for the Dead: Forensic Pathologists and Criminal Justice in the United States', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), 438-59.
186. See Smith & Wynne, op. cit. note 44; Smith, op. cit. note 43; Brian Wynne, 'Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 23-55; Roger Smith, 'The Trials of Forensic Science', Science as Culture, Vol. 4 (1988), 71-94; Edmond, opera cit. note 39. See also Simon Cole, 'Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprinting Evidence and Expert Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 687-712: Cole notes some of the social/professional factors explaining the traditional limited degree of scientific/legal scrutiny applied to fingerprinting techniques in US adversarial settings. For a more general historical perspective in a US context, see Julie Johnson-McGrath, 'Speaking for the Dead: Forensic Pathologists and Criminal Justice in the United States', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), 438-59.
187. See Smith & Wynne, op. cit. note 44; Smith, op. cit. note 43; Brian Wynne, 'Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 23-55; Roger Smith, 'The Trials of Forensic Science', Science as Culture, Vol. 4 (1988), 71-94; Edmond, opera cit. note 39. See also Simon Cole, 'Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprinting Evidence and Expert Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 687-712: Cole notes some of the social/professional factors explaining the traditional limited degree of scientific/legal scrutiny applied to fingerprinting techniques in US adversarial settings. For a more general historical perspective in a US context, see Julie Johnson-McGrath, 'Speaking for the Dead: Forensic Pathologists and Criminal Justice in the United States', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), 438-59.
188. See Smith & Wynne, op. cit. note 44; Smith, op. cit. note 43; Brian Wynne, 'Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 23-55; Roger Smith, 'The Trials of Forensic Science', Science as Culture, Vol. 4 (1988), 71-94; Edmond, opera cit. note 39. See also Simon Cole, 'Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprinting Evidence and Expert Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 687-712: Cole notes some of the social/professional factors explaining the traditional limited degree of scientific/legal scrutiny applied to fingerprinting techniques in US adversarial settings. For a more general historical perspective in a US context, see Julie Johnson-McGrath, 'Speaking for the Dead: Forensic Pathologists and Criminal Justice in the United States', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), 438-59.
189. See Smith & Wynne, op. cit. note 44; Smith, op. cit. note 43; Brian Wynne, 'Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 39, 23-55; Roger Smith, 'The Trials of Forensic Science', Science as Culture, Vol. 4 (1988), 71-94; Edmond, opera cit. note 39. See also Simon Cole, 'Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprinting Evidence and Expert Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 687-712: Cole notes some of the social/professional factors explaining the traditional limited degree of scientific/legal scrutiny applied to fingerprinting techniques in US adversarial settings. For a more general historical perspective in a US context, see Julie Johnson-McGrath, 'Speaking for the Dead: Forensic Pathologists and Criminal Justice in the United States', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), 438-59.
190. In re Richardson-Merrell Inc., 'Bendectin' Products Liability Litigation, 624 F.Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
191. See also 857 F.2d 290, 318 (6th Cir. 1988), and Sanders (1992), op. cit. note 10, 339.
192. In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290, 318 (6th Cir. 1988).
193. See Mike Michael, 'Lay Discourses of Science: Science-in-General, Science-in-Particular, and Self', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1992), 313-33.
194. Jasanoff, op. cit. note 41; see also Smith, op. cit. note 43; Wynne, op. cit. note 100; Roger Smith, 'Expertise and Causal Attribution in Deciding between Crime and Mental Disorder', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 67-98.
195. Jasanoff, op. cit. note 41; see also Smith, op. cit. note 43; Wynne, op. cit. note 100; Roger Smith, 'Expertise and Causal Attribution in Deciding between Crime and Mental Disorder', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 67-98.
196. Jasanoff, op. cit. note 41; see also Smith, op. cit. note 43; Wynne, op. cit. note 100; Roger Smith, 'Expertise and Causal Attribution in Deciding between Crime and Mental Disorder', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 67-98.
197. Jasanoff, op. cit. note 41; see also Smith, op. cit. note 43; Wynne, op. cit. note 100; Roger Smith, 'Expertise and Causal Attribution in Deciding between Crime and Mental Disorder', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 67-98.
198. Sanders (1992), op. cit. note 10, 362-85.
199. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 'Bendectin' Products Liability Litigation. MDL No. 486, 624 F.Supp. 1212, 1221 (S.D. Ohio 1985): also Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 884 F.2d 170; DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 952.
200. 857 F.2d 290, 317 (6th Cir. 1988).
201. 874 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1989), emphases added.
202. 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992); see also 1351.
203. George L. Priest, 'The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 14 (1985), 461-502; Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).
204. George L. Priest, 'The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 14 (1985), 461-502; Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).
205. 113 S.Ct 2786 (1993).
206. 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).
207. Marcia Angel, Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case (New York: Norton, 1996); Sheila Jasanoff, 'Expert Games in Silicon Gel Breast Implant Litigation', in Michael Freeman and Helen Reece (eds), Science in Court (Aldershot, Hants.: Dartmouth, 1998), 83-107.
208. Marcia Angel, Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case (New York: Norton, 1996); Sheila Jasanoff, 'Expert Games in Silicon Gel Breast Implant Litigation', in Michael Freeman and Helen Reece (eds), Science in Court (Aldershot, Hants.: Dartmouth, 1998), 83-107.
209. David L. Faigman, Elise Porter and Michael J. Saks, 'Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence', Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 15 (1994), 1799-835, at 1811.
210. For example, the majority judgment in the US Supreme Court decision in General Electric Company v. Joiner (522 US 136, 139; L.Ed.2d 508, 521; 118 S.Ct. 512 [1997]), quoted the New England Journal of Medicine amicus curiae brief submitted in support of the defendant: 'A judge could better fulfil this gatekeeper function [in relation to proffers of expert evidence] if he or she had help from scientists. Judges should be strongly encouraged to make greater use of their inherent authority . . . to appoint experts. . . . Reputable experts could be recommended to courts by established scientific organizations, such as the National Academy of Science or the American Association for the Advancement of Science'.
211. Edmond & Mercer, op. cit. notes 3, 55; Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? A Citizen's Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 395-409, at 408: 'Citizens who train themselves to read and understand the primary sources, the original scientific studies, can participate meaningfully; those who do not, cannot'. Cf. Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, 'About Misunderstandings about Misunderstandings', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 1 (1992), 17-22, at 20: 'For the requirement, usually accepted as an implicit article of faith, that people should be experts, or at least fluent, in science and medicine before giving their view about it, after all, is contrary to the basic tenet of our democratic societies. Democracy is a bet: the bet that conscience should take precedence over competence'.
212. Edmond & Mercer, op. cit. notes 3, 55; Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? A Citizen's Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 395-409, at 408: 'Citizens who train themselves to read and understand the primary sources, the original scientific studies, can participate meaningfully; those who do not, cannot'. Cf. Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, 'About Misunderstandings about Misunderstandings', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 1 (1992), 17-22, at 20: 'For the requirement, usually accepted as an implicit article of faith, that people should be experts, or at least fluent, in science and medicine before giving their view about it, after all, is contrary to the basic tenet of our democratic societies. Democracy is a bet: the bet that conscience should take precedence over competence'.
213. Edmond & Mercer, op. cit. notes 3, 55; Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? A Citizen's Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 395-409, at 408: 'Citizens who train themselves to read and understand the primary sources, the original scientific studies, can participate meaningfully; those who do not, cannot'. Cf. Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, 'About Misunderstandings about Misunderstandings', Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 1 (1992), 17-22, at 20: 'For the requirement, usually accepted as an implicit article of faith, that people should be experts, or at least fluent, in science and medicine before giving their view about it, after all, is contrary to the basic tenet of our democratic societies. Democracy is a bet: the bet that conscience should take precedence over competence'.
214. For example, the new English Civil Procedure Rules encourage the judge and parties to limit the number of experts and, where possible, to share a 'neutral' expert. Trial judges are encouraged and empowered to appoint 'a joint single expert', even if the parties are unable to reach agreement on the specific expert. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), 137-52, and the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), Part 35; Edmond, op. cit. note 19. For a range of proposals encouraging greater use of neutral experts, consider also: Bert Black, Francis Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert', Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 1715-811; David E. Bernstein, 'Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1996), 123-82; Note, 'Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108 (1995), 1481-605; Lee Loevinger, 'Science as Evidence', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 35 (1995), 153-90; James A. Martin, 'The Proposed "Science Court" ', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 75 (1977), 1058-91.
215. For example, the new English Civil Procedure Rules encourage the judge and parties to limit the number of experts and, where possible, to share a 'neutral' expert. Trial judges are encouraged and empowered to appoint 'a joint single expert', even if the parties are unable to reach agreement on the specific expert. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), 137-52, and the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), Part 35; Edmond, op. cit. note 19. For a range of proposals encouraging greater use of neutral experts, consider also: Bert Black, Francis Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert', Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 1715-811; David E. Bernstein, 'Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1996), 123-82; Note, 'Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108 (1995), 1481-605; Lee Loevinger, 'Science as Evidence', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 35 (1995), 153-90; James A. Martin, 'The Proposed "Science Court" ', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 75 (1977), 1058-91.
216. For example, the new English Civil Procedure Rules encourage the judge and parties to limit the number of experts and, where possible, to share a 'neutral' expert. Trial judges are encouraged and empowered to appoint 'a joint single expert', even if the parties are unable to reach agreement on the specific expert. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), 137-52, and the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), Part 35; Edmond, op. cit. note 19. For a range of proposals encouraging greater use of neutral experts, consider also: Bert Black, Francis Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert', Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 1715-811; David E. Bernstein, 'Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1996), 123-82; Note, 'Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108 (1995), 1481-605; Lee Loevinger, 'Science as Evidence', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 35 (1995), 153-90; James A. Martin, 'The Proposed "Science Court" ', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 75 (1977), 1058-91.
217. For example, the new English Civil Procedure Rules encourage the judge and parties to limit the number of experts and, where possible, to share a 'neutral' expert. Trial judges are encouraged and empowered to appoint 'a joint single expert', even if the parties are unable to reach agreement on the specific expert. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), 137-52, and the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), Part 35; Edmond, op. cit. note 19. For a range of proposals encouraging greater use of neutral experts, consider also: Bert Black, Francis Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert', Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 1715-811; David E. Bernstein, 'Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1996), 123-82; Note, 'Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108 (1995), 1481-605; Lee Loevinger, 'Science as Evidence', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 35 (1995), 153-90; James A. Martin, 'The Proposed "Science Court" ', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 75 (1977), 1058-91.
218. For example, the new English Civil Procedure Rules encourage the judge and parties to limit the number of experts and, where possible, to share a 'neutral' expert. Trial judges are encouraged and empowered to appoint 'a joint single expert', even if the parties are unable to reach agreement on the specific expert. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), 137-52, and the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), Part 35; Edmond, op. cit. note 19. For a range of proposals encouraging greater use of neutral experts, consider also: Bert Black, Francis Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert', Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 1715-811; David E. Bernstein, 'Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1996), 123-82; Note, 'Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108 (1995), 1481-605; Lee Loevinger, 'Science as Evidence', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 35 (1995), 153-90; James A. Martin, 'The Proposed "Science Court" ', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 75 (1977), 1058-91.
219. For example, the new English Civil Procedure Rules encourage the judge and parties to limit the number of experts and, where possible, to share a 'neutral' expert. Trial judges are encouraged and empowered to appoint 'a joint single expert', even if the parties are unable to reach agreement on the specific expert. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), 137-52, and the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), Part 35; Edmond, op. cit. note 19. For a range of proposals encouraging greater use of neutral experts, consider also: Bert Black, Francis Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert', Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 1715-811; David E. Bernstein, 'Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1996), 123-82; Note, 'Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108 (1995), 1481-605; Lee Loevinger, 'Science as Evidence', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 35 (1995), 153-90; James A. Martin, 'The Proposed "Science Court" ', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 75 (1977), 1058-91.
220. For example, the new English Civil Procedure Rules encourage the judge and parties to limit the number of experts and, where possible, to share a 'neutral' expert. Trial judges are encouraged and empowered to appoint 'a joint single expert', even if the parties are unable to reach agreement on the specific expert. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), 137-52, and the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), Part 35; Edmond, op. cit. note 19. For a range of proposals encouraging greater use of neutral experts, consider also: Bert Black, Francis Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert', Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 1715-811; David E. Bernstein, 'Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1996), 123-82; Note, 'Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108 (1995), 1481-605; Lee Loevinger, 'Science as Evidence', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 35 (1995), 153-90; James A. Martin, 'The Proposed "Science Court" ', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 75 (1977), 1058-91.
221. For example, the new English Civil Procedure Rules encourage the judge and parties to limit the number of experts and, where possible, to share a 'neutral' expert. Trial judges are encouraged and empowered to appoint 'a joint single expert', even if the parties are unable to reach agreement on the specific expert. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996), 137-52, and the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), Part 35; Edmond, op. cit. note 19. For a range of proposals encouraging greater use of neutral experts, consider also: Bert Black, Francis Ayala and Carol Saffran-Brinks, 'Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert', Texas Law Review, Vol. 72 (1994), 1715-811; David E. Bernstein, 'Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth', Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1996), 123-82; Note, 'Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108 (1995), 1481-605; Lee Loevinger, 'Science as Evidence', Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 35 (1995), 153-90; James A. Martin, 'The Proposed "Science Court" ', Michigan Law Review, Vol. 75 (1977), 1058-91.