Witnessing identification: Latent fingerprinting evidence and expert knowledge

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 28, Issue 5-6, 1998, Pages 687-712

  Cole, Simon A ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032258625     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631298028005002     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. See, for example, Andrew Ross, 'If the Genes Fir, How do You Acquit?', in Toni Morrison and Claudia Brodsky Lacour (eds), Birth of a Nation'hood: Gaze, Script, and Spectacle in the OJ Simpson Case (New York: Pantheon, 1997), 241-72.
2. Alec Jeffreys, the inventor of the first genetic identification technique reports that . . . . . . one of the reasons we called this 'DNA fingerprinting' was absolutely deliberate. If we had called this 'idiosyncratic Southern blot profiling', nobody would have taken a blind bit of notice. Call it 'DNA fingerprinting', and the penny dropped. [Alec Jeffreys, interviewed by Michael Lynch, Ruth McNally and Patrick Daly, University of Leicester, UK, 24 July 1996]. Forensic practitioners soon dropped the term 'DNA fingerprinting' in favour of 'DNA typing' or 'DNA profiling'. I draw-throughout this paper on interviews conducted as part of our NSF-funded team project: for further details, see the 'Introduction' to this Special Issue by Michael Lynch and Sheila Jasanoff, 'Contested Identities: Science, Law and Forensic Practice', Social Studio of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 675-86 at 681-82.
3. Eric S. Lander and Bruce Budowle, 'DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest', Nature, Vol. 371 (27 October 1994), 735-38, at 735. See also the paper in this Special Issue by Saul Halfon: 'Collecting, Testing and Convincing: Forensic DNA Experts in the Courts', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 801-28.
4. Eric S. Lander and Bruce Budowle, 'DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest', Nature, Vol. 371 (27 October 1994), 735-38, at 735. See also the paper in this Special Issue by Saul Halfon: 'Collecting, Testing and Convincing: Forensic DNA Experts in the Courts', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, Nos 5-6 (October-December 1998), 801-28.
5. Johnnie Cochran, quoted in Anne Joseph and Alison Winter, 'Making the Match: Human Traces, Forensic Experts and the Public Imagination', in Francis Spufford and Jenny Uglow (eds), Cultural Babbage: Technology, Time and Invention (London: Faber & Faber, 1996), 193-214, at 208.
6. Grice v. Stau, 151 S.W.2d 211 (Texas, 1941).
7. This is a general impression gathered from the absence of cases including defense challenges to fingerprint evidence in the legal record (but see State v. Caldwell, below) and discussions and interviews with attorneys and LFPEs. It is difficult, of course, to provide evidence of a negative, but one illustration of the tendency of defense attorneys to take fingerprint evidence for granted was provided by an investigation of a recent evidence-tampering scandal among the New York State Police. The investigation found that 'in most, if not all of the cases where fingerprint evidence was significant, the defense attorneys were surprisingly complacent about the fingerprint evidence and did little, if anything to challenge it . . . . Indeed, it does not appear that a latent fingerprint expert participated on behalf on the defense in any of the tainted cases'. This was in spite of the fact that many of the fabrications were crude and easily detectable, and 'in at least one case the circumstance cried out for an independent evaluation by a defense fingerprint expert': Nelson E. Roth, The New York State Police Evidence Tampering Investigation, Report to the Governor of the State of New York (Ithaca, NY, 20 January 1997), 312.
8. See, for example, People v. Basheen Rush (New York, 1995), trial transcript, 186, quoted in 'Court Decisions', New York Law Journal, Vol. 31 (20 June 1995), col. 2.
9. See, especially, Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-22; Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989), 56-92.
10. See, especially, Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-22; Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (London: Routledge, 1989), 56-92.
11. See Joseph & Winter, op. cit. note 4.
12. This figure is taken from Martin Leadbetter, 'Rex v. Stratton and Stratton', Fingerprint Whorld, Vol. 2 (January 1977), 32-38, at 35. Fingerprint Whorld is published by The Fingerprint Society, and is currently edited by Graham Hughes, at the Fingerprint Bureau, Merseyside Police HQ, Canning Place, Liverpool L1 8JX, UK.
13. This figure is taken from an item by John E. Berry in Ridge Detail in Nature, Vol. 7 (1983), 2. This annual journal is edited and published by John Berry, at 4 Chilterns, South Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 8JU, UK.
14. Figure 3 is also used by Saul Halfon in his paper in this Special Issue: op. cit. note 3, 809. It is an autoradiograph produced by GencLex Corporation, and reproduced here with their kind permission. On the problems of seeing autoradiographs, see Klaus Amann and Karin Knorr-Cetina, 'The Fixation of (Visual) Evidence', in Michael Lynch and Steve Woolgar (eds), Representation in Scientific Practice (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 85-122.
15. I am making deliberate use of an analogy with the 19th-century optical invention, the stereoscope, which entailed a similar disciplining of observation: see Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990).
16. William F. Leahy, 'The Value of an Identification Bureau to a Prosecuting Attorney', Minutes of the Annual Convention of the International Association for Identification (Berkeley, CA: International Association for Identification, 1921), 32.
17. See Michael Lynch, 'Discipline and the Material Form of Images: An Analysis of Scientific Visibility', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 37-66. An analogous, though clearly more tenuous, argument was made in the Rodney King case. The State's expert witnesses contended that what appeared to lay observers around the world as an unambiguous videotape of four police officers brutalizing a helpless civilian, was actually something quite different when viewed through the lens of their professional expertise: Charles Goodwin, 'Professional Vision', American Anthropologist, Vol. 96 , No. 3 (September 1994), 606-33; Avital Ronell, 'Video/Television/Rodney King: Twelve Steps beyond The Pleasure Principal', Differences, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1992), 1-15. Another group of technicians with 'professional vision' is discussed in Stephen R. Barley, 'The Social Construction of a Machine: Ritual, Superstition, Magical Thinking and Other Pragmatic Responses to Running a CT Scanner', in Margaret Lock and Deborah R. Gordon (eds), Biomedicine Examined (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 497-539; Barley, 'Technology as an Occasion for Structuring: Evidence from Observations of CT Scanners and the Social Order of Radiology Departments', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1986), 78-108.
18. See Michael Lynch, 'Discipline and the Material Form of Images: An Analysis of Scientific Visibility', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 37-66. An analogous, though clearly more tenuous, argument was made in the Rodney King case. The State's expert witnesses contended that what appeared to lay observers around the world as an unambiguous videotape of four police officers brutalizing a helpless civilian, was actually something quite different when viewed through the lens of their professional expertise: Charles Goodwin, 'Professional Vision', American Anthropologist, Vol. 96 , No. 3 (September 1994), 606-33; Avital Ronell, 'Video/Television/Rodney King: Twelve Steps beyond The Pleasure Principal', Differences, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1992), 1-15. Another group of technicians with 'professional vision' is discussed in Stephen R. Barley, 'The Social Construction of a Machine: Ritual, Superstition, Magical Thinking and Other Pragmatic Responses to Running a CT Scanner', in Margaret Lock and Deborah R. Gordon (eds), Biomedicine Examined (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 497-539; Barley, 'Technology as an Occasion for Structuring: Evidence from Observations of CT Scanners and the Social Order of Radiology Departments', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1986), 78-108.
19. See Michael Lynch, 'Discipline and the Material Form of Images: An Analysis of Scientific Visibility', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 37-66. An analogous, though clearly more tenuous, argument was made in the Rodney King case. The State's expert witnesses contended that what appeared to lay observers around the world as an unambiguous videotape of four police officers brutalizing a helpless civilian, was actually something quite different when viewed through the lens of their professional expertise: Charles Goodwin, 'Professional Vision', American Anthropologist, Vol. 96 , No. 3 (September 1994), 606-33; Avital Ronell, 'Video/Television/Rodney King: Twelve Steps beyond The Pleasure Principal', Differences, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1992), 1-15. Another group of technicians with 'professional vision' is discussed in Stephen R. Barley, 'The Social Construction of a Machine: Ritual, Superstition, Magical Thinking and Other Pragmatic Responses to Running a CT Scanner', in Margaret Lock and Deborah R. Gordon (eds), Biomedicine Examined (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 497-539; Barley, 'Technology as an Occasion for Structuring: Evidence from Observations of CT Scanners and the Social Order of Radiology Departments', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1986), 78-108.
20. See Michael Lynch, 'Discipline and the Material Form of Images: An Analysis of Scientific Visibility', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 37-66. An analogous, though clearly more tenuous, argument was made in the Rodney King case. The State's expert witnesses contended that what appeared to lay observers around the world as an unambiguous videotape of four police officers brutalizing a helpless civilian, was actually something quite different when viewed through the lens of their professional expertise: Charles Goodwin, 'Professional Vision', American Anthropologist, Vol. 96 , No. 3 (September 1994), 606-33; Avital Ronell, 'Video/Television/Rodney King: Twelve Steps beyond The Pleasure Principal', Differences, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1992), 1-15. Another group of technicians with 'professional vision' is discussed in Stephen R. Barley, 'The Social Construction of a Machine: Ritual, Superstition, Magical Thinking and Other Pragmatic Responses to Running a CT Scanner', in Margaret Lock and Deborah R. Gordon (eds), Biomedicine Examined (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 497-539; Barley, 'Technology as an Occasion for Structuring: Evidence from Observations of CT Scanners and the Social Order of Radiology Departments', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1986), 78-108.
21. See Michael Lynch, 'Discipline and the Material Form of Images: An Analysis of Scientific Visibility', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1985), 37-66. An analogous, though clearly more tenuous, argument was made in the Rodney King case. The State's expert witnesses contended that what appeared to lay observers around the world as an unambiguous videotape of four police officers brutalizing a helpless civilian, was actually something quite different when viewed through the lens of their professional expertise: Charles Goodwin, 'Professional Vision', American Anthropologist, Vol. 96 , No. 3 (September 1994), 606-33; Avital Ronell, 'Video/Television/Rodney King: Twelve Steps beyond The Pleasure Principal', Differences, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1992), 1-15. Another group of technicians with 'professional vision' is discussed in Stephen R. Barley, 'The Social Construction of a Machine: Ritual, Superstition, Magical Thinking and Other Pragmatic Responses to Running a CT Scanner', in Margaret Lock and Deborah R. Gordon (eds), Biomedicine Examined (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 497-539; Barley, 'Technology as an Occasion for Structuring: Evidence from Observations of CT Scanners and the Social Order of Radiology Departments', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1986), 78-108.
22. I am indebted to Vilma Santiago-Irrizary for pointing out the curious positions Anglo-American law has taken regarding the reliability of vision and hearing. It generally trusts vision, even when, as in the case of eyewitness evidence, it is known to be unreliable - while hearing, as in the various restrictions on hearsay, is subjected to strict scrutiny. On the origins of modern science's equation of objectivity with visual analysis, see, for example, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, 'The Image of Objectivity', Representations, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Fall 1992), 81-128.
23. G. Tyler Mairs, 'Random Thoughts Concerning Finger Prints', Finger Print and Identification Magazine, Vol. 36, No. 2 (February 1955), 3-18, at 3.
24. Anonymous LFPE, interviewed by Simon Cole (24 July 1996).
25. The notion of synesthesia is drawn from James W. Fernandez, Persuasions and Performances: The Play of Tropes in Culture (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 40-41.
26. The first 'fingerprint expert' was probably Juan Vucetich, a criminalist in La Plata, Argentina, who supervised the use of fingerprints in the Rojas child-murder case in 1892. The earliest forensic fingerprint case appeared in Argentina because it was there that a fingerprint classification system for criminal record-keeping was first developed. Fingerprinting was initially embraced by police departments as a record-keeping tool; its forensic potential was generally viewed only as an additional benefit. See Simon A. Cole, Manufacturing Identity: A History of Criminal Identification Techniques from Photography through Fingerprinting (unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Science and Technology Studies, Cornell University, 1998), 124-97, 226-33.
27. George Wilton Wilton, Fingerprints: History, Law and Romance (London: William Hodge, 1938), 94.
28. Emperor v. Sahdeo 3 Indian L. Rep. 1 (Nagpur, 1904). Forensic fingerprint cases also appeared early in India because a second fingerprint classification was developed there by Edward Henry. Accordingly, India has the oldest case law on fingerprint evidence in the English language.
29. Emperor v. Abdul Hamid 32 Indian L. Rep. 759-70 (Calcutta, 1905), reprinted in John H. Taylor, Finger-Print Evidence (Washington, DC: United States Navy Department, 1920), 7-9.
30. Emperor v. Abdul Hamid, op. cit. note 23, 759-70.
31. The concept of 'jurisdiction' is taken from Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), esp. 86-91.
32. In 1901, Garson had opposed the Yard's switch from anthropometric identification to fingerprinting: Lord (Henry) Belper et al., Minutes of Evidence taken before the Departmental Committee on Identification of Criminals (London: Wyman & Sons, 1901), 40-42. Another 'expert', Henry Faulds, was at the defense table but, for reasons that are not clear, did not testify. Faulds was one of the originators of modern fingerprint identification, having described the technique in 'On the Skin Furrows of the Hand', Nature, Vol. 22 (28 October 1880), 605: see Cole, op. cit. note 20, 128-31. In a pamphlet published immediately after the Deptford trial, Faulds was highly critical of the Stratton match and competence of Collins and the Yard's fingerprint operation in general: Henry Faulds, Guide to Finger-Print Identification (Hanley, Staffs.: Wood Mitchell, 1905).
33. In 1901, Garson had opposed the Yard's switch from anthropometric identification to fingerprinting: Lord (Henry) Belper et al., Minutes of Evidence taken before the Departmental Committee on Identification of Criminals (London: Wyman & Sons, 1901), 40-42. Another 'expert', Henry Faulds, was at the defense table but, for reasons that are not clear, did not testify. Faulds was one of the originators of modern fingerprint identification, having described the technique in 'On the Skin Furrows of the Hand', Nature, Vol. 22 (28 October 1880), 605: see Cole, op. cit. note 20, 128-31. In a pamphlet published immediately after the Deptford trial, Faulds was highly critical of the Stratton match and competence of Collins and the Yard's fingerprint operation in general: Henry Faulds, Guide to Finger-Print Identification (Hanley, Staffs.: Wood Mitchell, 1905).
34. In 1901, Garson had opposed the Yard's switch from anthropometric identification to fingerprinting: Lord (Henry) Belper et al., Minutes of Evidence taken before the Departmental Committee on Identification of Criminals (London: Wyman & Sons, 1901), 40-42. Another 'expert', Henry Faulds, was at the defense table but, for reasons that are not clear, did not testify. Faulds was one of the originators of modern fingerprint identification, having described the technique in 'On the Skin Furrows of the Hand', Nature, Vol. 22 (28 October 1880), 605: see Cole, op. cit. note 20, 128-31. In a pamphlet published immediately after the Deptford trial, Faulds was highly critical of the Stratton match and competence of Collins and the Yard's fingerprint operation in general: Henry Faulds, Guide to Finger-Print Identification (Hanley, Staffs.: Wood Mitchell, 1905).
35. George Wilton Wilton, Fingerprints: Fifty Years of Injustice (Galashiels: A.Walker & Son, 1955), 13.
36. Anne M. Joseph, 'Anthropometry, the Police Expert, and the Deptford Murders: The Contested Introduction of Fingerprinting for the Identification of Criminals in Late Victorian and Edwardian Britain', in Jane Caplan and John Torpey (eds), Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), in press; Leadbetter, op. cit. note 10.
37. Mary Holland, wife of the editor of The Detective, Philip Holland, began a long tradition of female LFPEs in the United States: see Mary Jaene Edmonds, Haunting Chicago: The Legend of Mary Holland and the Jennings Murder Trial (forthcoming). Most women worked in record-keeping, though, and trial testimony was rare. Membership in the International Association for Identification was not open to women in the early 20th century.
38. Mary Holland, wife of the editor of The Detective, Philip Holland, began a long tradition of female LFPEs in the United States: see Mary Jaene Edmonds, Haunting Chicago: The Legend of Mary Holland and the Jennings Murder Trial (forthcoming). Most women worked in record-keeping, though, and trial testimony was rare. Membership in the International Association for Identification was not open to women in the early 20th century.
39. Scotland Yard's 'Henry system' of fingerprint classification had first been instituted in the USA in 1902 by Henry DeForest in order to verify the identity of applicants for the police and fire departments taking civil service applicants. For criminal identification, the Henry system had been implemented at the New York State Bureau of Prisons by James Parke in 1903. Parke, working from Henry's published training manual, had modified the system slightly, in effect creating a new classification system, which he dubbed 'The American System'. It was not until 1904 that Ferrier introduced the Henry system to the USA in its true form. Most US agencies adopted Ferrier's version of the Henry system, so 'The American System' became quite a misnomer: see Cole, op cit. note 20, 248-50, 295-97; Harry Myers II, 'De Forest's Pioneer Finger Print Operations', Finger Print and Identification Magazine, Vol. 30, No. 8 (August 1948), 3-19; Michael Harling, Origins of the New York State Bureau of Identification (Albany, NY: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 1996).
40. Scotland Yard's 'Henry system' of fingerprint classification had first been instituted in the USA in 1902 by Henry DeForest in order to verify the identity of applicants for the police and fire departments taking civil service applicants. For criminal identification, the Henry system had been implemented at the New York State Bureau of Prisons by James Parke in 1903. Parke, working from Henry's published training manual, had modified the system slightly, in effect creating a new classification system, which he dubbed 'The American System'. It was not until 1904 that Ferrier introduced the Henry system to the USA in its true form. Most US agencies adopted Ferrier's version of the Henry system, so 'The American System' became quite a misnomer: see Cole, op cit. note 20, 248-50, 295-97; Harry Myers II, 'De Forest's Pioneer Finger Print Operations', Finger Print and Identification Magazine, Vol. 30, No. 8 (August 1948), 3-19; Michael Harling, Origins of the New York State Bureau of Identification (Albany, NY: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 1996).
41. People v. Jennings, trial transcript, 139.
42. Ibid., 114-15.
43. People v. Jennings 96 N.E. 1077 (Illinois, 1911), at 1082-83.
44. Edward Lindsey, 'Conviction of Murder on Finger-Print Evidence', Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 1 (1911), 848-49, at 849.
45. People v. Crispi (New York, 1911), trial transcript, 41-45.
46. On handwriting experts, see Tamara Plakins Thornton, Handwriting in America: A Cultural History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 73-135; Roxanne Panchasi, 'Graphology and the Science of Individual Identity in Modern France', Configurations, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 1996), 1-31; D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux and Michael J. Saks, 'Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise" ', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 137 (1989), 731-88; and Jennifer Mnookin's forthcoming PhD thesis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
47. On handwriting experts, see Tamara Plakins Thornton, Handwriting in America: A Cultural History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 73-135; Roxanne Panchasi, 'Graphology and the Science of Individual Identity in Modern France', Configurations, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 1996), 1-31; D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux and Michael J. Saks, 'Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise" ', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 137 (1989), 731-88; and Jennifer Mnookin's forthcoming PhD thesis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
48. On handwriting experts, see Tamara Plakins Thornton, Handwriting in America: A Cultural History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 73-135; Roxanne Panchasi, 'Graphology and the Science of Individual Identity in Modern France', Configurations, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 1996), 1-31; D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux and Michael J. Saks, 'Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise" ', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 137 (1989), 731-88; and Jennifer Mnookin's forthcoming PhD thesis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
49. People v. Crispi, trial transcript, 83-99. On the problems of replication, see H.M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 29-49.
50. In their book Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 60-65, Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer argue that science requires a mechanism for 'witnessing' experiments. For reasons of convenience, scientists eventually dispensed with 'live' witnessing, establishing in its stead more complex mechanisms for 'virtual witnessing'. In this case, Faurot blurred the boundary between 'virtual' and actual witnesses.
51. People v. Crispi (New York County District Attorney Case File #81943, Municipal Archives of the City of New York). Similarly, during the testimony of a Norwegian expert witness, a reporter remarked: 'The resemblance leapt to our eyes': A. Daae, 'Un cas d'identification par les empreintes digitales à la cour d'assiss de Christiania', Archives Internationales de Médecine Légale, Vol. 2 (1911), 58-62, at 59. The rhetorical technique of making the jurors participants in the matching process is still practised today. One LFPE suggests leaving some points unlabelled, so the jury can find them for themselves: Pat A. Wertheim, 'Qualifying as an Expert Fingerprint Witness: Designing a Set of Questions to Assist in Court Testimony', Journal of Forensic Identification, Vol. 40 (1990), 60-68.
52. People v. Crispi (New York County District Attorney Case File #81943, Municipal Archives of the City of New York). Similarly, during the testimony of a Norwegian expert witness, a reporter remarked: 'The resemblance leapt to our eyes': A. Daae, 'Un cas d'identification par les empreintes digitales à la cour d'assiss de Christiania', Archives Internationales de Médecine Légale, Vol. 2 (1911), 58-62, at 59. The rhetorical technique of making the jurors participants in the matching process is still practised today. One LFPE suggests leaving some points unlabelled, so the jury can find them for themselves: Pat A. Wertheim, 'Qualifying as an Expert Fingerprint Witness: Designing a Set of Questions to Assist in Court Testimony', Journal of Forensic Identification, Vol. 40 (1990), 60-68.
53. People v. Crispi, trial transcript, 162-63.
54. Ibid., 255; 'Finger Prints Convict', New York Times (12 May 1911), 20.
55. Ibid., 255; 'Finger Prints Convict', New York Times (12 May 1911), 20.
56. Catherine Crawford, 'Legalizing Medicine: Early Modern Legal Systems and the Growth of Medico-Legal Knowledge', in Michael Clark and Crawford (eds), Legal Medicine in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 89-116; Mary Nagle Wessling, 'Infanticide Trials and Forensic Medicine: Württemburg, 1757-93', in ibid., 117-44; Joel Peter Eigen, ' "I Answer as a Physician": Opinion as Fact in Pre-McNaughtan Trials', in ibid., 167-99.
57. Catherine Crawford, 'Legalizing Medicine: Early Modern Legal Systems and the Growth of Medico-Legal Knowledge', in Michael Clark and Crawford (eds), Legal Medicine in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 89-116; Mary Nagle Wessling, 'Infanticide Trials and Forensic Medicine: Württemburg, 1757-93', in ibid., 117-44; Joel Peter Eigen, ' "I Answer as a Physician": Opinion as Fact in Pre-McNaughtan Trials', in ibid., 167-99.
58. Catherine Crawford, 'Legalizing Medicine: Early Modern Legal Systems and the Growth of Medico-Legal Knowledge', in Michael Clark and Crawford (eds), Legal Medicine in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 89-116; Mary Nagle Wessling, 'Infanticide Trials and Forensic Medicine: Württemburg, 1757-93', in ibid., 117-44; Joel Peter Eigen, ' "I Answer as a Physician": Opinion as Fact in Pre-McNaughtan Trials', in ibid., 167-99.
59. James C. Mohr, Doctors and the Law: Medical Jurisprudence in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
60. Charles E. Rosenberg, The Trial of the Assassin Guiteau: Psychiatry and Law in the Gilded Age (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1968).
61. Julie Johnson[-McGrath], 'Coroners, Corruption and the Politics of Death: Forensic Pathology in the United States', in Clark & Crawford (eds), op. cit. note 42, 268-89.
62. On graphology, see note 36.
63. Claire Valier, 'True Crime Stories: Scientific Methods of Criminal Investigation, Criminology, and Historiography', British Journal of 'Criminology, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter 1998), 88-105, at 93.
64. Frederick Kuhne, The Finger Print Instructor (New York: Munn, 1917), iv.
65. Edwin R. Keedy, 'Finger Prints and Heart Pulsations', Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 3 (1913), 952-54, at 953.
66. A.A. Gribben, 'How the Finger Print Expert Presents His Case in Court', Finger Print and Identification Magazine, Vol. 1, No. 2 (August 1919), 499-516 at 511 (emphasis in original).
67. Ibid, (emphasis in original). Gribben's is a very revealing use of the term 'must' to describe both the necessity that the judgements of two experts be the same and the underlying principle that different judgements are not possible.
68. David R. Ashbaugh, 'The Premise of Friction Ridge Identification, Clarity, and the Identification Process', Journal of Forensic Identification, Vol. 44 (1994), 499-516, at 511.
69. 'The fingerprint expert is unique among the forensic specialists. Because the fingerprint science is objective and exact, conclusions reached by fingerprint experts are absolute and final': Robert J. Hazen and Clarence E. Phillips, 'The Expert Fingerprint Witness', in Henry C. Lee and R.E. Gaensslen (eds), Advances in Fingerprint Technology (New York: Elsevier, 1991), 241-59, at 242. The former head of the Identification Division at New Scotland Yard (citing a 1934 legal judgment) agrees: 'It is possible that arguments regarding the origin of the fingerprint may take place, but not about the fundamental identification. Fingerprint identification is not a conclusion based on theories, but fact ...': Gerald T.C. Lambourne, 'Fingerprint Standards', Medicine, Science, and the Law, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 1984), 227-29, at 227.
70. 'The fingerprint expert is unique among the forensic specialists. Because the fingerprint science is objective and exact, conclusions reached by fingerprint experts are absolute and final': Robert J. Hazen and Clarence E. Phillips, 'The Expert Fingerprint Witness', in Henry C. Lee and R.E. Gaensslen (eds), Advances in Fingerprint Technology (New York: Elsevier, 1991), 241-59, at 242. The former head of the Identification Division at New Scotland Yard (citing a 1934 legal judgment) agrees: 'It is possible that arguments regarding the origin of the fingerprint may take place, but not about the fundamental identification. Fingerprint identification is not a conclusion based on theories, but fact ...': Gerald T.C. Lambourne, 'Fingerprint Standards', Medicine, Science, and the Law, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 1984), 227-29, at 227.
71. Kuhne, op. cit. note 48, 61.
72. For instance, the British recently reported a fingerprint misidentification. Although the press speculated that this might undermine the credibility of fingerprint evidence, nothing more has been heard of the case as of this writing. See: Stephen Grey, 'Yard in Fingerprint Blunder', The Times (London, 6 April 1997), 4; Duncan Campbell, 'Fingerprint Proof "Flawed" ', The Guardian (London, 7 April 1997), 5; Keith Potter, 'Error in Fingerprint Identification Could Lead to More Challenges', Police Review (11 April 1997), 4. I am indebted to Michael Lynch and John Berry for these references.
73. For instance, the British recently reported a fingerprint misidentification. Although the press speculated that this might undermine the credibility of fingerprint evidence, nothing more has been heard of the case as of this writing. See: Stephen Grey, 'Yard in Fingerprint Blunder', The Times (London, 6 April 1997), 4; Duncan Campbell, 'Fingerprint Proof "Flawed" ', The Guardian (London, 7 April 1997), 5; Keith Potter, 'Error in Fingerprint Identification Could Lead to More Challenges', Police Review (11 April 1997), 4. I am indebted to Michael Lynch and John Berry for these references.
74. For instance, the British recently reported a fingerprint misidentification. Although the press speculated that this might undermine the credibility of fingerprint evidence, nothing more has been heard of the case as of this writing. See: Stephen Grey, 'Yard in Fingerprint Blunder', The Times (London, 6 April 1997), 4; Duncan Campbell, 'Fingerprint Proof "Flawed" ', The Guardian (London, 7 April 1997), 5; Keith Potter, 'Error in Fingerprint Identification Could Lead to More Challenges', Police Review (11 April 1997), 4. I am indebted to Michael Lynch and John Berry for these references.
75. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W. 2d 574 (Minnesota, 1982), at 584. Also see James E. Starrs, 'A Miscue in Fingerprint Identification: Causes and Concerns', Journal of Police Science and Administration, Vol. 12 (1984), 287-96. Technically, because US appeals courts may not rule on facts, the Court determined that the trial court had improperly denied the defendant's request for a new trial on the basis of new evidence that the original fingerprint identification was erroneous.
76. In 1939, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed a murder conviction because the fingerprint identification had been made by H.G. Coffey, an 'expert' of suspect qualifications. Coffey claimed to be a graduate of Cook & Evans University in Chicago, an inaccurate reference to the criminalistics school, The Institute of Applied Science: Shelton v. Commonwealth 134 S.W. 2d 653 (Kentucky, 1939), at 656.
77. 'Certification Revoked', Identification News, Vol. 31, No. 2 (February 1981), 2; 'Certification Revoked', ibid., No. 9 (September 1981), 2.
78. 'Certification Revoked', Identification News, Vol. 31, No. 2 (February 1981), 2; 'Certification Revoked', ibid., No. 9 (September 1981), 2.
79. Marie R. Haug, 'Computer Technology and the Obsolescence of the Concept of Profession', in Haug and Jacques Dofny (eds), Work and Technology (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977), 215-28. Condemning the erring LFPE for incompetence is the profession's way of 'accounting for error', which allows it to preserve the integrity of the profession by sacrificing the credibility of a member: see Michael Mulkay and G. Nigel Gilbert, 'Accounting for Error: How Scientists Construct their Social World When They Account for Correct and Incorrect Belief, Sociology,Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1982), 165-83. Charles Perrow, in his Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic, 1984), notes a similar institutional preference for blaming 'human error' rather than flaws in 'the system'.
80. Marie R. Haug, 'Computer Technology and the Obsolescence of the Concept of Profession', in Haug and Jacques Dofny (eds), Work and Technology (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977), 215-28. Condemning the erring LFPE for incompetence is the profession's way of 'accounting for error', which allows it to preserve the integrity of the profession by sacrificing the credibility of a member: see Michael Mulkay and G. Nigel Gilbert, 'Accounting for Error: How Scientists Construct their Social World When They Account for Correct and Incorrect Belief, Sociology,Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1982), 165-83. Charles Perrow, in his Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic, 1984), notes a similar institutional preference for blaming 'human error' rather than flaws in 'the system'.
81. Marie R. Haug, 'Computer Technology and the Obsolescence of the Concept of Profession', in Haug and Jacques Dofny (eds), Work and Technology (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977), 215-28. Condemning the erring LFPE for incompetence is the profession's way of 'accounting for error', which allows it to preserve the integrity of the profession by sacrificing the credibility of a member: see Michael Mulkay and G. Nigel Gilbert, 'Accounting for Error: How Scientists Construct their Social World When They Account for Correct and Incorrect Belief, Sociology,Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1982), 165-83. Charles Perrow, in his Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic, 1984), notes a similar institutional preference for blaming 'human error' rather than flaws in 'the system'.
82. State v. Caldwell, op. cit. note 56, at 596 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
83. Everett Cherrington Hughes, Men and their Work (Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 1958), 90. In forensic science in general, there is a similar tendency to blame the individual scientist or technician for 'miscarriages of justice', while preserving the credibility of the system: Carol A.G. Jones, Expert Witnesses: Science, Medicine, and the Practice of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 270-71.
84. Everett Cherrington Hughes, Men and their Work (Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 1958), 90. In forensic science in general, there is a similar tendency to blame the individual scientist or technician for 'miscarriages of justice', while preserving the credibility of the system: Carol A.G. Jones, Expert Witnesses: Science, Medicine, and the Practice of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 270-71.
85. Robert D. Olsen, Sr, 'Identification of Latent Prints', in Lee & Gaensslen (eds), op. cit. note 53, 39-58, at 55-56 (emphasis in original). Also see Starrs, op. cit. note 56, 295
86. David L. Grieve, electronic posting [forens-1@acc.fau.edu], Forensics Newsgroup (28 March 1995).
87. Azriel Gorski, electronic posting [forens-1@acc.fau.edu], Forensics Newsgroup (22 March 1995).
88. Roger Smith, 'Forensic Pathology, Scientific Expertise, and the Criminal Law', in Smith & Wynne (eds), op. cit. note 8, 56-92, at 65-66.
89. See note 48.
90. Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 355-407.
91. Abbott, op. cit. note 25, 51.
92. Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the International Association for Identification (Memphis, TN: IAI, 30 August - 3 September 1927), 39.
93. Andre A. Moenssens, 'Testifying as a Fingerprint Witness', Finger Print and Identification Magazine, Vol. 54, No. 6 (June 1972), 3-18, at 14.
94. Olsen, op. cit. note 62, 55-56.
95. Bernard W.N. Robertson, 'Fingerprints, Relevance and Admissibility', New Zealand Recent Law Review, Vol. 2 (1990), 252-58, at 256. Also see Thomas E. Krupowicz, Fingerprints: Innocence or Guilt, the Identity Factors (Chicago, IL: Terk, 1994), 161.
96. Bernard W.N. Robertson, 'Fingerprints, Relevance and Admissibility', New Zealand Recent Law Review, Vol. 2 (1990), 252-58, at 256. Also see Thomas E. Krupowicz, Fingerprints: Innocence or Guilt, the Identity Factors (Chicago, IL: Terk, 1994), 161.
97. Andre A. Moenssens, 'Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution', Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Spring 1993), 1-20, at 5.
98. For more on this issue, see Simon A. Cole, 'What Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of Latent Fingerprint Identification', Science in Context (forthcoming).
99. Abbott, op. cit. note 25, 71.
100. Michael J. Saks, 'Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science', Hastings Law Journal (forthcoming); David Stoney, 'Fingerprint Identification', in David L. Faigman et al. (eds), Modern Scientific Evidence (St Paul, MN: West), 814-39.
101. Michael J. Saks, 'Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science', Hastings Law Journal (forthcoming); David Stoney, 'Fingerprint Identification', in David L. Faigman et al. (eds), Modern Scientific Evidence (St Paul, MN: West), 814-39.
102. Kenneth B. Noble, 'Unorthodox Expert With a Nobel Prize Prepares for the Simpson Spotlight', New York Times (5 April 1995), A18.
103. On laboratory technicians and the routinization of DNA-typing techniques, see Kathleen Jordan and Michael Lynch, 'The Mainstreaming of a Molecular Biological Tool: A Case Study of a New Technique', in Graham Button (ed), Technology in Working Order: Studies of Work, Interaction, and Technology (London: Routledge, 1993), 162-78, at 175.
104. As Lander and Budowle claim: see note 3.
105. SEARCH Group Inc., Legal and Policy Issues Relating to Biometric Identification Technologies, unpublished report for the Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice (Sacramento, CA, April 1990), 3; William Ledlie Culbert and Frederick M. Lau, 'Identification by Comparison of Roentgenograms of Nasal Accessory Sinuses and Mastoid Processes', Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 89 (21 May 1927), 1634-36; Ciprian Kolb and Leo Gresz, 'A New Method for Identifying Persons: The Veins in the Back of the Hand', Scientific American Supplement, Vol. 70 (3 September 1910), 159.
106. SEARCH Group Inc., Legal and Policy Issues Relating to Biometric Identification Technologies, unpublished report for the Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice (Sacramento, CA, April 1990), 3; William Ledlie Culbert and Frederick M. Lau, 'Identification by Comparison of Roentgenograms of Nasal Accessory Sinuses and Mastoid Processes', Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 89 (21 May 1927), 1634-36; Ciprian Kolb and Leo Gresz, 'A New Method for Identifying Persons: The Veins in the Back of the Hand', Scientific American Supplement, Vol. 70 (3 September 1910), 159.
107. SEARCH Group Inc., Legal and Policy Issues Relating to Biometric Identification Technologies, unpublished report for the Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice (Sacramento, CA, April 1990), 3; William Ledlie Culbert and Frederick M. Lau, 'Identification by Comparison of Roentgenograms of Nasal Accessory Sinuses and Mastoid Processes', Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 89 (21 May 1927), 1634-36; Ciprian Kolb and Leo Gresz, 'A New Method for Identifying Persons: The Veins in the Back of the Hand', Scientific American Supplement, Vol. 70 (3 September 1910), 159.