Set for stability? Prospects for conflict and cooperation in East Asia

Review of International Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 405-428

  Berger, Thomas ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0034378871     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210500004058     Document Type: Article

References (113)

1. Aaron Friedberg, 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Mutlipolar Asia', International Security, 18:3 (Winter 1993/94).
2. See for instance, Richard K. Betts, 'Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security, 18:3 (Winter 1993/94); and Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, 'Rethinking East Asian Security,' Survival, 36:2 (1994).
3. See for instance, Richard K. Betts, 'Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security, 18:3 (Winter 1993/94); and Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, 'Rethinking East Asian Security,' Survival, 36:2 (1994).
4. To use the vernacular of international relations theory, cultural-ideological factors in East Asia simultaneously intensify the security dilemma while heightening the danger of buck-passing in mutually reinforcing and potentially catastrophic ways. On the concept of the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis's seminal work, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilmma,' World Politics, 30:2 (October 1978). On the notion of buck passing, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1984).
5. To use the vernacular of international relations theory, cultural-ideological factors in East Asia simultaneously intensify the security dilemma while heightening the danger of buck-passing in mutually reinforcing and potentially catastrophic ways. On the concept of the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis's seminal work, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilmma,' World Politics, 30:2 (October 1978). On the notion of buck passing, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1984).
6. For the purposes of the current discussion, stability is defined as the absence of a direct military conflict or the build-up of military forces in anticipation of such a conflict.
7. Classic formulations of the Realist position include Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for War and Peace, 5th edn. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1978 [1948]); and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For the most famous Realist criticism of those who would ignore factors of power, see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939, 2nd edn. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1948).
8. Classic formulations of the Realist position include Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for War and Peace, 5th edn. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1978 [1948]); and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For the most famous Realist criticism of those who would ignore factors of power, see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939, 2nd edn. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1948).
9. Classic formulations of the Realist position include Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for War and Peace, 5th edn. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1978 [1948]); and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For the most famous Realist criticism of those who would ignore factors of power, see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939, 2nd edn. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1948).
10. See Mogenthau, Politics among Nations; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
11. See Mogenthau, Politics among Nations; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
12. See Mogenthau, Politics among Nations; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
13. See Mogenthau, Politics among Nations; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).
14. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
15. As first argued by Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,' World Politics, 30:2 (January 1978).
16. See Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelph Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Robert Jervis, 'The Utility of Nuclear Deterrence,' International Security, 13:2 (1998).
17. See Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelph Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); and Robert Jervis, 'The Utility of Nuclear Deterrence,' International Security, 13:2 (1998).
18. Liberalism in IR represents a far more diverse and less well integrated body of literature than does Realism, although there are certain common features - i.e. a belief in progress in the international system and a belief in the malleability and perfectibility of the international system - which clearly ties the different strands together. For a useful recent overview, see Andrew Moravschik, 'A Liberal Theory of International Politics', International Organization, 51:4 (1997); Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); and David Baldwin, 'Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics', in David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For an overview of the history lineage of Liberal international relations theory, with an emphasis on its relationship to political theory, see Michael W. Doyle, The Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton, 1997).
19. Liberalism in IR represents a far more diverse and less well integrated body of literature than does Realism, although there are certain common features - i.e. a belief in progress in the international system and a belief in the malleability and perfectibility of the international system - which clearly ties the different strands together. For a useful recent overview, see Andrew Moravschik, 'A Liberal Theory of International Politics', International Organization, 51:4 (1997); Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); and David Baldwin, 'Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics', in David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For an overview of the history lineage of Liberal international relations theory, with an emphasis on its relationship to political theory, see Michael W. Doyle, The Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton, 1997).
20. Liberalism in IR represents a far more diverse and less well integrated body of literature than does Realism, although there are certain common features - i.e. a belief in progress in the international system and a belief in the malleability and perfectibility of the international system - which clearly ties the different strands together. For a useful recent overview, see Andrew Moravschik, 'A Liberal Theory of International Politics', International Organization, 51:4 (1997); Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); and David Baldwin, 'Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics', in David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For an overview of the history lineage of Liberal international relations theory, with an emphasis on its relationship to political theory, see Michael W. Doyle, The Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton, 1997).
21. Liberalism in IR represents a far more diverse and less well integrated body of literature than does Realism, although there are certain common features - i.e. a belief in progress in the international system and a belief in the malleability and perfectibility of the international system - which clearly ties the different strands together. For a useful recent overview, see Andrew Moravschik, 'A Liberal Theory of International Politics', International Organization, 51:4 (1997); Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); and David Baldwin, 'Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics', in David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For an overview of the history lineage of Liberal international relations theory, with an emphasis on its relationship to political theory, see Michael W. Doyle, The Ways of War and Peace (New York: Norton, 1997).
22. For a clearly articulated exposition of this view see Kenneth N. Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies', in Kenneth Oye (ed.), Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
23. For a succinct but comprehensive interpretation from a liberal point of view of the evolution of international system since the end of the Cold War, see Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986). For a more recent evaluation, see Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', Review of International Studies, 25:2 (1999).
24. For a succinct but comprehensive interpretation from a liberal point of view of the evolution of international system since the end of the Cold War, see Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986). For a more recent evaluation, see Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', Review of International Studies, 25:2 (1999).
25. The classic statement of this view is Norman Angell, The Grand Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1912).
26. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
27. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
28. The European community is usually cited as the first possible exemplar of such a change. See for instance, Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964).
29. Keohane, After Hegemony.
30. See Michael Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983); Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), Debating the Democratic Peace (International Security Reader: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
31. See Michael Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983); Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), Debating the Democratic Peace (International Security Reader: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
32. See Michael Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983); Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), Debating the Democratic Peace (International Security Reader: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
33. See Michael Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12:4 (1983); Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), Debating the Democratic Peace (International Security Reader: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
34. See Deudney and Ikenberry, 'Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', p. 186.
35. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
36. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
37. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
38. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
39. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
40. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
41. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
42. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
43. Constructivism is a relatively new paradigm in International Relations, although the concepts on which it draws enjoy a distinguished pedigree in the social sciences. The first use of the term is generally attributed to Nicholas N. Onuf, A World of Our Making (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). For other leading exemplars of the approach, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 1:3 (1987); and 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46:2 (1992). For reviews of the development of the constructivist approach see 'Introduction' in Jeff Chekel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, 50:2 (January 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianisms and the Social Constructivist Challenge', and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Political Change', both in International Organization, 52:4 (1998).
44. See Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It'.
45. Although he does not call himself a 'constructivist', this kind of argument is very much at the core of Steven Van Evera's influential article, 'Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15:3 (Winter 1990/91).
46. For an interesting example of Western Realist-type thinking in an Asian society where the structural constraints were very different from those in the West when Realism arose, see Ian Alasdair Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
47. This is not to say that the United States can impose its preferences on other regional actors, nor that it can act unilaterally without regard for other nations. Rather it means that in terms of actual capabilities, especially in the area of military capabilities, which Realist theorists tend to view as decisive, no other nation comes close to the United States in power.
48. On the general reorientation of Russian foreign policy, see Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998); and Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, The Soviet Collapse and the New Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
49. On the general reorientation of Russian foreign policy, see Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998); and Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, The Soviet Collapse and the New Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
50. On Russian strategic interests in the Far East, see Robert Legold, 'Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle', in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). On the border issue between the PRC and Russia, see Gilbert Rozman, 'Northeast China: Waiting for Regionalism', Problems of Post-Communism, 45:4 (1998).
51. On Russian strategic interests in the Far East, see Robert Legold, 'Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle', in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1995). On the border issue between the PRC and Russia, see Gilbert Rozman, 'Northeast China: Waiting for Regionalism', Problems of Post-Communism, 45:4 (1998).
52. For a particularly provocative example, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).
53. See Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 146.
54. Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, pp. 146-51. For a more detailed overview, see John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, 'Current and Future Challenges Facing China's Defense Industries', China Quarterly, 146 (June 1996).
55. Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, pp. 146-51. For a more detailed overview, see John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, 'Current and Future Challenges Facing China's Defense Industries', China Quarterly, 146 (June 1996).
56. One Japanese military officer who has observed Chinese military exercises told me that in his estimation it will be 20 years at least before the PRC's military forces can begin to approach Western or Japanese standards of training. Discussions in Tokyo, October 1996.
57. The United States is in all likelihood in the position to launch a successful disarming first strike agains the PRC if it chose to do so Even were a few Chinese strategic weapons to survive an American attack, the United States would maintain overwhelming escalation dominance, allowing it to blackmail the PRC along the lines of the famous 'Nitze scenario' of the early 1980s. Chinese leaders, assuming they wish to avoid annihilation, and also assuming they retain control over their own forces, would have no choice but to forgo retaliation.
58. For contrasting views on the Japanese defence industry, see Richard Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) and Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
59. For contrasting views on the Japanese defence industry, see Richard Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) and Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
60. For one recent assessment of the Japanese strategic nuclear potential, see Selig S. Harrison, 'Japan and Nuclear Weapons', in Selig Harrison (ed.), Japan's Nuclear Option (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).
61. For an argument along these lines, stressing geostrategic factors, see Robert S. Ross, 'The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century', International Security, 23:4 1999), pp. 90-2.
62. For a recent, optimistic assessment, see Michael O'Hanlon, 'Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks', International Security, 22:4 (1998). Even this relatively upbeat assessment, however, does not deny that the North could inflict massive military and civilian losses on the South and US forces stationed in Korea, losses which may be politically unacceptable for either government. Moreover it does not take into consideration the potential political impact of even relatively limited North Korean military operations.
63. For rationalist interpretations of North Korean policy as a form of coercive bargaining from a postion of weakness, see David Kang, 'North Korea: Deterrence through Danger', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Byeongil Ahn, 'The North Korean Problem and the Role of South Korea', in Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo (eds.), North Korea After Kim II Sung: Continuity or Change? (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press/Stanford University Press, 1997).
64. For rationalist interpretations of North Korean policy as a form of coercive bargaining from a postion of weakness, see David Kang, 'North Korea: Deterrence through Danger', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Byeongil Ahn, 'The North Korean Problem and the Role of South Korea', in Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo (eds.), North Korea After Kim II Sung: Continuity or Change? (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press/Stanford University Press, 1997).
65. For a useful English language review of the new Guidelines and their significance for US-Japanese security cooperation, see Paul S. Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima, 'Managing the New US-Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanisms to Address Post-Cold War Requirements', in Michael J. Green and Patrick Cronin (eds.), The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999); and Richard P. Cronin, 'Japan-US Security Cooperation: Implications of the New Defense Cooperation Guidelines' (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 30, 1997). In Japanese, see Morimoto Satoshi, Kyokuto Yuzi de Nihon wa Nani ga dekiru ka: Gaidorain to Yuzi Hosei (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyusho, 1999).
66. For a useful English language review of the new Guidelines and their significance for US-Japanese security cooperation, see Paul S. Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima, 'Managing the New US-Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanisms to Address Post-Cold War Requirements', in Michael J. Green and Patrick Cronin (eds.), The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999); and Richard P. Cronin, 'Japan-US Security Cooperation: Implications of the New Defense Cooperation Guidelines' (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 30, 1997). In Japanese, see Morimoto Satoshi, Kyokuto Yuzi de Nihon wa Nani ga dekiru ka: Gaidorain to Yuzi Hosei (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyusho, 1999).
67. For a useful English language review of the new Guidelines and their significance for US-Japanese security cooperation, see Paul S. Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima, 'Managing the New US-Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanisms to Address Post-Cold War Requirements', in Michael J. Green and Patrick Cronin (eds.), The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999); and Richard P. Cronin, 'Japan-US Security Cooperation: Implications of the New Defense Cooperation Guidelines' (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 30, 1997). In Japanese, see Morimoto Satoshi, Kyokuto Yuzi de Nihon wa Nani ga dekiru ka: Gaidorain to Yuzi Hosei (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyusho, 1999).
68. Since 1990 the United States has negotiated access to high quality air and naval facilities throughout Southeast Asia to compensate for the loss of its bases in the Philippines. According to the former commander in chief of the US Pacific command, the new emphasis is on 'places not bases'. See United States Department of Defense, East Asia Strategy Report (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1995), testimony of Admiral Charles R. Larson before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, March 2, 1994.
69. Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, pp. 48-55.
70. Periodically, concern is sounded that Japan may use its strategic relationship with the United States as a cover for engaging in a major military build-up. The breaking of the 1 per cent of GDP limit on defence spending in 1986, Japanese participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations after 1991 and the new Guidelines on US-Japanese Defense Cooperation - to mention only the most recent examples - have all been viewed as heralding a new era in Japanese security policy. The relative stability of Japan's actual military capabilities, as well as its continued reluctance to use its existing forces over the past decade or so, seem to indicate that these pronouncements may be a bit exaggerated.
71. For an overview of the regions dependence on outside sources for energy, see Kent Calder, Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific, revised edn. (Sonoma, CA: Nicholas Brealey, 1997), ch. 3. Note that Calder sees energy dependency and the growing demand for energy as a cause of increased instability in the region. Other analysts are cautious.
72. See Wu Xinbo, 'China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power', in M. Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practices, pp. 122-7,143-5. This does not imply that China's current leadership is committed to an idealistic interpretation of China's national interests. On the contrary, the majority of analysts maintain that Chinese leaders continue to have a very realist conception of the world. See Yong Deng, 'Chinese Conceptions of National Interest in International Relations', China Quarterly, 154 (June 1998). However, a Liberal would point out that the trend is in the direction towards greater emphasis on economic growth, greater emphasis on technocratic governance, and increased cooperation with the international community.
73. See Wu Xinbo, 'China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power', in M. Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practices, pp. 122-7,143-5. This does not imply that China's current leadership is committed to an idealistic interpretation of China's national interests. On the contrary, the majority of analysts maintain that Chinese leaders continue to have a very realist conception of the world. See Yong Deng, 'Chinese Conceptions of National Interest in International Relations', China Quarterly, 154 (June 1998). However, a Liberal would point out that the trend is in the direction towards greater emphasis on economic growth, greater emphasis on technocratic governance, and increased cooperation with the international community.
74. See C.H. Kwan, Economic Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region: Towards a Yen Bloc (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 4-5.
75. See Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura, Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
76. It should be noted that a considerable percentage of these investment flows are believed to have been actually generated in the mainland and disguised as Foreign Direct Investment in order to gain the tax exemptions which the Chinese government grants to foreign investors.
77. Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, p. 170.
78. See Samuel Kim, 'China's International Organizational Behaviour', in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1994), especially p. 406.
79. For an overview of Chinese participation in international institutions, see Michael Oksenberg and Elisabeth Economy (eds.), China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).
80. For a general overview of the development of regional institutions, see Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). On the development of institutions regarding the environment, see Miranda Schreurs and Dennis Pirages, Ecological Security in Northeast Asia (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Yonsei University Press, 1998).
81. For a general overview of the development of regional institutions, see Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). On the development of institutions regarding the environment, see Miranda Schreurs and Dennis Pirages, Ecological Security in Northeast Asia (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Yonsei University Press, 1998).
82. One of the more insightful and important debates concerns the degree to which the PRC is genuinely committed to arms control. Analysts remain divided on this issue, in part because the evidence remains ambiguous. For a relatively pessimistic point of view, see Banning N. Garret and Bonnie S. Galser, 'Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control', International Security, 20:3 (Winter 1995/1996). For a more optimistic assessment, see Ian Alasdair Johnston in Ikenberry and Mastanduno, International Relations in Asia Pacific.
83. One of the more insightful and important debates concerns the degree to which the PRC is genuinely committed to arms control. Analysts remain divided on this issue, in part because the evidence remains ambiguous. For a relatively pessimistic point of view, see Banning N. Garret and Bonnie S. Galser, 'Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control', International Security, 20:3 (Winter 1995/1996). For a more optimistic assessment, see Ian Alasdair Johnston in Ikenberry and Mastanduno, International Relations in Asia Pacific.
84. For an overview, see Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security, International Institute of Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper #302 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
85. For a useful review of these developments, see Minxin Pei, 'The Fall and Rise of Democracy in East Asia', in Larry Diamond and Mark Plattner (eds.), Democracy in East Asia (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
86. See Victor Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), conclusions.
87. For a good overview of the development of the crisis, see Karl D. Jackson (ed.), Asian Contagion: The Causes and Consequences of a Financial Crisis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999). On the potential problems of the Chinese economy, see Nicholas Lardy. For a more left-wing perspective on the crisis, see Robert Wade, The New Left Review.
88. For a good overview of the development of the crisis, see Karl D. Jackson (ed.), Asian Contagion: The Causes and Consequences of a Financial Crisis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999). On the potential problems of the Chinese economy, see Nicholas Lardy. For a more left-wing perspective on the crisis, see Robert Wade, The New Left Review.
89. For a rather grim assessment of the potential strategic impact of the Asian economic crisis on regional security, see Paul Dibb, David D. Hale and Peter Prince, 'The Strategic Implications of Asia's Economic Crisis', Survival, 40:2 (Summer 1998).
90. The New York Times, July 12, 1999, A1.
91. As always, such pronostications should be taken with a grain of salt. While the crisis has not immediately resulted in a collapse of international order, in a number of respects the underlying roots of the crisis remain more or less intact. In particular the opaque personalistic business practices and close ties between the public and private sectors have not been swept away by the fresh winds of globalization that blew through Asian financial markets between 1997 and 1999. The possibility of a second round of crisis, possibly even more severe than the first, cannot be ignored.
92. For a series of detailed, recent analyses of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme and its strategic and political implications, see Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes (eds.), Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Penninsula (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). For a revealing review of the diplomatic relationship between the United States and the two Koreas, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997).
93. For a series of detailed, recent analyses of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme and its strategic and political implications, see Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes (eds.), Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Penninsula (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). For a revealing review of the diplomatic relationship between the United States and the two Koreas, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997).
94. Kim Il Sungism is held to have superseded Marxism-Leninism since the 1992 revision of the North Korean constitution.
95. For an overview of the ideological development of the North Korean regime, see Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Jung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
96. On the character of the North Korea regime, see Thomas H. Henriksen Jongryn Mo (eds.), North Korea After Kim Il Sung (see fn. 36 above); and Dae Sook Suh and Chae Jin Lee, North Korea after Kim Il Sung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). For a penetrating and relatively sympathetic portrayal, see Bruce Cummings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: Norton, 1997), ch. 8.
97. On the character of the North Korea regime, see Thomas H. Henriksen Jongryn Mo (eds.), North Korea After Kim Il Sung (see fn. 36 above); and Dae Sook Suh and Chae Jin Lee, North Korea after Kim Il Sung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). For a penetrating and relatively sympathetic portrayal, see Bruce Cummings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: Norton, 1997), ch. 8.
98. On the character of the North Korea regime, see Thomas H. Henriksen Jongryn Mo (eds.), North Korea After Kim Il Sung (see fn. 36 above); and Dae Sook Suh and Chae Jin Lee, North Korea after Kim Il Sung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). For a penetrating and relatively sympathetic portrayal, see Bruce Cummings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: Norton, 1997), ch. 8.
99. For a review of these issues, see Alan Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); and Tu Weiming, 'Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan', China Quarterly, 148 (December 1996). On the democratization process in Taiwan, and its close linkage to the issue of sovereignty, see Yun Han Chu, 'Taiwan's Unique Challenges', Journal of Democracy, 7:3 (July 1996), pp. 70-71, 78-81. Reflecting the historically contingent nature of the process of identity creation, in South Korea the trend has been in precisely the opposite direction, with the pro-democracy movement using nationalist themes of a unified Korea to attack the regime and calling for greater dialogue with the North.
100. For a review of these issues, see Alan Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); and Tu Weiming, 'Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan', China Quarterly, 148 (December 1996). On the democratization process in Taiwan, and its close linkage to the issue of sovereignty, see Yun Han Chu, 'Taiwan's Unique Challenges', Journal of Democracy, 7:3 (July 1996), pp. 70-71, 78-81. Reflecting the historically contingent nature of the process of identity creation, in South Korea the trend has been in precisely the opposite direction, with the pro-democracy movement using nationalist themes of a unified Korea to attack the regime and calling for greater dialogue with the North.
101. For a review of these issues, see Alan Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); and Tu Weiming, 'Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan', China Quarterly, 148 (December 1996). On the democratization process in Taiwan, and its close linkage to the issue of sovereignty, see Yun Han Chu, 'Taiwan's Unique Challenges', Journal of Democracy, 7:3 (July 1996), pp. 70-71, 78-81. Reflecting the historically contingent nature of the process of identity creation, in South Korea the trend has been in precisely the opposite direction, with the pro-democracy movement using nationalist themes of a unified Korea to attack the regime and calling for greater dialogue with the North.
102. Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 March 2000.
103. See, for instance, Lucian Pye, 'Memory, Imagination and National Myths', in Gerrit Gong (ed.), Remembering and Forgetting: The Legacy of War and Peace in East Asia (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), especially pp. 25-8.
104. I have developed these themes at greater length elsewhere. See Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
105. The Gulf War in fact came very close to realizing such a catastrophic scenario. See Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, pp. 171-7.
106. For a readable and fascinating analysis of the failure to base American foreign policy on realist principles and the reliance instead on Wilson's idealism, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), ch. 1.
107. For an interesting analysis of American foreign policy along these lines, see Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). See especially pp. 187-190 and 227-8 on the Cold War consensus.
108. For an interesting analysis of the American aversion to casualties, see Thomas Langsten, 'Imagining Peace', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 6 September, 1998)
109. See François Godemont.
110. The issue of cultural change is one of the central problem areas in the entire Constructivist and culturalist literature. For an interesting discussion of the issue in general, see Harry Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change', in Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability and Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992). have sought to deal with the issue of cultural change in my previous work, see Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, especially pp. 12-15.
111. The issue of cultural change is one of the central problem areas in the entire Constructivist and culturalist literature. For an interesting discussion of the issue in general, see Harry Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change', in Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability and Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992). have sought to deal with the issue of cultural change in my previous work, see Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, especially pp. 12-15.
112. This is one of the chief differences between the situation in East Asia and Europe. In Europe NATO as well as the European Union have been strong multilateral organizations that are legitimated through reference to a community of common values rather than merely a community of common economic and security interests. This arguably has given these institutions greater domestic political legitimacy and staying power than is true of any of the existing institutional structures in Asia. For an argument along these lines with respect to Europe, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
113. Imagine the strength of European peace movements in the 1980s if there had been a CSCE without NATO. Such an arrangement, much like the League of