Taiwan's unique challenges

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1996, Pages

  Chu, Yun Han ^a,b  

^a NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b National Research Institutes   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842536081     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. For a narrative account of the historical background, see Thomas Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1986).
2. Edwin A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" China Quarterly 99 (September 1984): 481-99.
3. For the linkage between derecognition crisis and regime breakdown, see Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989) and Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), ch. 2.
4. For the linkage between derecognition crisis and regime breakdown, see Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989) and Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), ch. 2.
5. For example, Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," World Politics 42 (July 1989): 471-99; Edwin Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
6. For example, Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," World Politics 42 (July 1989): 471-99; Edwin Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
7. The figures are from Teh-fu Huang, "Election and Evolution of Kuomintang," in Hung-mao Tien, ed., Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
8. For an analysis of the power struggle over succession, see Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan's Domestic Political Reforms, Institutional Change and Power Realignment," in Gary Klintworth, ed., Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994).
9. The constitutional convention that the cabinet must resign after each reelection of the Legislative Yuan was firmly established by an October 1995 ruling of the Council of Grand Justices.
10. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 1-21.
11. As an unexpected consequence of the factional strife inside the KMT, the security apparatus has found itself forced to change its partisan inclination and to be more cautious and discreet in dealing with politically sensitive surveillance. This is because the security apparatus is staffed by a disproportionately large number of second-generation mainlanders, many of whom sympathize with the KMT nonmainstream faction or the New Party. The old practices are now checked by occasional embarrassing leaks from insiders.
12. For an analysis of the electoral advantages of vote-buying under the SNTV system, see Yun-han Chu, "SNTV and the Evolving Party System in Taiwan," Chinese Political Science Review 22 (June 1994): 33-52.
13. For a detailed analysis of the structured corruption in local politics see Joseph Bosco, "Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage and the State in Local Politics," in Murray Rubinstein, ed., The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).
14. For a more detailed analysis, see Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu, "Neo-authoritarianism, Polarized Conflict and Populism in a Newly Democratizing Regime: Taiwan's Emerging Mass Politics," Journal of Contemporary China 5 (Spring 1996): 23-41.
15. The English translation of this quote is from the Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 May 1996, 16.
16. The three preconditions for lifting the ban on direct trade and direct air and sea links with mainland China stipulated in Taipei's February 1991 National Unification Guideline - Beijing's renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan, recognition of Taiwan as a political entity on an equal footing with the PRC, and provision to Taiwan of reasonable space for international recognition and participation - won tacit endorsement from many DPP leaders, who worried that the overconcentration of Taiwanese investment capital in China and the deepening of trade dependence would increase Taiwan's vulnerability to the PRC's economic statecraft and close off the independence option.
17. This is a direct quote from a speech by PRC vice-premier Qian Qichen at the 1994 annual working meeting on Taiwan affairs. See Minpao (Hong Kong), 14 May 1994.
18. Most opinion polls show that the traditional DPP votes accounted for at least a fifth to a quarter of the 54 percent of the popular vote that went to Lee Teng-hui. Aggregate election statistics testify to this as well. For instance, a difference of almost 9 percentage points separates the share of the total popular vote that went to the DPP's 1996 presidential candidate and the share that went to the same party's candidates for the National Assembly. See Table 1.