Renegotiation and collusion in organizations

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 453-483

  Felli, Leonardo ^a   Villas Boas, J Miguel ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034364316     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864000567936     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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