Probability Judgment in Three-Category Classification Learning

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 28-52

  Koehler, Derek J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ASSOCIATION; CLASSIFICATION; CONCEPT FORMATION; CONFLICT; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; INFLUENZA; LEARNING; STATISTICAL MODEL;

CONCEPT FORMATION; CONFLICT (PSYCHOLOGY); CUES; HUMANS; INFLUENZA, HUMAN; JUDGMENT; LINEAR MODELS; PROBABILITY LEARNING;

EID: 0033627807     PISSN: 02787393     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0278-7393.26.1.28     Document Type: Article

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