Monetary policy games and coalitions in a two-country model with unionised wage setting

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 57-76

  Zervoyianni, Athina ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HULL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PATRAS   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002268468     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028597     Document Type: Article

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