Inflation targeting as a way of precommitment

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 431-448

  Herrendorf, Berthold ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000497704     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028655     Document Type: Article

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