Building a democratic developmental state: social democracy in the developing world

Democratization

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 1-32

  White, Gordon ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; DEMOCRATIZATION; DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT;

EID: 0032415157     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349808403571     Document Type: Article

References (96)

1. For discussion of the relationship between globalization and democracy, see for example D. Held, 'Democracy, the Nation-state and the Global System', Economy and Society, Vol.20, No.2 (1991), pp.138-72 and R. Falk, 'Democratising, Internationalising, and Globalising: a Collage of Blurred Images', Third World Quarterly, Vol.13, No.4 (1993), pp. 627-40.
2. For discussion of the relationship between globalization and democracy, see for example D. Held, 'Democracy, the Nation-state and the Global System', Economy and Society, Vol.20, No.2 (1991), pp.138-72 and R. Falk, 'Democratising, Internationalising, and Globalising: a Collage of Blurred Images', Third World Quarterly, Vol.13, No.4 (1993), pp. 627-40.
3. The World Bank, for example, expanded its earlier narrow conception of the developmental role of the state in its World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997).
4. The locus classicus for the idea of 'social capital' is R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). There is a copious literature on 'civil society'; one attempt to make sense of the bewildering array of uses to which the term has been put is G. White, 'Civil Society, Democratization and Development (1)', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1994), pp.375-90. Francis Fukuyama's account can be found in his Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Penguin Books, 1996).
5. The locus classicus for the idea of 'social capital' is R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). There is a copious literature on 'civil society'; one attempt to make sense of the bewildering array of uses to which the term has been put is G. White, 'Civil Society, Democratization and Development (1)', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1994), pp.375-90. Francis Fukuyama's account can be found in his Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Penguin Books, 1996).
6. The locus classicus for the idea of 'social capital' is R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). There is a copious literature on 'civil society'; one attempt to make sense of the bewildering array of uses to which the term has been put is G. White, 'Civil Society, Democratization and Development (1)', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1994), pp.375-90. Francis Fukuyama's account can be found in his Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Penguin Books, 1996).
7. G. Soros, 'The Capitalist Threat', The Atlantic Monthly (Feb. 1997), pp.45-58.
8. S.P. Huntington in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p.7 uses the procedural notion when he argues that a polity is democratic 'to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote'. Dahl extends the range of requirements to eight, including freedom of association and expression, eligibility for public office, alternative sources of information and institutions for making governments accountable to voters' wishes, in R. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), p.3.
9. S.P. Huntington in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p.7 uses the procedural notion when he argues that a polity is democratic 'to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote'. Dahl extends the range of requirements to eight, including freedom of association and expression, eligibility for public office, alternative sources of information and institutions for making governments accountable to voters' wishes, in R. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), p.3.
10. Following normal area demarcations, 'East Asia' here denotes the societies of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China, and 'South-east Asia' to denote the mainland societies of Burma through Singapore and the island nations of Indonesia, Philippines and Papua New Guinea.
11. M. Moore, 'Is Democracy Rooted in Material Prosperity?', in R. Luckham and G. White (eds.), Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).
12. For example, the reader is invited to see whether he/she is convinced by the evidence for the putative ability of democratic regimes to carry out sweeping programmes of economic reforms reported in The Economist (27 Aug. 1994) article, 'Democracy and Growth: Why Voting is Good for You', pp.17-19, or the evidence adduced to support the judgement that 'democratization promotes economic development' by D. C. Shin, 'On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory', World Politics, Vol.47, No.1 (1994), pp. 156-7.
13. For example, the reader is invited to see whether he/she is convinced by the evidence for the putative ability of democratic regimes to carry out sweeping programmes of economic reforms reported in The Economist (27 Aug. 1994) article, 'Democracy and Growth: Why Voting is Good for You', pp.17-19, or the evidence adduced to support the judgement that 'democratization promotes economic development' by D. C. Shin, 'On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory', World Politics, Vol.47, No.1 (1994), pp. 156-7.
14. The Economist, op. cit.
15. For this literature, see the comparative analysis by B. Gills, J. Rocamora and R. Wilson (eds.), Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993) and the analysis of South Korea by D.C. Kong, 'From Relative Autonomy to Consensual Development: the Case of South Korea', Political Studies, Vol.XLIII (1995), pp.630-44.
16. For this literature, see the comparative analysis by B. Gills, J. Rocamora and R. Wilson (eds.), Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993) and the analysis of South Korea by D.C. Kong, 'From Relative Autonomy to Consensual Development: the Case of South Korea', Political Studies, Vol.XLIII (1995), pp.630-44.
17. For vivid evidence of this on Latin America see G. O'Donnell, 'On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-communist Countries', World Development, Vol.21, No.8 (1993), pp.1355-70 , and on Thailand see S. Nicro, 'Thailand's NIC Democracy: Studying from General Elections', Pacific Affairs, Vol.66, No.2 (1993), pp.167-82.
18. For vivid evidence of this on Latin America see G. O'Donnell, 'On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-communist Countries', World Development, Vol.21, No.8 (1993), pp.1355-70 , and on Thailand see S. Nicro, 'Thailand's NIC Democracy: Studying from General Elections', Pacific Affairs, Vol.66, No.2 (1993), pp.167-82.
19. Cited in The Economist, op. cit., p. 17.
20. A. Leftwich, 'Voting Can Damage Your Wealth', The Times Higher Education Supplement (13 Aug. 1993), p.13.
21. P. Landell-Mills, Governance, 'Civil Society and Empowerment in sub-Saharan Africa: Building the Institutional Basis for Sustainable Development' (Washington, DC: World Bank, Africa Technical Department, 10 June 1992), p. 10.
22. For instance, Huntington, op. cit., p.210 lists problems which 'tend to be peculiarly characteristic of democratic systems: stalemate, the inability to reach decisions, susceptibility to demagoguery, domination by vested economic interests'.
23. Huntington, op. cit., p.263.
24. For example, J. Linz and A. Stepan make this argument in a South American context, in 'Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation of Destruction: European and South American Comparisons', in R.A. Pastor (ed.), Democracy in the Americas (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989).
25. This comparison does not deny that democratic regimes may be threatened by economic failure, as was the case in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.
26. Huntington, op. cit., p.258.
27. L. Diamond, 'Introduction to Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries', p.35, manuscript cited in Shin, op. cit., p. 154.
28. L. Diamond, 'Introduction to Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries', p.35, manuscript cited in Shin, op. cit., p. 154.
29. R. Jeffries, 'The State, Structural Adjustment and Good Government in Africa', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.31, No. 1 (1993), pp.30 and 28.
30. For an early 'socialist-revisionist' discussion of these issues in the African context, see R.L. Sandbrook, 'Liberal Democracy in Africa: a Socialist-Revisionist Perspective', Canadian Journal of Africa Studies, Vol.22, No.2 (1988), pp.240-67.
31. For a comparative analysis of the 'semi-democracies' of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, see W.F. Case. 'Semi-democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change', Pacific Affairs, Vol.66, No.2 (1993), pp.183-205 and his 'Can the "Halfway House" Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian Countries', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.4 (1996), pp.437-64.
32. For a comparative analysis of the 'semi-democracies' of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, see W.F. Case. 'Semi-democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change', Pacific Affairs, Vol.66, No.2 (1993), pp.183-205 and his 'Can the "Halfway House" Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian Countries', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.4 (1996), pp.437-64.
33. R. Sklar, 'Towards a Theory of Developmental Democracy', in A. Leftwich (ed.), Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p.36.
34. There are some notable exceptions where longer-term issues of the compatibility of democracy and development have been discussed on a broad canvas: for one useful analysis, see S. Haggard and R. Kaufman, 'The Challenges of Consolidation', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.4 (1994), pp.5-16.
35. The importance of a long-term relationship between developmental efficacy and democratic consolidation has been stressed by one of the classic writers in the field, Seymour Martin Lipset, 'The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited', American Sociological Review, Vol.59, No.1 (1994), pp. 1-22.
36. P. Burnell argues this case strongly in the context of Zambia, in 'The Politics of Poverty and the Poverty of Politics in Zambia's Third Republic', Third World Quarterly, Vol.16, No.4 (1995), pp.675-90 citing Huntington, op. cit. and L. Diamond, 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', American Behavioral Scientist, Vol.35, No.4/5 (1992) in support.
37. P. Burnell argues this case strongly in the context of Zambia, in 'The Politics of Poverty and the Poverty of Politics in Zambia's Third Republic', Third World Quarterly, Vol.16, No.4 (1995), pp.675-90 citing Huntington, op. cit. and L. Diamond, 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', American Behavioral Scientist, Vol.35, No.4/5 (1992) in support.
38. P. Burnell argues this case strongly in the context of Zambia, in 'The Politics of Poverty and the Poverty of Politics in Zambia's Third Republic', Third World Quarterly, Vol.16, No.4 (1995), pp.675-90 citing Huntington, op. cit. and L. Diamond, 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', American Behavioral Scientist, Vol.35, No.4/5 (1992) in support.
39. A. Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.12.
40. J. Eatwell et al., Transformation and Integration: Shaping the Future of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1995), p.2.
41. While this analysis draws on the voluminous literature on developmental states which has emerged since the mid-1980s, it pays particular attention to the work of P. Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
42. As often remarked, however, some degree of autonomy can be created by technocratic insulation, especially in poor societies where the media are weakly developed and the organizational power of interest groups is not well established.
43. Jeffries, op. cit., p.21.
44. R.L. Sklar, 'Developmental Democracy', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.29, No.4 (1987), p.714.
45. There exists a long tradition in political sociology of structural analyses of the emergence of democracy, the most illustrious of which being Barrington Moore's path-breaking comparative study of the class bases of different political systems, in The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). For a relatively recent piece of analysis in this tradition, which seeks to explain the different historical antecedents of liberal and social democracy, see A. Joseph, 'Pathways to Capitalist Democracy: What Prevents Social Democracy?', British Journal of Sociology, Vol.45, No.2 (1994), pp.211-34. For a useful overview of structural and political analyses of the evolution of democratic institutions, see B. Geddes, 'Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America', in A. Lijphart and C. H. Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp.16-23.
46. There exists a long tradition in political sociology of structural analyses of the emergence of democracy, the most illustrious of which being Barrington Moore's path-breaking comparative study of the class bases of different political systems, in The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). For a relatively recent piece of analysis in this tradition, which seeks to explain the different historical antecedents of liberal and social democracy, see A. Joseph, 'Pathways to Capitalist Democracy: What Prevents Social Democracy?', British Journal of Sociology, Vol.45, No.2 (1994), pp.211-34. For a useful overview of structural and political analyses of the evolution of democratic institutions, see B. Geddes, 'Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America', in A. Lijphart and C. H. Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp.16-23.
47. There exists a long tradition in political sociology of structural analyses of the emergence of democracy, the most illustrious of which being Barrington Moore's path-breaking comparative study of the class bases of different political systems, in The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). For a relatively recent piece of analysis in this tradition, which seeks to explain the different historical antecedents of liberal and social democracy, see A. Joseph, 'Pathways to Capitalist Democracy: What Prevents Social Democracy?', British Journal of Sociology, Vol.45, No.2 (1994), pp.211-34. For a useful overview of structural and political analyses of the evolution of democratic institutions, see B. Geddes, 'Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America', in A. Lijphart and C. H. Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp.16-23.
48. For a discussion of the ideas of 'political society' and 'civil society', see White, op. cit.
49. For a basic exposition of this approach, see J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, 'Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions', Governance. An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol.9, No.3 (1996), pp.247-64.
50. G. O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy', in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Second Edn.) (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.98.
51. A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty One Countries (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1984); Lijphart and Waisman, op. cit.
52. A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty One Countries (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1984); Lijphart and Waisman, op. cit.
53. Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., p.14;
54. O'Donnell, op. cit. 1993 and 1996.
55. A. Stepan and C. Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation : Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism', World Politics, Vol.46 (1993), p.22. For a discussion of the parliamentary versus presidential issue in the context of eastern Europe, see T.A. Baylies, 'Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe', World Politics, Vol.48 (1996), pp.297-323.
56. A. Stepan and C. Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation : Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism', World Politics, Vol.46 (1993), p.22. For a discussion of the parliamentary versus presidential issue in the context of eastern Europe, see T.A. Baylies, 'Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe', World Politics, Vol.48 (1996), pp.297-323.
57. G. Wilson, 'The Westminster Model in Comparative Perspective', in I. Budge and D. McKay (eds.), Developing Democracy: Comparative Research in Honour of J.F.P. Blondel (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 197f. , for example, demonstrates how the traditional Westminster model has proven inadequate in coping with societies with serious ethnic and cultural divisions. It tends to generate 'zero-sum' political solutions with clear winners and losers which tend to exacerbate existing conflicts. Conversely, A. Lijphart, 'The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: a Consociational Interpretation', American Political Science Review, Vol.90, No.2 (1996), pp.258-68 argues the case that Indian democracy has survived because it embodies key elements of the power-sharing principles of consociational democracy.
58. G. Wilson, 'The Westminster Model in Comparative Perspective', in I. Budge and D. McKay (eds.), Developing Democracy: Comparative Research in Honour of J.F.P. Blondel (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 197f. , for example, demonstrates how the traditional Westminster model has proven inadequate in coping with societies with serious ethnic and cultural divisions. It tends to generate 'zero-sum' political solutions with clear winners and losers which tend to exacerbate existing conflicts. Conversely, A. Lijphart, 'The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: a Consociational Interpretation', American Political Science Review, Vol.90, No.2 (1996), pp.258-68 argues the case that Indian democracy has survived because it embodies key elements of the power-sharing principles of consociational democracy.
59. S.D. Hahm and C.L. Plein, 'Institutions and Technological Development in Korea: the Role of the Presidency', Comparative Politics, Vol.28, No.1 (1995), pp.55-76.
60. L. Diamond, 'Three Paradoxes of Democracy', in Diamond and Plattner (eds.), op. cit., pp.111-23.
61. Alfred Stepan has provided the classic definition of 'political society' which is broader than that used here since it includes institutional arrangements - such as electoral rules and legislatures - which we include under the category of state institutions. See Stepan's Rethinking Military Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
62. One example of the longer-term relationships between parties and policy outcomes is the quantitative analysis of the relationship between the governmental impact of political parties and welfare programmes, specifically public pensions, in E. Huber and J.D. Stephens, 'Political Parties and Public Pensions - A Quantitative Analysis', Acta Sociologica, Vol. 36, No.4 (1993), pp.309-25. Their data, covering the period 1958 to 1986, suggest that the party composition of governments has had a substantial impact on welfare polity: both Christian democratic and social democratic incumbency are associated positively with pension expenditure, while only the latter is associated with lower levels of inequality and poverty among the elderly. P. Chhibber has also argued that the emergence of electoral competition to the Congress Party has significantly influenced the level and direction of government expenditures in India, in 'Political Parties, Electoral Competition, Government Expenditures and Economic Reform in India', The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.32, No.1 (1995), pp.74-96.
63. One example of the longer-term relationships between parties and policy outcomes is the quantitative analysis of the relationship between the governmental impact of political parties and welfare programmes, specifically public pensions, in E. Huber and J.D. Stephens, 'Political Parties and Public Pensions - A Quantitative Analysis', Acta Sociologica, Vol. 36, No.4 (1993), pp.309-25. Their data, covering the period 1958 to 1986, suggest that the party composition of governments has had a substantial impact on welfare polity: both Christian democratic and social democratic incumbency are associated positively with pension expenditure, while only the latter is associated with lower levels of inequality and poverty among the elderly. P. Chhibber has also argued that the emergence of electoral competition to the Congress Party has significantly influenced the level and direction of government expenditures in India, in 'Political Parties, Electoral Competition, Government Expenditures and Economic Reform in India', The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.32, No.1 (1995), pp.74-96.
64. C. Cansino, 'Party Government in Latin America: Theoretical Guidelines for an Empirical Analysis', International Political Science Review, Vol.16, No.2 (1995), pp. 169-82.
65. Similar views of the positive functions of stable and influential party systems in relation to the emergence of effective democratic governance underlie the analyses of L. Morlino, 'Consolidation and Party Government in Southern Europe', International Political Science Review, Vol.16, No.2 (1995), pp.145-67 in relation to Southern Europe, and in relation to Russia, I. McAllister and S. White, 'Democracy, Political Parties and Party Formation in Post-communist Russia', Party Politics, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.49-72.
66. Similar views of the positive functions of stable and influential party systems in relation to the emergence of effective democratic governance underlie the analyses of L. Morlino, 'Consolidation and Party Government in Southern Europe', International Political Science Review, Vol.16, No.2 (1995), pp.145-67 in relation to Southern Europe, and in relation to Russia, I. McAllister and S. White, 'Democracy, Political Parties and Party Formation in Post-communist Russia', Party Politics, Vol.1, No.1 (1995), pp.49-72.
67. This literature is surveyed by D. Bartlett and W. Hunter, 'Market Structures, Political Institutions and Democratization: the Latin American and East European Experiences', Review of International Political Economy, Vol.4, No. 1 (1997), pp.90-91.
68. R. Sandbrook, 'Transitions without Consolidation: Democratization in Six African Countries', Third World Quarterly, Vol.17, No.1 (1996), p.76. His view of Ghana might well be contested, given the apparently high degree of factionalism among the Ghanaian opposition. However, in the African context the number of parties is less important than the fact that most of them are based on personalism, ethnicity or region, rather than strategic policy alternatives of a left-right or other programmatic kind.
69. For a systematic analysis of existing 'developmental democracies', see A. Leftwich (ed.), Democracy and Development, op. cit.
70. For a comparison of 'one-party dominant regimes', see T.J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: the One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1990). For a study of one-party dominance in Botswana, see P.P. Molutsi and J.D. Holm, 'Developing Democracy when Civil Society is Weak: The Case of Botswana', African Affairs, Vol.89, No.356 (1990), pp.323-40 and J.D. Holm, 'Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana', in A. Leftwich, (ed.), Democracy and Development, op. cit., pp.97-113. G. Di Palma discusses the difficulties involved in establishing such systems, in To Craft Democracies (London: University of California Press, 1990) , and P. Ferdinand argues that the global dynamics of the post-cold war era are undermining these systems, in 'The Party's Over: Market Liberalization and the Challenges for One-party and One-party Dominant Regimes: The Cases of Taiwan, and Mexico, Italy and Japan', Democratization, Vol.1, No.1 (1994), pp. 133-50. The recent experience of the Mexican regime centred on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) may be good evidence for his argument.
71. For a comparison of 'one-party dominant regimes', see T.J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: the One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1990). For a study of one-party dominance in Botswana, see P.P. Molutsi and J.D. Holm, 'Developing Democracy when Civil Society is Weak: The Case of Botswana', African Affairs, Vol.89, No.356 (1990), pp.323-40 and J.D. Holm, 'Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana', in A. Leftwich, (ed.), Democracy and Development, op. cit., pp.97-113. G. Di Palma discusses the difficulties involved in establishing such systems, in To Craft Democracies (London: University of California Press, 1990) , and P. Ferdinand argues that the global dynamics of the post-cold war era are undermining these systems, in 'The Party's Over: Market Liberalization and the Challenges for One-party and One-party Dominant Regimes: The Cases of Taiwan, and Mexico, Italy and Japan', Democratization, Vol.1, No.1 (1994), pp. 133-50. The recent experience of the Mexican regime centred on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) may be good evidence for his argument.
72. For a comparison of 'one-party dominant regimes', see T.J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: the One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1990). For a study of one-party dominance in Botswana, see P.P. Molutsi and J.D. Holm, 'Developing Democracy when Civil Society is Weak: The Case of Botswana', African Affairs, Vol.89, No.356 (1990), pp.323-40 and J.D. Holm, 'Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana', in A. Leftwich, (ed.), Democracy and Development, op. cit., pp.97-113. G. Di Palma discusses the difficulties involved in establishing such systems, in To Craft Democracies (London: University of California Press, 1990) , and P. Ferdinand argues that the global dynamics of the post-cold war era are undermining these systems, in 'The Party's Over: Market Liberalization and the Challenges for One-party and One-party Dominant Regimes: The Cases of Taiwan, and Mexico, Italy and Japan', Democratization, Vol.1, No.1 (1994), pp. 133-50. The recent experience of the Mexican regime centred on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) may be good evidence for his argument.
73. For a comparison of 'one-party dominant regimes', see T.J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: the One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1990). For a study of one-party dominance in Botswana, see P.P. Molutsi and J.D. Holm, 'Developing Democracy when Civil Society is Weak: The Case of Botswana', African Affairs, Vol.89, No.356 (1990), pp.323-40 and J.D. Holm, 'Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana', in A. Leftwich, (ed.), Democracy and Development, op. cit., pp.97-113. G. Di Palma discusses the difficulties involved in establishing such systems, in To Craft Democracies (London: University of California Press, 1990) , and P. Ferdinand argues that the global dynamics of the post-cold war era are undermining these systems, in 'The Party's Over: Market Liberalization and the Challenges for One-party and One-party Dominant Regimes: The Cases of Taiwan, and Mexico, Italy and Japan', Democratization, Vol.1, No.1 (1994), pp. 133-50. The recent experience of the Mexican regime centred on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) may be good evidence for his argument.
74. For a comparison of 'one-party dominant regimes', see T.J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: the One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1990). For a study of one-party dominance in Botswana, see P.P. Molutsi and J.D. Holm, 'Developing Democracy when Civil Society is Weak: The Case of Botswana', African Affairs, Vol.89, No.356 (1990), pp.323-40 and J.D. Holm, 'Development, Democracy and Civil Society in Botswana', in A. Leftwich, (ed.), Democracy and Development, op. cit., pp.97-113. G. Di Palma discusses the difficulties involved in establishing such systems, in To Craft Democracies (London: University of California Press, 1990) , and P. Ferdinand argues that the global dynamics of the post-cold war era are undermining these systems, in 'The Party's Over: Market Liberalization and the Challenges for One-party and One-party Dominant Regimes: The Cases of Taiwan, and Mexico, Italy and Japan', Democratization, Vol.1, No.1 (1994), pp. 133-50. The recent experience of the Mexican regime centred on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) may be good evidence for his argument.
75. Holm, op. cit., p.111.
76. For an analysis of the evolving party systems in eastern Europe, see M. Waller, 'Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of Social-democratization', Party Politics, Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.473-90, and for Taiwan, see H. Tien and Y. Chu, 'Building Democracy in Taiwan', China Quarterly, No. 148 (1996), pp. 1141-70.
77. For an analysis of the evolving party systems in eastern Europe, see M. Waller, 'Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of Social-democratization', Party Politics, Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp.473-90, and for Taiwan, see H. Tien and Y. Chu, 'Building Democracy in Taiwan', China Quarterly, No. 148 (1996), pp. 1141-70.
78. Kong, op. cit. and E.M. Kim, 'Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations for the South Korea Case', Social Problems, Vol.40, No.2 (1993), pp.228-49.
79. Kong, op. cit. and E.M. Kim, 'Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations for the South Korea Case', Social Problems, Vol.40, No.2 (1993), pp.228-49.
80. R. Fatton, Jr., 'Africa in the Age of Democratization: the Civic Limitations of Civil Society', African Studies Review, Vol.38, No.2 (1995), pp.67-99; D. Rueschmeyer, E.H. Stephens and J. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
81. R. Fatton, Jr., 'Africa in the Age of Democratization: the Civic Limitations of Civil Society', African Studies Review, Vol.38, No.2 (1995), pp.67-99; D. Rueschmeyer, E.H. Stephens and J. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
82. Fatton, op. cit., p.90.
83. This definition is defended and used for empirical purposes in White, op. cit. Since many intermediate organizations in the real world do not fully embody all these characteristics, this definition should be seen as an ideal-type.
84. D. Korten; Getting to the 21st. Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1990); Landell-Mills, op. cit.
85. D. Korten; Getting to the 21st. Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1990); Landell-Mills, op. cit.
86. B. Crisp, 'Limitations to Democracy in Developing Capitalist Societies: The Case of Vernezuela', World Development, Vol.22, No.10 (1994), p.1501.
87. T. Cheng and L.B. Krause, 'Democracy and Development: with Special Attention to Korea', Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (1992, Summer), pp.3-25.
88. For a review of this literature, see Shin, op. cit., pp.38-41. To the extent that the institutional arrangements which emerge from these elite-defined transitions reflect the interests of these very elites, one of the most urgent, and developmentally crucial, elements of democratic consolidation is to improve the political access of wider sections of society and involve them in the process of institutional 'crafting'. In the history of Western societies, for example, the role of labour parties based on an organized working class played an important role in providing the political impetus for designing the central features of their 'welfare states'.
89. See, for example, Geddes, op. cit.
90. Lijphart and Waisman, op. cit., p.244.
91. E. Huber, D. Rueschemeyer and J.D. Stephens, 'The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Democracy', Comparative Politics, Vol.29, No.3 (1997), p.338.
92. L. Whitehead, 'The Alternatives to "Liberal Democracy": A Latin American Perspective', Political Studies, Vol.XL, Special Issue (1992), p.151.
93. This does not just reflect a relationship based on quantitative levels of development, but on structural changes in the class system, as argued by E. Huber, D. Rueschemeyer and J.D. Stephens, 'The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.7, No.3 (1993), pp.71-85.
94. This factor is stressed by many analysts. For example, Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., p. 11 stress the need for 'encompassing coalitions' to counter poverty; Bartlett and Hunter, op. cit., pp.100ff. discuss the differential political implications of different class coalitions in the context of Latin America and Eastern Europe; and Holm, op. cit., p. 111 cites the Botswana case as one which 'demonstrates that the primary need is to form a political coalition of elites committed to development'.
95. This factor is stressed by many analysts. For example, Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., p. 11 stress the need for 'encompassing coalitions' to counter poverty; Bartlett and Hunter, op. cit., pp.100ff. discuss the differential political implications of different class coalitions in the context of Latin America and Eastern Europe; and Holm, op. cit., p. 111 cites the Botswana case as one which 'demonstrates that the primary need is to form a political coalition of elites committed to development'.
96. This factor is stressed by many analysts. For example, Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., p. 11 stress the need for 'encompassing coalitions' to counter poverty; Bartlett and Hunter, op. cit., pp.100ff. discuss the differential political implications of different class coalitions in the context of Latin America and Eastern Europe; and Holm, op. cit., p. 111 cites the Botswana case as one which 'demonstrates that the primary need is to form a political coalition of elites committed to development'.