Why the Soviet Military Supported Gorbachev But Why the Russian Military Might Only Support Yeltsin for a Price

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 1993, Pages 455-489

  Desch, Michael C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 21744450862     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: 1743937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399308437529     Document Type: Article

References (413)

1. Robert Jervis, ‘The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?’ International Security 16/3 (Winter 1991/92), p.57.
2. There is renascent interest in the argument first articulated by the philosopher Immanual Kant in The Perpetual Peace as to whether democracies are more peaceful.
3. Lately, scholars have applied it to the contemporary world: See Michael Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review 80/4 (Dec. 1986), pp.1152–69;
4. Steve Chan, ‘Mirror, Mirror on the Wall … Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 28/4 (Dec. 1984), pp.617–48;
5. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, ‘The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965’, The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1/4 (Summer 1976), pp.50–69.
6. Ceterus paribus, I think that this argument holds most of the time. However, I also think that other systemic factors are probably important too. For a solid critique of the ‘peaceful democracies’ literature, see John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990), pp.480–91.
7. Because militaries are centralized and hierarchically organized, they are by definition anti-democratic. This is true even of the militaries of democratic states. As long as they are subordinate to civilian control this presents no problem. But if this relationship is reversed, and militaries start to take an active role in politics, they are likely to be an obstacle to further democratization. As Robert A. Dahl argued, the ‘circumstances most favorable for competitive politics exist when access to violence … is either dispersed or denied to oppositions and governments.’ See Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1971), p.51.
8. The major works on civil-military relations remain Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the Slate: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ., 1957);
9. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (NY: The Free Press, 1960);
10. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: Thé Role of the Military in Politics (NY: Praeger, 1962);
11. Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professional, Praetorian and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1977).
12. The major works on Soviet civil-military relations include Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1967);
13. Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1979);
14. Dale Hersping, The Soviet High Command, 1967–1989: Personalities and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990);
15. Timothy Colton and Thane Gustafson, (eds.). Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990).
16. In addition to Stephen M. Meyer, ‘How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military’, International Security 16/3 (Winter 1991/92), pp.5–38.
17. some of the best essays on contemporary civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and Russia include John W. R. Lepingwell, ‘Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup’, World Politics 44/4 (July 1992), pp.539–72;
18. Bruce D. Porter, Red Armies in Crisis (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1991);
19. David Holloway, ‘State, Society and the Military Under Gorbachev’, International Security 14/3 (Winter 1989/90), pp.5–24;
20. Condoleeza Rice, ‘The Party, the Military and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union’, World Politics 60/1 (Oct. 1987), pp.55–81.
21. While their positions arc well-qualified, I believe it is fair to characterize all of these authors as fairly optimistic about civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and Russia. Important exceptions to this general optimism are Mikhail Tsypkin, ‘Will the Military Rule Russia?’ Security Studies 2/1 (Autumn 1992), pp.38–73;
22. Stephen Foye, ‘Post-Soviet Russia: Politics and the New Russian Army’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL Research Report 1/33 (21 Aug. 1992), pp.5–12;
23. Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917–1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1993);
24. Kimberly Martin Zisk, ‘Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia’, Occasional Paper (Columbus, OH: The Mershon Center, March 1993).
25. Rice (note 4), 80–1.
26. So has Samuel Huntington in Political Order and Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1968), p.194.
27. Stephen Meyer, ‘The Army Isn’t Running Gorbachev’, New York Times 8 May 1990, p.29.
28. On the likely success of democratization see Martin Malia, ‘Apocalypse Not’, New Republic, 22 Feb. 1993, pp.21–7
29. Serge Schmemann, ‘As Clinton Finds, Russia, It’s Messy but Working’, New York Times (hereafter NYT).
30. ‘Week in Review’, 24 Jan. 1993, p.5.
31. See, e.g. ‘The Threat That Was’, Economist, 28 Aug. 1993, pp.17–19
32. Stephen Meyer, ‘Troopers’, New Republic, 25 Oct. 1993, p.10.
33. On the debate about the future of Russia in the US intelligence community see Eliane Sciolino, ‘Senior CIA Analyst Admits Discord Over Russia’, New York Times, 4 Feb. 1993, p.7.
34. Huntington, Soldier and State (note 3), pp.83–5.
35. Stanislaw Andreski, ‘On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships’, Journal of Strategic Studies (hereafter JSS) 3/3 (Dec. 1980), pp.3–10.
36. For discussion of the importance of institutionalization for political stability, see Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp.1–31
37. Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, ‘The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems’, American Political Science Review 76/4 (Dec. 1982), pp.778–89, esp. 779.
38. Huntington, Soldier and State (note 3), pp.80–1.
39. See the comments by Richard Armitage, outgoing coordinator for US aid to the former Soviet Republics, in Steven A. Holmes, ‘US Names New Coordinator for Aid to Ex-Soviet Lands’, NYT, 23 Feb. 1993, p.4.
40. Suggesting this argument are Thomas Nichols, ‘Conclusions: The Unresolved Agenda’ in William C. Greene and Theodore Karasik (eds.), Gorbachev and His Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p.198
41. Henry Bienen, ‘For the Soviets, Interesting Times Have Barely Begun’, The Chicago Tribune, 25 Aug. 1991.
42. see. 5, 3. But Lepingwell, p.566
43. Foye, ‘The Case for a Coup: Gorbachev and the Generals?’ RFE/RL Report on the USSR 3/2 (11 Jan. 1991), p.2 explicitly reject this comparison.
44. Apparently Russian leaders, including Yeltsin himself, believe that there arc some similarities between contemporary Russian and Third World domestic politics. See Foye, ‘Chile, Russia Sign Cooperation Declaration’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 1 June 1993 [e-mail].
45. Also see Robert V. Daniels, ‘Yeltsin’s No Jefferson. More Like Pinochet’, NYT, 2 Oct. 1993, p.23
46. ‘Spasibo, Alberto’, The Economist, 4 Dec. 1993, p.50.
47. For discussion of the role that Marshal Georgii Zhukov played in Nikita Krushchev’s struggle with the ‘Anti-Party Group’, see Carl Linden, Khruschev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957–1964 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1966), pp.43–4 and 52–3.
48. On the internal role of the Soviet military, see Alexander R. Alexiev and Robert C. Nurick, The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev: Report on a RAND Workshop [R-3907-RC] (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., Feb. 1990), p.23.
49. For an account of the use of the Soviet Army to suppress the strikes in Novercherkassk in 1962 see Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago Three, Harry Willetts, trans. (NY: Harper & Row, 1976), pp.507–14.
50. See Colton, ‘Perspectives on Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet Union’ in Colton and Gustafson, p.2l
51. Harry Gelman, The Soviet Turn Toward Conventional Force Reductions: The Internal Variables at Play [R-3876-AF] (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., Dec. 1989), p.61.
52. For a discussion of the evolution of ‘objective control’ mechanisms in the Soviet Union, see Kenneth Currie, ‘Soviet General Staff’s New Role’, Problems of Communism 38/3 (March-April 1984), pp.32–3.
53. Subjective control of the Soviet military was exercised through three avenues: First, all officers had to be party members. Second, the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces made sure that Party policy was enforced. Finally, the Third Chief Directorate of the Committee on State Security (KGB) kept close tabs on the political reliability of the officer corps. See Amy Knight, ‘The KGB and Civil-Military Relations’ in Colton and Gustafson (note 18), pp.97–8.
54. Others arc, however, skeptical about the importance of the formal mechanism of control. See Colton, ‘The Party Military Connection’ in Herspring and Volgyes, p.71.
55. Lepingwell (note 4), p.547.
56. Gelman (note 18), pp.6–7
57. Harry Gelman, ‘Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military Institution’, Adelphi Paper No.258 (London: Brassey’s for IISS, Spring 1991), p.27.
58. Nichols, The Sacred Cause, pp.145 and 106 argues that civil-military conflict began at the 27th Party Congress in 1982 but concedes that it really intensified in 1988.
59. Regarding the increased defense spending between 1985 and 1987, see Steven Sestanovich, ‘What Does He Know and When Will We Know It?’ NYT 17 May 1992, ‘Week in Review’ [WIR], 3.
60. Regarding the slow down in the growth of Soviet defense spending in the late 1970s, see F. Stephen Larabee, ‘Gorbachev and the Soviet Military’, Foreign Affairs 66/5 (Summer 1988), p.1003
61. Abraham S. Becker, Ogarkov’s Complaint and Gorbachev’s Dilemma: the Soviet Defense Budget and Party-Military Conflict, [R-3541-AF] (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., Dec. 1987), p.v. Both report that growth rates in Soviet military spending went from 4 per cent to 2 per cent.
62. Meyer, ‘How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed’, p.17;
63. Alexiev and Nurick (note 17), pp.v–vi;
64. Gelman, ‘Gorbachev and the Future …’, pp.33–6.
65. Alexiev and Nurick (note 17), pp.xii and 62–3;
66. Larabee (note 22), pp.1018 and 1025;
67. Rose E. Gottemoeller, Conflict and Consensus in the Soviet Armed Forces [R-3759-At] (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., Oct. 1989), p.1.
68. Gelman (note 18), p.3.
69. Jeremey R. Azreal, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976–1986 [R-3521-AF] (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., June 1987), pp.40–1.
70. See, e.g. Jack Snyder, ‘The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Expansionism?’ International Security 12/3 (Winter 1987/88), pp.93–131
71. Snyder, ‘Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options’, International Security 12/4 (Spring 1988), pp.48–77.
72. For a Soviet source making this case, see Andrey Vladimorich Kozyrev, ‘Confidence and the Balance of Interests’, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn No.10 (Oct. 1988).
73. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS] Soviet Report (25 Oct. 1988), pp.1–7.
74. Stephen M. Meyer, ‘Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking on Security’, International Security 13/2 (Fall 1988), p.129.
75. For specific references to Soviet military officers who made this argument, see Gelman, Soviet Military Leadership and the Question of Deployment Retreats, p.4;
76. Herspring, Soviet High Command (note 3), p.250;
77. Gottemoeller (note 24), p.41;
78. Alexiev and Nurick (note 17), p.45.
79. Erik Hoffmann, ‘Soviet Views of the “Scientific-Technological Revolution”’, World Politics 30/4 (July 1978), p.615.
80. Thane Gustafson, ‘The Response to Technological Change’ in Colton and Gustafson (note 18), p.170.
81. Doctor of Economic Science, Col. S. Barentov, ‘On the Level of Economic, Scientific and Technical Progress’, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil No.5 (March 1983) in Joint Publications Research Service [Microfiche No.83924], p.6.
82. Gustafson (note 18), pp.208–13.
83. Ibid., p.14.
84. Also see William E. Odom, ‘Soviet Force Posture Dilemmas and Directions’, Problems of Communism 34/4 (July/Aug. 1985), pp.2–7 regarding the three revolutions in warfare. The first was the mechanization of warfare in the 1930s; the second was the nuclear revolution of the 1950s; and the third was the revolution in conventional high-technology weapons in the 1980s.
85. Gustafson (note 31), p.194.
86. Ibid., p.193.
87. This has obvious relevance to the debate concerning whether and how ‘peace through strength’ contributed to the end of the Cold War. Participants include John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Hanging Tough Paid Off’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 45/1 (Jan. 1989), pp.11–14;
88. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The International Sources of Soviet Change’, International Security 16/3 (Winter 1991/92), pp.74–118;
89. Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Did “Peace Through Strength” End the Cold War? Lessons From INF’, International Security 16/1 (Summer 1991), pp.162–88.
90. James M. McConnell, ‘Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development’, World Politics 37/3 (April 1985), p.318.
91. This supports Raymond Garthoff’s position in his debate with Richard Pipes about whether the Soviets were planning to fight and win a nuclear war. See Richard Pipes, ‘Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War’, Commentary 64/1 (July 1977), pp.21–34
92. Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1990), esp. ch.3.
93. Gottemoeller (note 24), p.3.
94. Also see McConnell, pp.325–6.
95. This suggests a view of nuclear weapons closest to Glenn Snyder’s ‘stability-instability paradox’. For a discussion of the theoretical debate about the impact of nuclear weapons on statecraft, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1989), ch.1
96. Gottemoeller (note 24), p.v. A US deployment of an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) system would have shifted the center of gravity back to the nuclear realm by making it possible for the United States to break out of the situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and thereby threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union without fear of retaliation. Obviously the NTR could affect both the nuclear and conventional levels. However, the Soviet military seemed far more confident in their ability to overcome ‘Star Wars’ than they were about their capacity to compete with the US in a high-technology conventional arms race.
97. Mary C. FitzGerald, ‘Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War: 1977–1985’, CNA Professional Paper [443.10] (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, Nov. 1986), p.1
98. Brian A. Davenport, ‘The Ogarkov Ouster: The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine and Civil/Military Relations in the 1980s’, JSS 14/2 (June 1991), p.130.
99. Ibid., p.58.
100. For discussion of the increasing role of conventional operations in Soviet military strategy see inter alia: Meyer, ‘Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev’s New Thinking’, 160;
101. Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1987);
102. Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, ‘A “New” Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications’, Strategic Review 16/3 (Summer 1988): 9–24;
103. John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock, III, ‘Soviet Military Theory From 1945–2000: Implications for NATO’, Washington Quarterly 9/4 (Fall 1986), pp.117–37;
104. Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?’ International Security 9/4 (Spring 1985), pp.44–78.
105. FitzGerald (note 41), pp.25–6.
106. Herspring, Soviet High Command (note 3), p.64.
107. McConnell (note 38), p.333.
108. See John M. Collins, US/Soviet Military Balance: Assessments and Statistics 1980–1985 (Washington DC: Congressional Res. Service, Spring 1985), pp.78–82. According to this source, the US was superior in 67 categories of militarily relevant technology, there was rough parity in 31, and the Soviets were ahead in only 28.
109. Larabce (note 22), p.1021–2.
110. Gottemoeller (note 24), p.v.
111. On this see Benjamin S. Lambeth, Moscow’s Lessons From the 1982 Lebanon Air War [RF-3000-AF] (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., Sept. 1984). The final score of the June 1982 Israeli-Syrian air engagements was 86/0.
112. Odom, ‘Soviet Force Posture’, (note 34), p.9.
113. On this see Douglas L. Clarke, ‘What the Soviet General Staff Might Learn From the Gulf War’, REF/RL Report on the USSR 3/5 (1. Feb. 1991), pp.3–5
114. FitzGerald, ‘Soviet Military Doctrine – Implications of the Gulf War’, International Defense Review Vol. 8 (1991), pp.809–10.
115. A useful overview of Soviet sources is Benjamin S. Lambeth, Desert Storm and Its Meaning: The View From Moscow [R-4164] (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1992). Lambeth suggests that the primary lessons the Soviet military learned from the war involved military organization, troop quality and morale. His evidence suggests, however, that the Soviets also concluded that the West’s technological advantage played a central role in the outcome of the war.
116. FitzGerald (note 41), pp.2–3
117. Odom, ‘Soviet Force Posture’, (note 34), p.11.
118. See, e.g. Odom’s discussion in ‘Soviet Force Posture’, of unsuccessful Soviet efforts to use operational maneuver groups [OMGs] to overcome NATO’s increasing technological advantages. On Soviet efforts to steal high technology from the West, see [US Central Intelligence Agency?) Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Technology – An Update (Washington, DC: US GPO, Sept. 1985).
119. This might be considered a shift from ‘balancing’ to ‘band wagoning’. For further discussion of these concepts, see Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1987), pp.17–21.
120. E.g. see Jerry Hough, ‘Assessing the Coup’, Current History 90/558 (Oct. 1991), pp.309–10.
121. For a general discussion of changing demographic balances in the Soviet Union, see Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, ‘Growth and Diversity of the Population of the Soviet Union’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol.510 (July 1990), pp.155–77.
122. Alexiev and Nurick (note 17), p.ix.
123. Gelman, ‘Soviet Military Leadership’ (note 29), p.58.
124. Meyer, ‘Sources and Prospects’, (note 28), p.154.
125. Valeric Bunco, ‘The Empire Strikes Back: the Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability’, International Organization 39/1 (Winter 1985). p.2.
126. Gelman, ‘Soviet Military Leadership’ (note 29), pp.11–14.
127. Ibid., pp.21–3.
128. There were a few strictly military objections too, see pp.19–20.
129. Ibid., p.24.
130. Gelman, ‘Gorbachev and the Future’, p.44.
131. Also see Meyer (note 4), p.4.
132. Meyer (note 4), p.29
133. Robert C. Arnett and Mary FitzGerald, ‘A Volunteer Red Army?’ Orbis 34/3 (Summer 1990), p.398.
134. Gelman (note 18), p.55.
135. Meyer (note 4), p.20.
136. Gottemoeller (note 24), v–vi.
137. Tsypkin, p.41 argues that support for, or opposition to, the Aug. 1991 coup attempt was based on institutional interest. E.g. the chiefs of the air defense and the ground forces – which had lost a great deal due to reform – supported the coup; whereas the heads of the air force, the strategic rocket forces, and the airborne troops – which had lost relatively less – opposed the coup.
138. Gelman (note 18), p.2.
139. Kolkowicz, ‘Interest Groups in Soviet Politics’ in Herspring and Volgyes, pp.17–19.
140. The key military proponents of reform were generally associated with the Far Eastern clique. See Larabee (note 22), pp.1010–11.
141. On this see Sarah Mendelson, ‘Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan’, World Politics 45/3 (April 1993), pp.327–60.
142. Lepingwell (note 4),;
143. Alexiev and Nurick (note 17), pp.1–3;
144. Meyer (note 4) p.16;
145. Richard Pipes, ‘Soviet Army Coup? Not Likely’, NYT, 20 Nov. 1990, p.19.
146. Mikhail Gorbachev, The August Coup: The Truth and Lessons (NY: HarperCollins, 1991), pp.13–15.
147. Bill Keller, ‘Moscow Gossips About Dictatorship’, NYT, 22 Nov. 1990, p.6.
148. Gelman, ‘Gorbachev and the Future’ (note 21), p.44. There are possible alternative explanations for Gorbachev’s change of course. Perhaps he had a change of heart about the direction and pace of change. While this is certainly possible, the more likely explanation is that he was forced to adopt hardline policies due to pressure from some factions in the military and civilian hardliners.
149. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1990–1991 (London: Brassey’s for IISS, 1991), p.144.
150. Thomas Friedman, ‘Gorbachev’s Military: A Bigger Role?’, NYT, 21 May 1990, p.14.
151. John Lepingwell notes that the Soviet Army attempted to circumvent CFE by moving over 57,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) area further east. See his ‘Towards a Post–Soviet Army’, Orbis 36/1 (Winter 1992), p.89.
152. Celestine Bohlen, ‘Soviets Are Deep in Military Rumors’, NYT, 17 Sept. 1990, p.4
153. Gelman, ‘Gorbachev and the Future’, (note 21), pp.54–5.
154. Schmemann, ‘The Tough New Leaders in Moscow Have Kremlinologists Up and Guessing’, NYT, 27 Jan. 1991, p.3.
155. Porter (note 4), pp.51–3.
156. Schmemann, ‘Touch New Leaders’, p.3.
157. Keller, ‘Shevardnadze Asserts Possibility of a Crackdown Led Him to Quit’, NYT, 3 Jan. 1991, p.3
158. Keller, ‘Shevardnadze Stuns Kremlin by Quitting Foreign Ministry and Warning of Dictatorship’, NYT, 21 Dec. 1990, p.6.
159. On this see Galia Golan, ‘Gorbachev’s Difficult Time in the Gulf’, Political Science Quarterly 107/2 (1992), pp.213–20.
160. Francis X. Clines, ‘Gorbachev Faces Hard–line Demand’, NYT, 22 April 1991.
161. Serge Schmemann, ‘Soviet Rightists See Nation Run Amok’, NYT, 28 June 1991, p.6.
162. Michael Gordon, ‘Soviet Military is Reported to Reassert Itself at Kremlin’, NYT, 13 April 1990, p.6.
163. Meyer (note 4), p.27.
164. Schmemann, ‘Soviet Rightists See Nation Run Amok’, p.6.
165. Two prominent examples are Gens. Ivan Tretyak and Mikhail Moiseyev. Gelman (note 21), p.15.
166. Schmemann, ‘Soviets, Citing Rise in Crime, Send Troops to Patrol Cities With Police’, NYT, 26 Jan. 1991, pp. 1 and 3;
167. Francis X. Clines, ‘Soviets Increase Patrols by Army, Extending Crackdown to 86 Cities’, NYT, 6 Feb. 1991, pp.1 and 3;
168. Schmemann, ‘Soviet Troops Join the Police on Patrol’, NYT, 2 Feb. 1991, p.3.
169. Viktor Alksnis, ‘A Once Great Country Is On Its Knees’, Los Angeles Times, 2 Aug. 1991, B11.
170. Gorbachev (note 74), pp.15–16.
171. Clines, ‘Troops Moving Into Moscow, Russian Leader Urges a Strike’, NYT, 20 Aug. 1991, p.1.
172. ‘KGB, Organized Coup, Yeltsin Says’, NYT, 8 Sept. 1991, p.11
173. Lepingwell (note. 4), p.562.
174. Porter (note 4), p.57.
175. Gorbachev (note 74), p.19.
176. Vitaly Korotich, ‘Now, the Second Stage of Perestroika Begins’, NYT, 26 Aug. 1991, p.15
177. Clifford Krauss, ‘Sergei Akhromeyev: Complete Soviet Soldier, Well–liked in the West’, NYT, 26 Aug. 1991, p.7.
178. Gorbachev (note 74), pp.42–4.
179. Porter (note 4), pp.57–8.
180. Lilia Shevtsova, ‘The August Coup and the Soviet Collapse’, Survival 34/1 (Spring 1992), p.6.
181. Ibid., pp.6–7.
182. James Billington, ‘The True Heroes of the Soviet Union’, NYT, 30 Aug. 1991, p.19
183. Keller, ‘From Resistance of the Few to Revolt of the Masses’, NYT, 15 Sept. 1991, p.3.
184. Hough (note 55), p.306.
185. Gorbachev (note 74), pp.11 and 31.
186. Meyer (note 4), p.11, fn. 13
187. Porter (note 4), pp.58–9.
188. Sometimes military professionalism can actually serve as an obstacle to reform. For a discussion of how this happened in the Chilean case, see Genaro Arrigada, Pinochet: The Politics of Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 170.
189. Gorbachev (note 74), 34–6;
190. ‘Yeltsin’s Army’, Economist, 24–30 Aug. 1991, p.12;
191. Lepingwell (note 4), p.559.
192. According to Yeltsin’s military aide Gen. Konstantin Kobets, ‘“If [Yazov] wanted, he could pulverize everything standing in the way of the armed forces.”’ Quoted in Keller, ‘The 3-Day Fiasco: Anatomy of a Failed Strike at the State’, NYT, 25 Aug. 1991, p.10.
193. Ibid., p.10.
194. Keller, ‘Sporadic Mutinies Rack Soviet Army’, NYT, 21 Aug. 1991, p.1.
195. Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Leadership of Soviet Military Facing Shuffle and Reduced Independence’, NYT, 23 Aug. 1991, p.12.
196. Shevtsova (note 101), p.7.
197. Meyer (note 48), p.11.
198. Ibid., p.30.
199. John-Thor Dahlberg, ‘Soviets Plan Military Purge’, Chicago Tribune, 26 Aug. 1991, p.1.
200. Lepingwell (note 4), pp.563–4.
201. Hough (note 55), pp.306–7.
202. Meyer (note 4), p.31.
203. Also see: ‘Excerpts From an Interview With Shevardnadze: Threat of Dictatorship “Has Been Removed”.’ NYT, 29 Aug. 1991, p.9
204. Michael Scammell, ‘The Disaster That Didn’t Happen’, NYT, 19 Aug. 1992, p.19.
205. Bohlen, ‘Gorbachev Vying for Army Backing Over Yeltsin’s Bid’, NYT, 11 Dec. 1991, p.8.
206. Carey Goldberg, ‘Gorbachev Fires Restive Army’s Chief of Staff’, Los Angeles Times, 8 Dec. 1991, pp.1 and 11.
207. William Safire, ‘Gorby Invites the Deluge’, NYT, 12 Dec. 1991, p.23
208. Friedman, ‘Soviet Military Attends Yeltsin’s Talks With Baker’, NYT, 17 Dec. 1991, pp.1 and 8.
209. Safire, ‘Reading Gorby’s Mind’, NYT, 22 Nov. 1990, p.19.
210. Bohlen, ‘Russian President Moves to Create a Separate Army’, NYT, 17 March 1992, pp.1 and 4.
211. Clines, ‘Yeltsin Out of Sight Again, Prompts Anxiety’, NYT, 28 Jan. 1992, pp.1 and 4
212. Schmemann, ‘Yeltsin Makes a Surprise Visit to Bolster the Black Sea Fleet’, NYT, 29 Jan. 1992, p.8.
213. See Steven Erlanger, ‘Yeltsin Receiving Criticism of Foes on Nuclear Treaty’, NYT, 2 Jan. 1993, pp.1 and 4.
214. Conflict between Yeltsin and the Parliament also delayed this. See Lepingwell, ‘Stepashin Says START–2 Ratification to be Delayed’, RFE/RL Daily Bulletin, 19 May 1993.
215. Erlanger, ‘Yeltsin Says US Seeks Arms Pact Assuring An Edge’, NYT, 11 June 1992, pp.1 and 4.
216. Schmemman, ‘Yeltsin to Keep Military Budget at Same Level’, NYT, 24 Nov. 1992, p.3.
217. Paul A. Goble, ‘The Russians Aren’t Going’, Washington Post, 19 July 1992, C1 and C4;
218. Schmemman, ‘Yeltsin Suggests a Role for Russia to Keep Peace in Ex-Soviet Lands’, NYT, March 1993, p.1;
219. Leslie Gelb, ‘Yeltsin As Monroe’, NYT, 7 March 1993, ‘WIR’, p.17;
220. Dzintra Bungs, ‘No Progress at Latvian – Russian Talks’, RFE/RL Daily Reports 21 Oct. 1992 [e-mail].
221. On the dominance of the CIS by Russia, see Foye, ‘Shaposhnikov named Security Council Secretary’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 14 June 1993 [e-mail];
222. Foye, ‘Russia Behind the Break-up? RFE/RL Daily Report, 16 June 1993 [e-mail];
223. Foye ‘Izvestiya on the Modalities of Shaposhnikov Appointment’, RFE/RL Daily Report 18 June 1993 [e-mail].
224. See Foye, ‘Defense Ministry Opposed to Concessions’ and ‘Yeltsin Pushes Housing for Military Personnel’ both in RFE/RL Research Report 1/32 (14 Aug. 1992), p.44.
225. Foye, ‘Russian Politics Complicates Baltic Troop Withdrawal’, RFE/RL Research Report 3/46 (20 Nov. 1992), pp.30–5;
226. Dzintra Bungs, ‘Yeltsin Again Links Troop Pullout to Human Rights’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 June 1993 [e-mail];
227. Bungs, ‘Russian Military Warns Baltics of Sharper Conflicts’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 26 Aug. 1993 [e-mail];
228. ‘Where Does Russia End?’ Economist, 13 Nov. 1993, p.58.
229. On this, see Schmemann, ‘Yeltsin Suspends Baltic Troop Pullout’, NYT, 30 Oct. 1992, p.7;
230. Bohlen ‘West Is Concerned at Russia’s Delay in Baltic Pullout’, NYT, 31 Oct. 1992, pp.1 and 4;
231. ‘Yeltsin Turns Nasty’, The Economist, 17 Oct. 1992, pp.14–15;
232. Schmemann, ‘Russian and Its Nasty Neighborhood Brawls’, NYT, 18 Oct. 1992, pp.1 and 3;
233. Gelb, ‘Russia’s Rumblings’, NYT, 25 Oct. 1992, p.15;
234. Schmemann, ‘Yeltsin Suspend Baltic Pullout’, NYT, 30 Oct. 1992, p.7;
235. Bohlen, ‘West Concerned at Russia’s Delay in Baltic Pullout’, NYT, 31 Oct. 1992, pp.1 and 4;
236. Erlanger, ‘Baltic Identity: Russians Wonder If They Belong’, NYT, 22 Nov. 1992, pp.1 and 11;
237. Erlanger, ‘Russian Troops Still in the Baltics Tell of Harrassment’, NYT, 27 Nov. 1992, p.3.
238. Bungs, ‘More On Russian Troops in Latvia, Estonia’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 20 Oct. 1993, [e-mail];
239. Bungs, ‘Update on Russian Military in the Baltics’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 30 Nov. 1993, [e-mail];
240. Saulius Girnius, ‘Withdrawal of Russian Troops From Latvia, Estonia May Be Suspended’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 21 Dec. 1993 [e-mail].
241. Vladimir Socor, ‘Russia’s Fourteenth Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova’, RFE/RL Research Report, 1/36 (11 Sept. 1992), pp.41–8
242. Foye, ‘Yeltsin Calls for Retention of Military Bases Abroad’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 June 1993 [e-mail].
243. Foye, ‘Yeltsin: Troops Can Be Withdrawn from Kuriles’, RFE/RL Research Report, 1/34 (28 Aug. 1992), p.44.
244. Foye, ‘Dissonance on Kuriles’, RFE/RL Research Report 1/34 (28 Aug. 1992), p.44.
245. For an earlier example of military opposition, see Foye, ‘Shaposhnikov on Kuriles’, RFE/RL Research Report 1/28 (10 July 1992), p.63.
246. Foye, ‘The Struggle Over Russia’s Kurile Island Policy’, RFE/RL Research Report 1/36 (11 Sept. 1992), p.37.
247. In July 1993 Yeltsin once again tried to assure the Japanese that he would reduce the Russian military. See Foye, ‘Tokyo Reacts; Chernomyrdin Again Says No Deal on Kuriles’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 20 Aug. 1993 [e-mail].
248. However, he soon back–pedaled from this promise. See Foye, ‘Yeltsin Offers Condolences; Tensions Remain’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 12 Oct. 1993 [e-mail].
249. Moreover, there have been continued military incidents between Russia and Japan in the area and there is no evidence that the Russian military garrison has been reduced. See Foye, ‘Japan Protests Russian Air Intrusion’ RFE/RL Daily Report 1 Sept. 1993 [e-mail]
250. Foye, ‘Russian Pull-out From Kurilcs Denied’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 14 Oct. 1993 [e-mail].
251. For evidence of continuing civilian support for CFE see Lepingwell, ‘Russia Softens Position on CFE’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 12 Nov. 1993.
252. For evidence of military opposition, see Foye, ‘Moscow Questions CFE Agreement’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 June 1993 [e-mail].
253. Lepingwell, ‘Russia Requests CFE Revision’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 7 Oct. 1993 [e-mail];
254. INTERFAX report on 18 Nov. 1993 cited in ‘General Urges Eliminating Some CFE Provisions’ in FBIS – Central Eurasia [CE], 18 Nov. 1993, p.3;
255. Foye, ‘Russia Continues to Ask CFE Changes’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 18 Nov. 1993 [e-mail].
256. Ustina Markus, ‘Yeltsin, Kravchuk Agree on Splitting Black Sea Fleet’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 18 June 1993 [e-mail].
257. Lepingwell, ‘Black Sea Fleet Officers Reject Agreement’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 30 June 1993 [e-mail];
258. Lepingwell, ‘Opposition to Black Sea Fleet Agreement Growing?’ RFE/RL Daily Report 2 July 1993;
259. Lepingwell, ‘Black Sea Fleet Agreement Debated’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 5 July 1993 [e-mail].
260. Lepingwell, ‘Parliament Calls for Russian Financing of Black Sea Fleet’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 12 July 1993.
261. Suzanne Crow, ‘Yeltsin, Grachev on Massandra Summit’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 6 Sept. 1993 [e-mail].
262. On Yeltsin’s initial willingness to let Poland and the Czech Republic join, see Louisa Vinton, ‘Yeltsin: No Objection to Polish NATO Membership’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 26 Aug. 1993 [e-mail]
263. Jan Oberman, ‘Yeltsin in Prague’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 27 Aug. 1993 [e-mail].
264. For continuing Foreign Ministry support of this position see INTERFAX report of 25 Nov. 1993 in ‘Foreign Ministry: “No Threat” Seen in NATO’ in FBIS – CE 26 Nov. 1993, p.11.
265. On Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s concurrence withthis, see Foye, ‘Chernomyrdin: Moscow Will Not Oppose Eastern Europe’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 9 Nov. 1993.
266. On Yeltsin’s change of heart, see Vinton and Crow, ‘Russia Back-pedals on Polish NATO Membership’, RFE/RL Daily Report 15 Sept. 1993 [e-mail]
267. Roger Cohen, ‘Yeltsin Opposes Expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe’, NYT, 2 Oct. 1993, p.4.
268. For evidence that the military was behind this change of heart see Lepingwell, ‘… But Debate Over Polish Interest in NATO Continues’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 20 Sept. 1993 [e-mail];
269. Foye, ‘More Grachcv Remarks’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 21 Oct. 1993 [e-mail].
270. Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Evgenii Primakov dismissed reports that the military played a role in this about-face. However, his remarks in connection with the FIS report on this clearly suggest that the military’s views were critical. See ‘Prospects for NATO Expansion and Russian Interests …’ Izvestiya 26 Nov. 1993
271. in ‘NATO Report Summarized’, FBIS-CE, 26 Nov. 1993, p.7.
272. Bohlen, ‘Professional Army, Free of Commissars, May Be Voluntary’, NYT, 31 Aug. 1992, pp.1 and 4.
273. Foye calculates that the ratio will be 630,000 officers to 540,000 enlisted. See his ‘Manpower Levels Falling Rapidly In Russian Army?’ RFE/RL Daily Report, 5 July 1993 [e-mail].
274. Meyer (note 4), p.36, fn.73.
275. For an excellent theoretical discussion of how small groups are able to have disproportionate influence during periods of instability see Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1982), p.167.
276. An Interview With General Kirshin’, Perspective 2/2 (Nov. 1991), p.3.
277. Obvious candidates include China, the Ukraine, and Japan. But so far they have not received much attention in Russian military writings. And at least in the Chinese case, military cooperation has been growing rather than declining. See Tyler, ‘Russia and China Plan Pact to Avoid Conflict’, NYT, 5 Dec. 1993, p.8
278. Tyler, ‘Russia and China Sign a Military Agreement’, NYT, 11 Oct. 1993, p.15.
279. The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the General Staff’s inability to determine either a likely external adversary or to ascertain which strategic sector is most dangerous is evident in ‘Report on Parliamentary Hearings’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 May 1992
280. cited in Roy Allison, ‘Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States’ Adelphi Paper No.280 (London: Brassey’s for IISS, Oct. 1993), p.22, fn.11.
281. ‘The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Russia’s Military Doctrine’, Rossiskiye Vesli, 18 Nov. 1993
282. in ‘“Detailed Account” of Military Doctrine’ FBIS-CE [Suppl.] 19 Nov. 1993, p.1. This account of the doctrine goes on to suggest on p.2 that ‘the immediate threat of direct aggression being launched against the Russian Federation has considerably declined in contemporary conditions.’ On pp.2–3, it does list some possible external threats including territorial claims against Russia, escalation of local conflicts, use of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation of these weapons arms races, external intervention in Russia, suppression of the rights of ethnic Russians in the ‘near abroad’, attacks on Russian military bases there, expansion of military blocs, and terrorism. The key point here is not that there arc no external threats but rather that they arc not as serious as during the Cold War and the Russian military regards them as only ‘potential’ rather than actual.
283. Erlanger, ‘Yeltsin Expresses Russian Impatience Over Ethnic Wars’, NYT, 22 June 1992, pp.1 and 7;
284. Sestanovich, ‘Yeltsin Needs Moral Support Too’, NYT, 15 June 1992, p.15;
285. Erlanger, ‘Moscow Fears for Troops Stationed in Tajikistan’, NYT, 30 Sept. 1992, p.7;
286. Schmemman, ‘Troops Arrive From Russia As Caucasus Fighting Flares’, NYT, 11 Nov. 1992, p.4.
287. ‘A Russian View of the World’, Economist, 13 March 1993, p.56.
288. On this case see Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977).
289. Bohlen, ‘A Russian Seeks ‘Glorious’ Borders’, NYT, 31 Jan. 1992, p.6.
290. See ‘Basie Provisions …’, p.3.
291. which lists such actual internal threats as the rise of separatist and nationalist organizations; attempts to overthrow the constitutional system; attacks on Russian nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities; creation of armed formations; the growth of organized crime; attacks upon military installations in Russia; the distribution of weapons; narcotics; and the uncertain status of certain border regions. More significantly, the new doctrine incorporates the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and militia forces and explicitly gives the Army an internal security role. See p.7.
292. Finally, the new doctrine holds that the internal ‘sociopolitical’ conditions of Russia are a matter of concern for the military. See pp.4–5.
293. For related discussion, see Igor Saltykov, ‘Confidential: Doctrine or Dictatorship’, Pravda, 16 Nov. 1993
294. in ‘Aspects of New Military Doctrine Questioned’, FBIS-CE, 17 Nov. 1993, pp.58–9.
295. Foye, ‘Yeltsin Proposes That Army Aid in Crime Fighting’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 27 April 1993, pp.1–2.
296. Crime has risen about 7 per cent since 1992. See Sheila Mamie, ‘Latest Figures on Crime’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 3 June 1993 [e-mail].
297. Lepingwell, ‘Paratroops Help to Collect Taxes’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 3 June 1993 [e-mail].
298. See Crow, ‘The Security Council Set to Expand’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 Sept. 1993 [e-mail] for an example about how the definition of ‘security’ is being expanded in the Russian security community.
299. The best discussion of the broad and all-inclusive content of South American national security doctrines is Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1971), ch.8.
300. Anonymous, ‘Articles From Voennaya Mysl Regarding the New Russian Military Doctrine [May 1992]’ in JPRS [UMT-92-008-L] (16 June 1992), p.6. Emphasis added.
301. Aleksandr Zhilin, ‘War Policy and the War of Politicians’, Moskovskiye Novosti No.47 (16 Nov. 1993)
302. in ‘Experts See Hawks’ Win on Military Doctrine’, FBIS-CE, 18 Nov. 1993, p.40.
303. Aleksander Mnatsakyan, ‘Again From the Taiga to the Baltic Seas …’ Rossiya, No.48 (24–30 Nov. 1993)
304. in ‘Military Doctrine Seen Increasing Army’s Clout’, FBIS-CE, 26 Nov. 1993, p.45.
305. Schmemann, ‘5,000 Angry Military Men Gather With Complaints in the Kremlin’, NYT, 18 Jan. 1992, p.4.
306. Also see: Elizabeth Shogren, ‘Officers Demand Unity for Ex–Soviet Military’, NYT, 18 Jan. 1992, pp.1 and 11.
307. More ominously, there arc reports that high ranking officers of the Baltic MD have told CIS Defense Minister Shaposhnikov that they refuse to obey orders to leave the Baltic states. On this see, Christopher Donnelly, ‘Evolving Problems in the Former Soviet Armed Forces’, Survival 34/3 (Autumn 1992), pp.28–42.
308. Quoted in ‘Hidden Enemy’, Economist, 27 March 1993, p.21.
309. Becker (note 22), pp.37–8
310. Larabce (note 22), p.1010. Rust was a West German citizen who flew a light plane into the Soviet Union and landed it on Red Square in the hopes of meeting Mikhail Gorbachev.
311. ‘An Interview With General Kirshin’ (note 149), p.4.
312. On this see Peter Reddaway, ‘Russia on the Brink?’, New York Review of Books, 40/3, (28 Jan. 1993), pp.33–4.
313. citing an article in the Russian journal Den, No.47 (22–28 Nov. 1992), p.1.
314. See Schmemann, ‘Russian Army Major Caught While Seeking to Kill Yeltsin’, NYT, 31 Jan. 1993, p.10.
315. On this see James Sherr, ‘Russian Orthodoxies: Little Change in Military Thinking’, The National Interest, No.30 (Winter 1992/93), pp.41–9.
316. Foye, ‘Eighty Officers Promoted General, Admiral’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 June 1993 [e-mail];
317. Foye, ‘Rutskoi Hits Yeltsin on State of the Army’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 18 June 1993 [e-mail];
318. Lepingwell, ‘More Corruption Charges Against Russian Military’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 24 June 1993 [e-mail] all provide evidence that Yeltsin might be trying to buy-off the officer corps through promotions.
319. Schmemann, ‘Yeltsin Lifts a Ministerial Load Off An Economists Shoulders’, NYT, 3 April 1992, p.6.
320. Schmemann, ‘New Kremlin Team Raises Questions On Yeltsin’s Aim’, NYT, 14 June 1992, p.10
321. ‘Enter the Past’, Economist, 27 Feb. 1993, pp.52–3.
322. Paul Lewis, ‘Russians Resisting Tighters Sanctions Against Belgrade’, NYT, 9 April 1993, p.6;
323. Lewis, ‘Russia Seeks to Delay Vote on Belgrade Sanctions’, NYT, 12 April 1993, p.4;
324. Gordon, ‘Russia Declines to Support Tighter Sanctions on Serbia’, NYT, 18 April 1993, p.8.
325. ‘Reform Teeters’, Economist, 11 July 1992, p.45.
326. An early 1993 investigative article in Moscow News included an interview with seven officers from nearly all the branches of the Russian Army representing a wide variety of geographic areas who claimed to want to establish a ‘tough military dictatorship, like the one in Chile …’ The author of this article concluded that ‘[w]hether or not the threat is great today is still a moot point. That it does exist is beyond doubt.’ See Alexander Zhilin, ‘Does An Underground Committee Function?’ Moscow News. 19 March 1993, p.10.
327. Also see Wendy Slater, ‘Yeltsin Curtails Vacation After Coup Warning’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 26 July 1993, [e-mail]
328. Alexander Rahr, ‘Shakhrai Warns of Army Take-over’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 19 Nov. 1993 [e-mail].
329. Over 500 people were injured, including 350 policemen, and one policeman killed during 1993 May Day riots. Almost 200 people were killed and nearly 600 seriously injured during the attacks on Ostankino TV and the assault on the Russian Parliament in early Oct. 1993. On this see Schmemann, ‘Foes of Yeltsin Riot in Moscow; Dozens Injured’, NYT, 2 May 1993, pp.1 and 3;
330. Erlanger, ‘Battle of Blame Now Follows the Moscow Protest’, NYT, 3 May 1993, p.5;
331. Bohlen, ‘Moscow Policeman Dies of Injuries From Violence on Saturday’, NYT, 6 May 1993, p.7;
332. Lepingwell, ‘Casualty Figures Climb, Vary’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 6 Oct. 1993 [e-mail].
333. ‘The Generals Grumble’, Economist, 22 Aug. 1992, p.38.
334. Also see Goldberg, ‘Once Mighty Warriors Now Feel Unneeded, Betrayed’, Los Angeles Times, 19 July 1993, p.8
335. Dahlberg, ‘An Army Besieged By Turmoil’, LAT, 18 July 1993, pp.6 and 7.
336. Erlanger, ‘Yeltsin Leaves on Vacation on Eve of Talks’, NYT, 16 Feb. 1993, p.4;
337. ‘Russian Politics: Snap, Snarl’, Economist, 20 Feb. 1993, pp.49–50;
338. ‘Yeltsin Issues Warning to Russian Congress’, NYT, 3 March 1993, p.7.
339. See, e.g. ‘What Red Army?’ NYT, 30 March 1993, p.14.
340. Erlanger, ‘Divided and Burdened, The Army Stays Neutral’, NYT, 24 March 1993, p.5
341. Douglas L. Clarke and Alfred Reisch, ‘Grachev Fights Politicization of Army’, RFE/RL Research Report, 1/36, 11 Sept. 1992, p.71.
342. Schmemann, ‘Russian Congress Is Called for a Showdown’, NYT, 6 March 1993, p.5
343. ‘Something Has To Give’, Economist, 13 March 1993, p.55.
344. Pipes, ‘Russia’s Crisis’, NYT, 14 March 1993, p.17.
345. According to press reports, Grachev and the other ‘security ministers’ made a public display of support for Yeltsin by seeing him off at the airport as he left for Vancouver summit and deliberately remained in Moscow to ensure that a coup did not take place during his absence. See Friedman, ‘Clinton Presents Billions to Yeltsin in US Aid Package’, NYT, 4 April 1993, p.1
346. Schmemann, ‘Yeltsin Tiptoeing on Sensitive Issues’, NYT, 4 April 1993, p.1l.
347. See remarks by Jeremey Azreal in Melissa Healy, ‘US Watching for Russian Military Moves’, Los Angeles Times, 23 March 1993, p.8.
348. Bohlen, ‘Yeltsin Fresh From His Victory, Is Attacked by Political Enemies’, NYT, 27 April 1993, p.1.
349. Michael Evans, ‘A Russian Army Out of Orders’, The Times [London], 10 March 1993, p.16.
350. See Dominic Gualtieri, ‘Khasbulatov Seeks Support of Armed Forces’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 Aug. 1993 [e-mail];
351. Foye, ‘Yeltsin Aware of Army’s Social Problems’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 Aug. 1993 [e-mail];
352. Rahr, ‘More On Possiblity of Armed Provocation’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 24 Sept. 1993 [e-mail].
353. Schmemann, ‘Yeltsin and Legislature Act to Oust Each Other’, NYT, 22 Sept. 1993, pp.1 and 18.
354. There have only been unsubstantiated rumors of a few troops responding. See, e.g., Socor, ‘“Dniester” Fighters Defend Russian Supreme Soviet’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 28 Sept. 1993 [e-mail].
355. Douglas Jcht, ‘Russian Army Is Seen As A Two-sided Sword’, NYT, 24 Sept. 1993, p.6
356. Heinrich Tiller and Hans-Henning Schroeder, ‘Power Crisis and the Military: The Role of the Russian Armed Forces in the Power Struggle between President and Parliament’ [English Summary of Machtkrise und Militar in Russland/ Bericht des BIOst, No.46 (Nov. 1993), p.45.
357. See, Safire, ‘Yeltsin …’ (note ?), p.27;
358. Schmemann, ‘Security …’ (note ?), p. 12;
359. ‘The Threat…’ Economist, p.19.
360. Raphael (note ?), p.16.
361. Ibid., p.1
362. Rahr, ‘Army Remains Calm’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 22 Sept. 1993 [e-mail].
363. Some presidential advisers, and even Yeltsin himself, have claimed the military hesitated during the events of 3–4 Oct. See Foye, ‘Yeltsin Aide Says Security Forces Hesitated’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 19 Oct. 1993 [e-mail];
364. Foye. ‘Grachcv Dismissal Denied’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 Nov. 1993 [e-mail];
365. Foye, ‘Yeltsin Criticizes Grachcv Over 4 October Events …’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 Nov. 1993 [e-mail], I suspect that they were holding-out for concessions from Yeltsin rather than hesitating.
366. Schmemann, ‘Yeltsin Supported By Security Chiefs in Political Fight’, NYT, 23 Sept. 1993, pp.1 and 2.
367. Safire, ‘Yeltsin Planned Coup’, NYT, 23 Sept. 1993, p.27
368. Therese Raphael, ‘Yeltsin’s Military Might’, Wall Street Journal, 23 Sept. 1993, p. 16.
369. See Sestanovich, ‘Don’t Give An Inch, Yeltsin’, NYT, 23 Sept. 1993, p.27.
370. E.g. 60 per cent of the troops were not paid during parts of the summer. See Foye, ‘Servicemen Not Getting Paid’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 10 Aug. 1993 [e-mail].
371. See the remarks by Deputy Minister of Defense Gen. Kobets in Foye, ‘Yeltsin Aware …’;
372. Foye, ‘Yeltsin Supports Proposal for More Contract Soldiers’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 1 Sept. 1993 [e-mail];
373. Foye, ‘On Regular Visits, Military Doctrine’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 1 Sept. 1993 [e-mail].
374. Foye, ‘Security Council Secretary Resigns’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 Aug. 1993 [e-mail].
375. See Rahr, ‘Two Killed in Overnight Attack on Military HQ’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 24 Sept. 1993 [e-mail];
376. Foye, ‘Military Leadership Was Reluctant Supporter of Yeltsin’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 6 Oct. 1993 [e-mail];
377. Schmemann, ‘The Man in the Middle: A Trusted Military Aid’, NYT, 6 Oct. 1993, p.14.
378. Foye, ‘Military Leadership Was Reluctant Supporter of Yeltsin’. RFE/RL Daily Report, 6 Oct. 1993 [e-mail];
379. Foye, ‘Defense Ministry Machinations?’ RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 Oct. 1993 [e-mail];
380. Foye, ‘Kokoshin, Grachev Remarks on Loyalty of Army’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 30 Sept. 1993 [3-mail].
381. Quoted in Foye, ‘Yeltsin Supports …’
382. Also see Rahr, ‘Yeltsin Controls Nuclear Button, Army’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 23 Sept. 1993 [e-mail];
383. Foye, ‘Kokoshin: Army Leadership Behind Yeltsin’, RFE/RL Daily Report 29 Sept. 1993 [e-mail];
384. Rahr, ‘“Power Ministries” Support Yeltsin’, RFE/RL Research Report, No.40 (8 Oct. 1993), p.8;
385. Foye, ‘Confrontation in Moscow: The Army Backs Yeltsin for Now’, RFE/RL Research Report 2/42 (22 Oct. 1993), p.15.
386. See Foye, ‘Army Feels It Deserves Special Treatment’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 6 Oct. 1993 [e-mail].
387. Defense Ministry procurement orders will reportedly rise by 50 per cent in 1994. See Keith Bush, ‘Military Procurement Orders to Rise? RFE/RL Daily Report, 18 Oct. 1993 [e-mail].
388. Lepingwell, ‘Grachev: Military Reductions Reconsidered’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 30 Dec. 1993 [e-mail].
389. A case in point is the new military doctrine which drops the old Soviet rhetoric about ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons, reemphasizes offensive military operations, and calls for increases in military manpower. The Russian paper Kommersant Daily suggests that this was the result of military pressure. See Foye, ‘Text of Military Doctrine Published’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 18 Nov. 1993 [e-mail].
390. Quoted in Zhilin, ‘War Policy …’ (note 160), p.40
391. Mnatsakyan (note 161), p.44.
392. Erlanger, ‘Questions Without an Answer: How the Army Voted’, NYT, 17 Dec. 1993, p.12.
393. Lepingwell, ‘Grachev on Elections’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 30 Dec. 1993 [e-mail].
394. Lepingwell, ‘How Did the Russian Military Vote?’ RFE/RL Daily Report, 16 Dec. 1993 [e-mail].
395. Stanislaw Kondrashcv, ‘Military Doctrine in Political Context’, Izvestiya, 24 Nov. 1993
396. in ‘Further on Doctrine’, FBIS-CE, 26 Nov. 1993, pp.45–6.
397. The key case in point was Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Lebed’s 14th Army in the Transdniestr which was consistently reported to be out of Moscow’s control. After the events of 3–4 Oct. it came to light that Lebed was in fact one of Grachev’s key supporters. See Socor, ‘Lebed on “Dniestr” Involvement in Moscow Rebellion’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 14 Oct. 1993 [e-mail].
398. Further, Lt. Gen. Valerii Manilov, a spokesman for the CIS, told a Harvard Univ. audience on 9 March 1993 that Lebed was acting with Moscow’s full approval. I thank Dr Bruce D. Porter for this anecdote. Yeltsin advisor Sergey Stankcvich was quoted by Rossiiskie Vesti as saying ‘that every step of that Army’s commander was authorized by the hierarchy of Russia’s Ministry of Defense.’ See Socor, ‘Russian Daily says Attack on Moldova authorized by Moscow’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 4 Feb. 1994 [e-mail].
399. There is some overlap between the observations made here and those in Lepingwell, ‘Soviet Civil-Military Relations’ (note 4), pp.570–2.
400. Huntington, Soldier and State (note 3), p.74 argues that a professional military will by definition be subordinate to civilian authority.
401. Certainly this has been the case, with a few notable exceptions, in Europe and North America. These militaries modernized in the face of an external threat environment. This made them professional in Huntington’s sense; they were externally oriented and subordinate to civilian authority. There arc two problems, however. First, some professional militaries – such as the French Army during the Algerian War – have dcprofcssionalized. Second, many other militaries have modernized in different threat environments – primarily internal – which has not led them to the European/North American pattern of professionalization. For a discussion of how modernization in a predominantly internal threat environment produces a dramatically different pattern of civil–military relations, see Stepan, ‘The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion’ in Stepan (ed.). Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1973), pp.47–65
402. Alain Rouquie’, The Military and the State in Latin America, Paul Sigmund, trans. (Berkeley, CA. Univ. of California Press, 1987), ch.2.
403. As evidence of continuing military concerns, the new military doctrine devotes 2½ (out of II) pages to this issue. See ‘Basic Provisions …’, pp.9–11. (note 151).
404. E.g. the EC played a small but important role in the transitions to democracy in Greece and Spain. On this see: Laurence Whitehead, ‘International Aspects of Democratization’ in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmittcr, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986), pp.20–3.
405. Former President Richard Nixon suggests that if reform in the former Soviet Union continues in the next few years the United States may save between $250 and $300 billion due to reduced defense spending. See his ‘Save the Peace Dividend’, NYT, 19 Nov. 1992, p.19.
406. Also see Sehmemann, ‘Who Hails Russia? Nixon, No Less’, NYT, 19 Feb. 1993, p.4
407. Richard Nixon, ‘Clinton’s Greatest Challenge’, NYT, 5 March 1993, p.15.
408. For indications of the Clinton administration’s intended course see R. W. Apple, Jr., ‘President Urges More Russian Aid’, NYT, 27 Feb. 1993, pp.1 and 4.
409. Quoted from ‘Excerpts from Christopher Speech: Monumental Stakes for US’, NYT, 23 March 1993. p.7.
410. This is already a serious problem. See Bohlen, ‘Estonia Rattles Its Russian Residents With Its Insistence on “Estonization”,’ NYT, 10 Aug. 1992, p.6.
411. For a thoughtful discussion of the problem and some solutions, see Ted Hopf, ‘Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes’, International Security 17/1 (Summer 1992), pp.44–75.
412. The classic articulation of this argument is Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, J. G. A. Pocock (ed.), (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1987).
413. Donnelly (note 162), p.48.