Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 1985, Pages 279-290

  Cassing, James H ^a   Hillman, Arye L ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012984244     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(85)90036-4     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Distortion-triggered lobbying and welfare: A contribution to the theory of directly unproductive profit-seeking activities
2. The political market for protection in industrial countries: Empirical evidence
3. The political economy of protection
4. On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
5. More on the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
6. Lobbying and welfare
7. Directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities
8. Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs
9. The welfare consequences of directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) lobbying activities: Price versus quantity distortions
10. On the dynamic non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the monetary model of the balance of payments
11. On the dynamic non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the monetary model of the balance of payments: Reply
12. The Social Costs of Monopoly Power
13. On the dynamic non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the monetary model of the balance of payments: Comment
14. A Note on the Distinction between Tariffs and Quotas
15. The non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas under uncertainty
16. Domestic monopoly and redundant tariff protection
17. Declining industries and political support protectionist motives
18. Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power
19. On the use of trade policy measures by a small country to counter foreign monopoly power
20. On water in the quota
21. Tariffs, Quotas, and Market Structure
22. The political economy of the rent seeking society
23. The Kennedy round: Evidence on the regulation of international trade in the United States
24. When Are a Tariff and a Quota Equivalent?
25. Quotas versus tariffs
26. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
27. Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs
28. The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation
29. The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States
30. Tariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in the United States and Abroad
31. The non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas under retaliation
32. A note on the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
33. The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly
34. The Optimum Quota and Retaliation
35. Inelastic offer curves, stability and the difference between tariffs and quotas
36. On the best use of trade controls in the presence of foreign market power
37. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopoly and theft
38. Ranking optimal tariffs and quotas for a large country under uncertainty