Universals and particulars: The case of liberal cultural nationalism

Political Studies

Volumn 46, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 963-977

  Seglow, Jonathan ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032325033     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00179     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. 1 I am grateful to Alessandro Ferrara and an anonymous referee for Political Studies for constructive comments on an earlier version of this article.
2. 2 The first point is argued convincingly in M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1996); for an example of the second see R. Goodin, 'What is so special about our fellow countrymen?', Ethics 98 (1988), 663-87.
3. 2 The first point is argued convincingly in M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1996); for an example of the second see R. Goodin, 'What is so special about our fellow countrymen?', Ethics 98 (1988), 663-87.
4. 3 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); D. Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in A. Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining 'The Politics of Recognition', (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press 2nd ed, 1994), pp. 25-73.
5. 3 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); D. Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in A. Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining 'The Politics of Recognition', (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press 2nd ed, 1994), pp. 25-73.
6. 3 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); D. Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in A. Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining 'The Politics of Recognition', (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press 2nd ed, 1994), pp. 25-73.
7. 4 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993).
8. 5 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972).
9. 6 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 77-8.
10. 7 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 54-8.
11. 8 See, among other examples, A. Ingram, 'Rawlsians, Pluralists and Cosmopolitans' in D. Archard (ed.), Philosophy and Pluralism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 147-61.
12. 9 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 102.
13. 10 Rawlsian justification is thus somewhere between a moral contractualist and a communitarian view. There is not the space here to explore in detail the substantive assumptions involved in this. But see D. Miller, 'Citizenship and pluralism', Political Studies 43 (1995), 432-50 at pp. 437-43 who traces Rawls's ambiguous route between citizenship and moral agency.
14. 11 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 318.
15. 12 This aspect of rights is emphasised by A. Honneth in his Struggles for Recognition (Cambridge, Polity, 1995). Honneth distinguishes between self-respect as a rights bearer and self-esteem for one's way of life but does not link the latter to culture.
16. 13 For the idea of a comprehensive doctrine see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 13-4.
17. 14 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 35-44.
18. 15 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 83.
19. 16 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 83.
20. 17 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 158-63.
21. 18 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 86.
22. 19 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 192-3. Oddly, Rawlsian self-respect has no explicit role in Multicultural Citizenship though Kymlicka's argument remains.
23. 20 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 76-90.
24. 21 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 1-26.
25. 22 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 26-33.
26. 23 Kymlicka, also refers to the 'Historic agreement' and 'Value of Diversity' arguments for minority rights, but these are given fairly short shrift. See Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 116-23.
27. 24 For an earlier version of this argument see Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, ch. 9.
28. 25 J. Waldron, 'Minority cultures and the cosmopolitan alternative', University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25 (1992), 751-93.
29. 26 M. Walzer, 'Nation and Universe' in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Brasenose College, Oxford, 1989).
30. 27 Compare A. Margalit and M. Halbertal, 'Liberalism and the right to culture', Social Research 61 (1994), 491-510, who argue for 'the right to preserve its particular culture with its traditional content', p. 504.
31. 28 On this see J. Danley, 'Liberalism, aboriginal rights, and cultural minorities', Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991), 168-85 at pp. 174-81; G. B. Levey, 'Equality, autonomy, and cultural rights', Political Theory, 25 (1997), 215-48 at pp. 220-4; and C. Kukathas, 'Multiculturalism as fairness: Will Kymlicka's multicultural citizenship', Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1997), 406-27 at pp. 412-6.
32. 28 On this see J. Danley, 'Liberalism, aboriginal rights, and cultural minorities', Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991), 168-85 at pp. 174-81; G. B. Levey, 'Equality, autonomy, and cultural rights', Political Theory, 25 (1997), 215-48 at pp. 220-4; and C. Kukathas, 'Multiculturalism as fairness: Will Kymlicka's multicultural citizenship', Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1997), 406-27 at pp. 412-6.
33. 28 On this see J. Danley, 'Liberalism, aboriginal rights, and cultural minorities', Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991), 168-85 at pp. 174-81; G. B. Levey, 'Equality, autonomy, and cultural rights', Political Theory, 25 (1997), 215-48 at pp. 220-4; and C. Kukathas, 'Multiculturalism as fairness: Will Kymlicka's multicultural citizenship', Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1997), 406-27 at pp. 412-6.
34. 29 C. Kukathas, 'Multiculturalism as fairness', pp. 413-6.
35. 30 B. Walker, 'Plural cultures, contested territories: a critique of Kymlicka', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 30 (1997), 211-34 at pp. 216-25.
36. 31 B. Parekh, 'Dilemmas of a multicultural theory of citizenship', Constellations, 4 (1997), 54-62 at pp. 58-61.
37. 32 Perhaps Kymlicka has this in mind when he distinguishes between identifying the demands of liberal justice in abstract and imposing it on non-liberal minorities. This move severs equal respect for persons from autonomy as the grounds of that respect. See Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 183-70.
38. 33 In this and the following paragraph I am indebted to the argument in J. Tomasi, 'Kymlicka, liberalism, and respect for cultural minorities', Ethics 105 (1995), 580-603.
39. 34 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 92.
40. 35 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 103.
41. 36 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 87-8.
42. 37 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 218 n. 29.
43. 38 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 92.
44. 39 See, for example, Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993) ch. 3; J. Raz and A. Margalit, 'National self-determination', Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 439-61; and A. de-Shalit, 'National self-determination: political, not cultural', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 906-20. National self-determination is obviously a correlate of Miller's argument that there should be a substantive ethical basis to the state.
45. 39 See, for example, Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993) ch. 3; J. Raz and A. Margalit, 'National self-determination', Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 439-61; and A. de-Shalit, 'National self-determination: political, not cultural', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 906-20. National self-determination is obviously a correlate of Miller's argument that there should be a substantive ethical basis to the state.
46. 39 See, for example, Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993) ch. 3; J. Raz and A. Margalit, 'National self-determination', Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 439-61; and A. de-Shalit, 'National self-determination: political, not cultural', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 906-20. National self-determination is obviously a correlate of Miller's argument that there should be a substantive ethical basis to the state.
47. 40 Miller, On Nationality, p. 50.
48. 41 D. Miller, 'In defence of nationality', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 3-16 at p. 8.
49. 42 A. Vincent, 'Liberal nationalism: an irresponsible compound', Political Studies, 45 (1997), 275-95 at p. 288.
50. 43 For moral universalist replies to Miller see M. Freeman, 'Nation-state and cosmopolis: a response to David Miller', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11 (1994), 79-87; C. Jones, 'Revenge of the philosophical mole: another response to David Miller on nationality', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 (1996), 73-86; and D. Weinstock, 'Is there a moral case for nationalism?', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 (1996), 87-100.
51. 43 For moral universalist replies to Miller see M. Freeman, 'Nation-state and cosmopolis: a response to David Miller', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11 (1994), 79-87; C. Jones, 'Revenge of the philosophical mole: another response to David Miller on nationality', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 (1996), 73-86; and D. Weinstock, 'Is there a moral case for nationalism?', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 (1996), 87-100.
52. 43 For moral universalist replies to Miller see M. Freeman, 'Nation-state and cosmopolis: a response to David Miller', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11 (1994), 79-87; C. Jones, 'Revenge of the philosophical mole: another response to David Miller on nationality', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 (1996), 73-86; and D. Weinstock, 'Is there a moral case for nationalism?', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 13 (1996), 87-100.
53. 44 Miller, On Nationality, p. 74.
54. 45 D. Miller, 'Nationality: some replies', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14 (1997), 69-81 at pp. 72-3.
55. 46 Miller, On Nationality, p. 64.
56. 47 According to Miller a nation is (i) a network of shared belief united by mutual recognition, (ii) whose identity embody historical continuity making each a 'community of obligation', (iii) Nations are active collective identities who (iv) occupy a particular geographical place, and who finally (v) share a common public culture. See Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', pp. 6-8; and On Nationality, p. 22-7.
57. 47 According to Miller a nation is (i) a network of shared belief united by mutual recognition, (ii) whose identity embody historical continuity making each a 'community of obligation', (iii) Nations are active collective identities who (iv) occupy a particular geographical place, and who finally (v) share a common public culture. See Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', pp. 6-8; and On Nationality, p. 22-7.
58. 48 Miller, On Nationality, p. 68, p. 158.
59. 49 Rawls would probably see Miller's communitarian public culture as a 'comprehensive doctrine', too controversial to serve as a basis of justification for political principles.
60. 50 Indeed, Miller claims that the needs of minority groups are best met by a clear and distinct national identity which stands above their specific cultural identities. See 'In defence of nationality', p. 11. Thus he offers no specific principles to aid members of minority cultures' self-respect.
61. 51 Miller argues that ethical universalism can only motivate citizens to deliver each other reciprocal duties. See On Nationality, pp. 71-2.
62. 52 Miller, On Nationality, p. 96.
63. 53 Miller, On Nationality, p. 150.
64. 54 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lecture VI.
65. 55 This point is argued in detail in Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, ch. 3.
66. 56 Miller, On Nationality, p. 36.
67. 57 Miller's more rationalist correspondents have seized on his defence of myth as a weak spot in his nationalist ethics. See Jones, 'Revenge of the philosophical mole', and J. O'Neill, 'Should nationalists be communitarians?', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11 (1994), 136-43.
68. For a counterview see D. Archard, 'Myths, lies and historical truth: a defence of nationalism', Political Studies, 43 (1995), 472-81.
69. 58 C. Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
70. 59 For a survey of Taylor's moral philosophy see J. Seglow, 'Goodness in an age of pluralism: on Charles Taylor's moral theory', Res Publica, 2 (1996), 163-80.
71. 60 See Taylor, Sources of the Self, ch. 2 and 'The politics of recognition', pp. 25-37.
72. 61 Taylor, 'The politics of recognition', p. 30.
73. 62 Taylor, 'The politics of recognition', pp. 28-37.
74. 63 Taylor, 'The politics of recognition', p. 59.
75. 64 See J. Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State' in Taylor and Gutmann, Multiculturalism, pp. 107-48; and S. Wolf, 'Comment', in Taylor and Gutmann, Multiculturalism, pp. 75-85.
76. 64 See J. Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State' in Taylor and Gutmann, Multiculturalism, pp. 107-48; and S. Wolf, 'Comment', in Taylor and Gutmann, Multiculturalism, pp. 75-85.
77. 65 See A. Ferrara, 'Authenticity and the project of modernity', European Journal of Philosophy, 2 (1994), 241-73 at pp. 241-2.
78. 66 See the references to authenticity in the index of J. Christman (ed.), The Inner Citadel (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989). In his 'The Concept of Autonomy' in this volume, G. Dworkin defines it as 'authenticity plus procedural independence', p. 61.
79. 66 See the references to authenticity in the index of J. Christman (ed.), The Inner Citadel (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989). In his 'The Concept of Autonomy' in this volume, G. Dworkin defines it as 'authenticity plus procedural independence', p. 61.
80. 67 M. Cooke, 'Authenticity and autonomy: Taylor, Habermas and the politics of recognition', Political Theory 25 (1997), 258-88.
81. 68 Ferrara, 'Authenticity and the project of modernity', p. 243.
82. 69 Ferrara, 'Authenticity and the project of modernity', p. 264. Emphasis original.
83. 70 P. Digeser, Our Politics? Our Selves (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 188-9;
84. T. Dumm, 'Strangers and liberals', Political Theory 22 (1994), 167-75 at p. 171;
85. A. Rorty, 'The hidden politics of cultural identification', Political Theory, 22 (1994), 152-66 at pp. 156-9;
86. and Wolf, 'Comment'.
87. 71 K. A. Appiah, 'Identity, Authenticity, Survival' in Taylor and Gutmann, Multiculturalism, pp. 149-63.
88. 72 Appiah, 'Identity, Authenticity, Survival', pp. 162-3.
89. 73 See, for a recent example of this sort of work, V. Beider, 'The cultural conditions of transnational citizenship', Political Theory, 25 (1997), 771-813.