National self-determination: Political, not cultural

Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 5, 1996, Pages 906-920

  De Shalit, Avner ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039712704     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00341.x     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the IPSA conference in Berlin, 1994, and at the ECPR meeting in Bordeaux, May 1995. I would like to thank Brian Barry, Harry Beran, Linda Bishai, Simon Caney, Michael Freeman, Paul Gilbert, Chandran Kukathas, Percy Lehning, David Miller Brendan O'Leary, Saul Smilansky, and Hillel Steiner for their comments.
2. I do not intend to argue this point. The reader may refer to David Miller, 'In defence of nationality'. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 3-17, Kai Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 29-44, and Brian Barry -Self-government revisited' in Miller and Siedentrop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983) pp 121-55 Among the basic needs of human beings, it is claimed, is the need to belong to a group beyond one's immediate social environment. It is further claimed that the nation constitutes such a group and it corresponds to this need. Nor am I discussing the issue which is sometimes tied up with national self-determination, namely tolerating illiberal minority groups within a liberal state. For a very interesting discussion of this problem see the exchange between Chandran Kukathas 'Are there any natural rights?', Political Theory, 20 (1992), 105-40; 'Cultural rights 'Political Theory 20 (1992) and Will Kymlicka, 'The rights of minority cultures', Political Theory, 20 (1992) 140-7 Their ideas are further discussed and challenged by Michael Freeman, 'Minority rights and ethnic conflict: a problem of liberal-democratic theory and practice', paper delivered at the IPSA conference, Berlin 1994.
3. I do not intend to argue this point. The reader may refer to David Miller, 'In defence of nationality'. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 3-17, Kai Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 29-44, and Brian Barry -Self-government revisited' in Miller and Siedentrop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983) pp 121-55 Among the basic needs of human beings, it is claimed, is the need to belong to a group beyond one's immediate social environment. It is further claimed that the nation constitutes such a group and it corresponds to this need. Nor am I discussing the issue which is sometimes tied up with national self-determination, namely tolerating illiberal minority groups within a liberal state. For a very interesting discussion of this problem see the exchange between Chandran Kukathas 'Are there any natural rights?', Political Theory, 20 (1992), 105-40; 'Cultural rights 'Political Theory 20 (1992) and Will Kymlicka, 'The rights of minority cultures', Political Theory, 20 (1992) 140-7 Their ideas are further discussed and challenged by Michael Freeman, 'Minority rights and ethnic conflict: a problem of liberal-democratic theory and practice', paper delivered at the IPSA conference, Berlin 1994.
4. I do not intend to argue this point. The reader may refer to David Miller, 'In defence of nationality'. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 3-17, Kai Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 29-44, and Brian Barry -Self-government revisited' in Miller and Siedentrop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983) pp 121-55 Among the basic needs of human beings, it is claimed, is the need to belong to a group beyond one's immediate social environment. It is further claimed that the nation constitutes such a group and it corresponds to this need. Nor am I discussing the issue which is sometimes tied up with national self-determination, namely tolerating illiberal minority groups within a liberal state. For a very interesting discussion of this problem see the exchange between Chandran Kukathas 'Are there any natural rights?', Political Theory, 20 (1992), 105-40; 'Cultural rights 'Political Theory 20 (1992) and Will Kymlicka, 'The rights of minority cultures', Political Theory, 20 (1992) 140-7 Their ideas are further discussed and challenged by Michael Freeman, 'Minority rights and ethnic conflict: a problem of liberal-democratic theory and practice', paper delivered at the IPSA conference, Berlin 1994.
5. I do not intend to argue this point. The reader may refer to David Miller, 'In defence of nationality'. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 3-17, Kai Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 29-44, and Brian Barry -Self-government revisited' in Miller and Siedentrop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983) pp 121-55 Among the basic needs of human beings, it is claimed, is the need to belong to a group beyond one's immediate social environment. It is further claimed that the nation constitutes such a group and it corresponds to this need. Nor am I discussing the issue which is sometimes tied up with national self-determination, namely tolerating illiberal minority groups within a liberal state. For a very interesting discussion of this problem see the exchange between Chandran Kukathas 'Are there any natural rights?', Political Theory, 20 (1992), 105-40; 'Cultural rights 'Political Theory 20 (1992) and Will Kymlicka, 'The rights of minority cultures', Political Theory, 20 (1992) 140-7 Their ideas are further discussed and challenged by Michael Freeman, 'Minority rights and ethnic conflict: a problem of liberal-democratic theory and practice', paper delivered at the IPSA conference, Berlin 1994.
6. I do not intend to argue this point. The reader may refer to David Miller, 'In defence of nationality'. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 3-17, Kai Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 29-44, and Brian Barry -Self-government revisited' in Miller and Siedentrop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983) pp 121-55 Among the basic needs of human beings, it is claimed, is the need to belong to a group beyond one's immediate social environment. It is further claimed that the nation constitutes such a group and it corresponds to this need. Nor am I discussing the issue which is sometimes tied up with national self-determination, namely tolerating illiberal minority groups within a liberal state. For a very interesting discussion of this problem see the exchange between Chandran Kukathas 'Are there any natural rights?', Political Theory, 20 (1992), 105-40; 'Cultural rights 'Political Theory 20 (1992) and Will Kymlicka, 'The rights of minority cultures', Political Theory, 20 (1992) 140-7 Their ideas are further discussed and challenged by Michael Freeman, 'Minority rights and ethnic conflict: a problem of liberal-democratic theory and practice', paper delivered at the IPSA conference, Berlin 1994.
7. I do not intend to argue this point. The reader may refer to David Miller, 'In defence of nationality'. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 3-17, Kai Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 29-44, and Brian Barry -Self-government revisited' in Miller and Siedentrop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983) pp 121-55 Among the basic needs of human beings, it is claimed, is the need to belong to a group beyond one's immediate social environment. It is further claimed that the nation constitutes such a group and it corresponds to this need. Nor am I discussing the issue which is sometimes tied up with national self-determination, namely tolerating illiberal minority groups within a liberal state. For a very interesting discussion of this problem see the exchange between Chandran Kukathas 'Are there any natural rights?', Political Theory, 20 (1992), 105-40; 'Cultural rights 'Political Theory 20 (1992) and Will Kymlicka, 'The rights of minority cultures', Political Theory, 20 (1992) 140-7 Their ideas are further discussed and challenged by Michael Freeman, 'Minority rights and ethnic conflict: a problem of liberal-democratic theory and practice', paper delivered at the IPSA conference, Berlin 1994.
8. I do not intend to argue this point. The reader may refer to David Miller, 'In defence of nationality'. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 3-17, Kai Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), 29-44, and Brian Barry -Self-government revisited' in Miller and Siedentrop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon, 1983) pp 121-55 Among the basic needs of human beings, it is claimed, is the need to belong to a group beyond one's immediate social environment. It is further claimed that the nation constitutes such a group and it corresponds to this need. Nor am I discussing the issue which is sometimes tied up with national self-determination, namely tolerating illiberal minority groups within a liberal state. For a very interesting discussion of this problem see the exchange between Chandran Kukathas 'Are there any natural rights?', Political Theory, 20 (1992), 105-40; 'Cultural rights 'Political Theory 20 (1992) and Will Kymlicka, 'The rights of minority cultures', Political Theory, 20 (1992) 140-7 Their ideas are further discussed and challenged by Michael Freeman, 'Minority rights and ethnic conflict: a problem of liberal-democratic theory and practice', paper delivered at the IPSA conference, Berlin 1994.
9. Which could also be a myth, as De George forcefully argues in his 'The myth of the right of collective self-determination', in W. Twining (ed.), Issues of Self-Determination (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press, 1990) pp. 1-7, or on the other hand a collective right, as Walzer claims in his 'The moral standing of states', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9 (1980) 209-30. The reader is free to decide for herself.
10. Which could also be a myth, as De George forcefully argues in his 'The myth of the right of collective self-determination', in W. Twining (ed.), Issues of Self-Determination (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press, 1990) pp. 1-7, or on the other hand a collective right, as Walzer claims in his 'The moral standing of states', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9 (1980) 209-30. The reader is free to decide for herself.
11. The theory of national self-determination that is put forward here seems to me to be better because it is liberated from the chains of liberalism in its thin meaning - a theory of individualism and liberty.
12. See, for example, A. Buchanan, Secession, (Boulder CO, Westview, 1992).
13. I owe this point to Simon Caney.
14. According to Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon the word was used in the Iliad as a 'number of people accustomed to living together', and after Homer it meant a 'nation or a people'. This meaning is ascribed to 'ethnos' in the works of the Greek historian Herodotus as well. And the Oxford Dictionary of Current English writes: 'ethnic: of group of mankind having common national or cultural tradition'.
15. This is, perhaps based on a communitarian definition of a nation. According to this interpretation, the Americans are not a nation in the strong sense of the word. Paraphrasing Robert Entman's book about American politics. Democracy Without Citizens (New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1989), I would claim that this is a case of citizens without a nation. Indeed, what holds Americans together is mainly the constitution: but this is a matter of citizenship. They do not hang to each other in obligations of welfare and well-being in the way one would find in many European countries. For further discussion see my Why Posterity Matters (London, Routledge, 1995) in which a moderate theory of communitarianism is put forward. See also the 'Introduction' in S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992).
16. This is, perhaps based on a communitarian definition of a nation. According to this interpretation, the Americans are not a nation in the strong sense of the word. Paraphrasing Robert Entman's book about American politics. Democracy Without Citizens (New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1989), I would claim that this is a case of citizens without a nation. Indeed, what holds Americans together is mainly the constitution: but this is a matter of citizenship. They do not hang to each other in obligations of welfare and well-being in the way one would find in many European countries. For further discussion see my Why Posterity Matters (London, Routledge, 1995) in which a moderate theory of communitarianism is put forward. See also the 'Introduction' in S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992).
17. This is, perhaps based on a communitarian definition of a nation. According to this interpretation, the Americans are not a nation in the strong sense of the word. Paraphrasing Robert Entman's book about American politics. Democracy Without Citizens (New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1989), I would claim that this is a case of citizens without a nation. Indeed, what holds Americans together is mainly the constitution: but this is a matter of citizenship. They do not hang to each other in obligations of welfare and well-being in the way one would find in many European countries. For further discussion see my Why Posterity Matters (London, Routledge, 1995) in which a moderate theory of communitarianism is put forward. See also the 'Introduction' in S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992).
18. See also the discussion of this question in R. E. Ewin, 'Peoples and secession', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11 (1994), p. 225.
19. Barry, 'Self-government revisited', p. 134.
20. Ernest Gellner has already argued that nationalism is 'primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unity should be congruent'. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 1.
21. E. J. Hobsbawm also adopts this use of the term in his Nations and Nationalism Since 1870 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). I dare even claim that in order for the nation to be constitutive of its members, it has to be an ethnic group as well. But this is, perhaps, an issue for another paper.
22. But then there are cases in which multi-culturalism is only a reflection of multi-ethnicism. In that case the discussion should focus on the ethnic aspect, because this tends to raise more radical and, from our point of view, more interesting demands.
23. H. Beran, 'The place of secession in liberal democratic theory' in P. Gilbert and P. Gregory (eds) Nations, Cultures and Markets (Aldershot, Avebury, 1994); H. Beran, 'A democratic theory of political self-determination for a new world order'. Paper presented at the IPSA conference. Berlin 1994; H. Beran, 'An attempt to formulate a democratic theory of the right of political selt-determination and secession', unpublished paper (1995).
24. H. Beran, 'The place of secession in liberal democratic theory' in P. Gilbert and P. Gregory (eds) Nations, Cultures and Markets (Aldershot, Avebury, 1994); H. Beran, 'A democratic theory of political self-determination for a new world order'. Paper presented at the IPSA conference. Berlin 1994; H. Beran, 'An attempt to formulate a democratic theory of the right of political selt-determination and secession', unpublished paper (1995).
25. H. Beran, 'The place of secession in liberal democratic theory' in P. Gilbert and P. Gregory (eds) Nations, Cultures and Markets (Aldershot, Avebury, 1994); H. Beran, 'A democratic theory of political self-determination for a new world order'. Paper presented at the IPSA conference. Berlin 1994; H. Beran, 'An attempt to formulate a democratic theory of the right of political selt-determination and secession', unpublished paper (1995).
26. Michael Walzer, 'The new tribalism', Dissent (1992), 162-71; D. Philpott, 'In defence of self-determination', Ethics, 105 (1995), 352-85.
27. Michael Walzer, 'The new tribalism', Dissent (1992), 162-71; D. Philpott, 'In defence of self-determination', Ethics, 105 (1995), 352-85.
28. Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec'; A. Margalit and J. Raz, 'National self-determination', Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 439-61.
29. Miller, 'In defence of nationality', pp. 12-3.
30. See also David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 4.
31. See also James Tully's analysis of the demands in Canada, where people demand 'constitutional protection' for their language and cultures, and 'constitutional recognition as official language minorities'. Tully, 'The crisis of identification: the case of Canada', Political Studies, 42 (1994), p. 78.
32. Nielsen, 'Secession: the case of Quebec', pp. 30, 33. emphasis added.
33. Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 6, 57.
34. E. Kamenka, 'Nationalism: ambiguous legacies and contingent futures'. Political Studies, 41, special issue (1993), p. 83.
35. G. A. Cohen History, Labour and Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988), p. 139. This paragraph is not necessarily related to nationality, and Cohen is quoted without any relation to the fact that he is originally from Quebec.
36. Notice that these cases are much more severe than the way Philpott describes a group which achieves self-determination and is now 'better able to participate, better represented, better able to deliberate ... (and) more autonomous'. Philpott, 'In defence of self-determination', p. 360.
37. The same applies to the Jews' movement of national determination, which flourished after the cultural emancipation of Jews in Europe, and after Jews had gained much more control over their private lives than formerly.
38. See A. Margalit and M. Halbertal, 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research, 61 (1994), p. 491. My interpretation here may be challenged along the lines that sometimes the majority views the minority's demand for self-determination as a threat to the majority's own existence. Indeed, many Israelis regard the Palestinian demand for a state as a threat not only to their free access to holy places in Hebron, East Jerusalem and other parts of the occupied territories, but rather to the existence of the state of Israel. It goes without saying that one of the conditions for granting national groups a state (I discuss this below) is that these groups respect the other groups' self-determination (cf. Margalit and Raz, 'National self-determination', pp. 457, 461). Of course the problem still remains whether these conditions are likely to be fulfilled. If the state is established for the sake of advancing the interests of a nation A, this may be in contrast to the interests of nation B. (cf. T. Kapitan, 'Nation, territory and the principles of self-determination', presented at the APA conference, May 1994, p. 9). Notice, however, that often the problem starts when one group suppresses the other (see my discussion below), not letting its members become citizens, at least not in the full sense. (See Yo'av Peled's distinction between liberal citizenship, i.e. having rights, and republican citizenship, i.e. being active de facto in the moral and political discourse which shapes the community: Peled, 'Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992) 432-43.
39. See A. Margalit and M. Halbertal, 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research, 61 (1994), p. 491. My interpretation here may be challenged along the lines that sometimes the majority views the minority's demand for self-determination as a threat to the majority's own existence. Indeed, many Israelis regard the Palestinian demand for a state as a threat not only to their free access to holy places in Hebron, East Jerusalem and other parts of the occupied territories, but rather to the existence of the state of Israel. It goes without saying that one of the conditions for granting national groups a state (I discuss this below) is that these groups respect the other groups' self-determination (cf. Margalit and Raz, 'National self-determination', pp. 457, 461). Of course the problem still remains whether these conditions are likely to be fulfilled. If the state is established for the sake of advancing the interests of a nation A, this may be in contrast to the interests of nation B. (cf. T. Kapitan, 'Nation, territory and the principles of self-determination', presented at the APA conference, May 1994, p. 9). Notice, however, that often the problem starts when one group suppresses the other (see my discussion below), not letting its members become citizens, at least not in the full sense. (See Yo'av Peled's distinction between liberal citizenship, i.e. having rights, and republican citizenship, i.e. being active de facto in the moral and political discourse which shapes the community: Peled, 'Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992) 432-43.
40. See A. Margalit and M. Halbertal, 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research, 61 (1994), p. 491. My interpretation here may be challenged along the lines that sometimes the majority views the minority's demand for self-determination as a threat to the majority's own existence. Indeed, many Israelis regard the Palestinian demand for a state as a threat not only to their free access to holy places in Hebron, East Jerusalem and other parts of the occupied territories, but rather to the existence of the state of Israel. It goes without saying that one of the conditions for granting national groups a state (I discuss this below) is that these groups respect the other groups' self-determination (cf. Margalit and Raz, 'National self-determination', pp. 457, 461). Of course the problem still remains whether these conditions are likely to be fulfilled. If the state is established for the sake of advancing the interests of a nation A, this may be in contrast to the interests of nation B. (cf. T. Kapitan, 'Nation, territory and the principles of self-determination', presented at the APA conference, May 1994, p. 9). Notice, however, that often the problem starts when one group suppresses the other (see my discussion below), not letting its members become citizens, at least not in the full sense. (See Yo'av Peled's distinction between liberal citizenship, i.e. having rights, and republican citizenship, i.e. being active de facto in the moral and political discourse which shapes the community: Peled, 'Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992) 432-43.
41. See A. Margalit and M. Halbertal, 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research, 61 (1994), p. 491. My interpretation here may be challenged along the lines that sometimes the majority views the minority's demand for self-determination as a threat to the majority's own existence. Indeed, many Israelis regard the Palestinian demand for a state as a threat not only to their free access to holy places in Hebron, East Jerusalem and other parts of the occupied territories, but rather to the existence of the state of Israel. It goes without saying that one of the conditions for granting national groups a state (I discuss this below) is that these groups respect the other groups' self-determination (cf. Margalit and Raz, 'National self-determination', pp. 457, 461). Of course the problem still remains whether these conditions are likely to be fulfilled. If the state is established for the sake of advancing the interests of a nation A, this may be in contrast to the interests of nation B. (cf. T. Kapitan, 'Nation, territory and the principles of self-determination', presented at the APA conference, May 1994, p. 9). Notice, however, that often the problem starts when one group suppresses the other (see my discussion below), not letting its members become citizens, at least not in the full sense. (See Yo'av Peled's distinction between liberal citizenship, i.e. having rights, and republican citizenship, i.e. being active de facto in the moral and political discourse which shapes the community: Peled, 'Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992) 432-43.
42. Hillel Steiner, 'Territorial justice', paper presented at the ECPR conference, Bordeaux, 1995.
43. For further discussion of such cases see J. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London, MacMillan, 1991).
44. Cf. Miller, 'In defence of nationality'.
45. I should stress that other theorists have emphasized the importance of enmity as well, but in another context, that of the colonial relations. For example, R. S. Bhalla suggested that the principle of self-determmation is acceptable as a legal principle only in its application to the liberation of colonial territories. Here I adopt a broader position. See Bhalla, 'The right of self-determination in international law' in Twining, Issues of Self-Determination.
46. Miller, 'In defence of nationality', pp. 5-6.
47. Hobsbawn is perhaps, right when he distinguishes between Balkanization and Lebanonization. The former is the return of many nations to declare their autonomy or independence, whereas the latter stands for 'autonomist and separatist aspirations of threatened minorities within national entities'. E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 186.
48. J. Tully, 'The crisis of identification', pp. 79-80.
49. Philpott, 'In defence of self-determination', p. 370.
50. Linda Bishai, 'Altered states: secession and the problems of liberal theory', presented at the ECPR conference, Bordeaux, 1995.
51. The notion of antagonistic conflict is taken from Mao Tse-Toung, although the meaning here is different.
52. I owe this example to Michael Freeman.
53. Philpott, 'In defence of self-determination', pp. 371-5.
54. For a different attitude see W. E. Connoly. 'Democracy and territoriality' in F. Dolan and T. Dumm (eds), Rhetorical Republic (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1994).
55. Obviously, it would be better if there were more liberal and fewer illiberal states. Also, it does not follow that we cannot specify at least a few minimal conditions for granting the right for a state. We can, perhaps, distinguish between the group not harming fundamental rights and not harming derivative rights. And yet, it we want to do so, we must have a clearer theoretical justification for this distinction, which, I suspect, we still lack.