Democracy and the national interest

Foreign Affairs

Volumn 75, Issue 6, 1996, Pages 47-62

  Talbott, Strobe ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003152047     PISSN: 00157120     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20047829     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. See, for example, Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996, pp. 16-32; and Henry Kissinger, "Beware: A Threat Abroad," Newsweek, June 17, 1996, p. 42.
2. See, for example, Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996, pp. 16-32; and Henry Kissinger, "Beware: A Threat Abroad," Newsweek, June 17, 1996, p. 42.
3. This principle has been prominent in the thinking of American statesmen in the twentieth century. Woodrow Wilson called democracy "the best preventive of such jealousies and suspicions and secret intrigues as produce wars," and Franklin Roosevelt said that "the continued maintenance and improvement of democracy constitute the most important guarantee of international peace." A substantial body of empirical evidence and political science scholarship supports the premise that democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other - and more likely to win wars against autocratic states. See, for example, David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, March 1992, pp. 24-37. For the case that democracies make better international partners, see G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, pp. 79-91. However, there has been considerable debate over whether democracies are more or less likely to go to war against nondemocratic states. The issue has been examined in depth in International Security. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," Fall 1994, pp. 5-49; and Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," Summer 1995, pp. 5-38.
4. This principle has been prominent in the thinking of American statesmen in the twentieth century. Woodrow Wilson called democracy "the best preventive of such jealousies and suspicions and secret intrigues as produce wars," and Franklin Roosevelt said that "the continued maintenance and improvement of democracy constitute the most important guarantee of international peace." A substantial body of empirical evidence and political science scholarship supports the premise that democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other - and more likely to win wars against autocratic states. See, for example, David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, March 1992, pp. 24-37. For the case that democracies make better international partners, see G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, pp. 79-91. However, there has been considerable debate over whether democracies are more or less likely to go to war against nondemocratic states. The issue has been examined in depth in International Security. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," Fall 1994, pp. 5-49; and Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," Summer 1995, pp. 5-38.
5. This principle has been prominent in the thinking of American statesmen in the twentieth century. Woodrow Wilson called democracy "the best preventive of such jealousies and suspicions and secret intrigues as produce wars," and Franklin Roosevelt said that "the continued maintenance and improvement of democracy constitute the most important guarantee of international peace." A substantial body of empirical evidence and political science scholarship supports the premise that democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other - and more likely to win wars against autocratic states. See, for example, David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, March 1992, pp. 24-37. For the case that democracies make better international partners, see G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, pp. 79-91. However, there has been considerable debate over whether democracies are more or less likely to go to war against nondemocratic states. The issue has been examined in depth in International Security. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," Fall 1994, pp. 5-49; and Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," Summer 1995, pp. 5-38.
6. This principle has been prominent in the thinking of American statesmen in the twentieth century. Woodrow Wilson called democracy "the best preventive of such jealousies and suspicions and secret intrigues as produce wars," and Franklin Roosevelt said that "the continued maintenance and improvement of democracy constitute the most important guarantee of international peace." A substantial body of empirical evidence and political science scholarship supports the premise that democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other - and more likely to win wars against autocratic states. See, for example, David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, March 1992, pp. 24-37. For the case that democracies make better international partners, see G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, pp. 79-91. However, there has been considerable debate over whether democracies are more or less likely to go to war against nondemocratic states. The issue has been examined in depth in International Security. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," Fall 1994, pp. 5-49; and Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," Summer 1995, pp. 5-38.
7. Freedom House's most recent survey of political rights and civil liberties found that the breakdown in 1995 was between "radically divergent polities - generally free societies characterized by democratic governance and unfree societies characterized by arbitrary rule." See Adrian Karatnycky, "Democracy and Despotism: Bipolarism Renewed?" Freedom Review, January-February 1996.
8. Samuel P. Huntington characterizes the expansion of democracy around the globe since 1974 as the most recent of three waves of democratization that have shaped the modern world. The first lasted from 1828 to 1926 and the second from 1943 to 1964. See The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
9. Nicéphore Soglo, the former president of Benin, wrote after his defeat in an election in March that too many African leaders have tried to justify their repressive rule in the early years after independence by claiming to be enlightened authoritarians: "We have been living with their legacy of economic devastation and political violence ever since. Africa can't afford to be held to a different democratic standard by the world." Although he lost the election to former President Mathieu Kerekou, Soglo called the vote a victory for democracy and noted that turnout was nearly 80 percent. Kerekou had first ascended to power in an army coup in October 1972, but, Soglo observed, "this year it was by way of the ballot box." See Soglo, "An African Election: I Lost, but Democracy Is Winning," The Washington Post, August 21, 1996, p. A25.
10. See Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," The Journal of Democracy, April 1996, and Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, September 1993.
11. See Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," The Journal of Democracy, April 1996, and Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, September 1993.
12. Sen, "Freedoms and Needs: An Argument for the Primacy of Political Rights," The New Republic, January 10, 1994, pp. 34-35.
13. See Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation," in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. In its annual survey of democracy and freedom around the world, Freedom House divides countries into three broad categories based on their support for political rights and civil liberties: "free," "partly free," and "not free." Partly free countries have extended significant political power or civil rights or both to their citizens but remain less free than liberal democracies such as the United States. The 1996 survey lists Sri Lanka, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala, for example, as "partly free" democracies.
14. Henry Kissinger, "Moscow and Beijing: A Declaration of Independence," The Washington Post, May 14, 1996, p. A15.
15. Turnout was particularly impressive given that 70 percent of Russian voters had already gone to the polls in the first round of the election two and a half weeks earlier, on June 16.
16. For a forceful rebuttal of the idea that Russia is inherently, incurably expansionist and that Russian democracy will fuel that tendency, see Stephen Sestanovich, "Geotherapy: Russia's Neuroses, and Ours," The National Interest, Fall 1996.
17. The International Crisis Group, which monitored the lead-up to the elections, argued vigorously for postponement, as did many observers in the press. See, for example, "Mr. Clinton's Dayton Deal," The Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1996, p. A12. In August, Robert Frowick, chairman of the Provisional Election Commission and chief representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, postponed Bosnian municipal elections because of flagrant Serb attempts to manipulate registration and rig the outcome. Ambassador Frowick's swift and decisive action sent a strong signal of international resolve and helped keep on track the more important elections at the national, "entity," and cantonal levels.
18. Reinhold Niebuhr made the same point in Children of Light and Children of Darkness: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."
19. Quoted in David Remnick, "Letter from Russia: The War for the Kremlin," The New Yorker, July 22, 1996, p. 57.