Arms Versus Alliances: The Capital Structure of Military Enterprise

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 1994, Pages 215-235

  Conybeare, John A C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84965489172     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038002003     Document Type: Article

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