Alignment theory and interrelated threats: Jordan and the persian gulf crisis

Security Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 112-153

  Harknett, Richard J ^a   Vandenberg, Jeffrey A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 1542331785     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429316     Document Type: Article

References (189)

1. The concern over alignment is somewhat surprising given the nuclear balance. On the wide-ranging impact of nuclear weapons on international security see T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz, eds., The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Weapons and the Emerging World Order (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997).
2. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 448-82; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 383-416; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
3. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 448-82; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 383-416; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
4. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 448-82; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 383-416; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
5. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 448-82; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 383-416; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
6. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 448-82; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 383-416; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 72-107.
7. For a strong overview of this literature see David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder Westview, 1993), 1-22; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); G. John Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment," World Politics 39, no. 1 (fall 1986): 53-77; Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures," International Organisation 30, no. 1 (winter 1976): 1-45.
8. For a strong overview of this literature see David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder Westview, 1993), 1-22; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); G. John Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment," World Politics 39, no. 1 (fall 1986): 53-77; Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures," International Organisation 30, no. 1 (winter 1976): 1-45.
9. For a strong overview of this literature see David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder Westview, 1993), 1-22; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); G. John Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment," World Politics 39, no. 1 (fall 1986): 53-77; Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures," International Organisation 30, no. 1 (winter 1976): 1-45.
10. For a strong overview of this literature see David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder Westview, 1993), 1-22; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); G. John Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment," World Politics 39, no. 1 (fall 1986): 53-77; Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures," International Organisation 30, no. 1 (winter 1976): 1-45.
11. Some recent work that reexamines systemic theories in the context of domestic influences include: Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (December 1992): 19-40; Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47; and Laurie A. Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-1981," International Journal of Middle East Studies 26 (summer 1994): 393-413.
12. Some recent work that reexamines systemic theories in the context of domestic influences include: Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (December 1992): 19-40; Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47; and Laurie A. Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-1981," International Journal of Middle East Studies 26 (summer 1994): 393-413.
13. Some recent work that reexamines systemic theories in the context of domestic influences include: Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (December 1992): 19-40; Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47; and Laurie A. Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-1981," International Journal of Middle East Studies 26 (summer 1994): 393-413.
14. Part of the research for this case study was conducted during a field trip to Jordan in the spring of 1996. This fieldwork included personal interviews with elite policymakers in Jordan as well as informed Jordanian academics, journalists, and political activists. The case study also relies on a mail questionnaire on state alignment behavior sent to high-ranking Bush administration officials and members of Congress who were involved in the policymaking process during the Gulf crisis. The survey was sent to seventy-four policymakers and we received fifteen responses. For a copy of the survey please contact the authors. This research also included follow-up telephone interviews with some respondents. All telephone interviews were conducted with administration officials of the highest rank, who were guaranteed confidentiality because of issues concerning the administration's report to Congress in October 1990. Therefore, direct attribution of American policymakers is omitted.
15. For a sample of the definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature, see George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julien Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 11-14; Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17-21; Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and PoSy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 46-64; and Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 89. Steven David's definition of alignment is also useful: "In broad terms, a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state." Choosing Sides, 29. David uses two criteria for alignment: security cooperation and dependency on a superpower for arms. Our definition concurs with David's with the exception of the latter criterion.
16. For a sample of the definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature, see George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julien Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 11-14; Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17-21; Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and PoSy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 46-64; and Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 89. Steven David's definition of alignment is also useful: "In broad terms, a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state." Choosing Sides, 29. David uses two criteria for alignment: security cooperation and dependency on a superpower for arms. Our definition concurs with David's with the exception of the latter criterion.
17. For a sample of the definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature, see George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julien Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 11-14; Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17-21; Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and PoSy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 46-64; and Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 89. Steven David's definition of alignment is also useful: "In broad terms, a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state." Choosing Sides, 29. David uses two criteria for alignment: security cooperation and dependency on a superpower for arms. Our definition concurs with David's with the exception of the latter criterion.
18. For a sample of the definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature, see George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julien Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 11-14; Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17-21; Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and PoSy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 46-64; and Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 89. Steven David's definition of alignment is also useful: "In broad terms, a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state." Choosing Sides, 29. David uses two criteria for alignment: security cooperation and dependency on a superpower for arms. Our definition concurs with David's with the exception of the latter criterion.
19. For a sample of the definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature, see George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julien Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 11-14; Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17-21; Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and PoSy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 46-64; and Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 89. Steven David's definition of alignment is also useful: "In broad terms, a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state." Choosing Sides, 29. David uses two criteria for alignment: security cooperation and dependency on a superpower for arms. Our definition concurs with David's with the exception of the latter criterion.
20. For a sample of the definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature, see George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julien Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 11-14; Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17-21; Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and PoSy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 46-64; and Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 89. Steven David's definition of alignment is also useful: "In broad terms, a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state." Choosing Sides, 29. David uses two criteria for alignment: security cooperation and dependency on a superpower for arms. Our definition concurs with David's with the exception of the latter criterion.
21. For a sample of the definitions of alignment and alliance in the literature, see George Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. Julien Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 63-75; Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 11-14; Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 17-21; Roger V. Dingman, "Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and PoSy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979); Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 46-64; and Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory Raymond, A Multipolar Peace?: Great Power Politics in the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 89. Steven David's definition of alignment is also useful: "In broad terms, a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state." Choosing Sides, 29. David uses two criteria for alignment: security cooperation and dependency on a superpower for arms. Our definition concurs with David's with the exception of the latter criterion.
22. For a sample of the classic balance of power literature, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985); Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955); Waltz, Theory of International Politics; also see discussions in George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); and Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
23. For a sample of the classic balance of power literature, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985); Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955); Waltz, Theory of International Politics; also see discussions in George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); and Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
24. For a sample of the classic balance of power literature, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985); Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955); Waltz, Theory of International Politics; also see discussions in George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); and Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
25. For a sample of the classic balance of power literature, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985); Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955); Waltz, Theory of International Politics; also see discussions in George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); and Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
26. For a sample of the classic balance of power literature, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985); Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955); Waltz, Theory of International Politics; also see discussions in George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); and Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
27. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126.
28. Bandwagoning as a form of appeasement or capitulation is discussed in Walt, Origins of Alliances, 19-21. Alignment behavior based on the desire to reap the benefits of a revisionist state's aggression is forwarded in Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." See also Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Paver Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 205-16.
29. Bandwagoning as a form of appeasement or capitulation is discussed in Walt, Origins of Alliances, 19-21. Alignment behavior based on the desire to reap the benefits of a revisionist state's aggression is forwarded in Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." See also Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Paver Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 205-16.
30. Bandwagoning as a form of appeasement or capitulation is discussed in Walt, Origins of Alliances, 19-21. Alignment behavior based on the desire to reap the benefits of a revisionist state's aggression is forwarded in Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." See also Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Paver Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 205-16.
31. Bandwagoning as a form of appeasement or capitulation is discussed in Walt, Origins of Alliances, 19-21. Alignment behavior based on the desire to reap the benefits of a revisionist state's aggression is forwarded in Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." See also Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Paver Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 205-16.
32. Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southeast Asia," International Organisation 42, no. 2 (spring 1988): 277; Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (spring 1985): 3-43.
33. Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southeast Asia," International Organisation 42, no. 2 (spring 1988): 277; Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (spring 1985): 3-43.
34. Walt, "Testing Theories," 311.
35. Waltz contends that balance of power politics "prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive" (Theory of International Politics, 121). Waltz distinguishes between a theory of international politics and theories of foreign policy. Domestic source explanations of alignment would fall under the latter. For the significance behind this distinction see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 121-22.
36. Waltz contends that balance of power politics "prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive" (Theory of International Politics, 121). Waltz distinguishes between a theory of international politics and theories of foreign policy. Domestic source explanations of alignment would fall under the latter. For the significance behind this distinction see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 121-22.
37. This brief overview is drawn from G. John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy, International Organization 42, no. 1 (winter 1988): 1-14.
38. Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
39. "Institutional structures mediate the interests and capacities of the groups and individuals within them...organizational structures of state and society shape and constrain the interests that actors come to embrace and the resources they wield" (G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy," International Organization 42, no. 1 [winter 1988]: 219-43).
40. Although there have been calls for an integrative approach, little has been done with regard to explaining state security alignment behavior in a comprehensive fashion. Ikenberry has argued that in terms of approaches to foreign economic policy, explanation would be enhanced "by focusing more explicitly and positively...[on how] the state serves as an important independent or intervening variable between social and international forces." Although this may be true, in practice this amounts to a state-centered approach that acknowledges the presence of other factors. See his contributions to the special issue, International Organization 42, no. 1 (winter 1988).
41. See Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 233-57; and Choosing Stats: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
42. See Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 233-57; and Choosing Stats: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
43. Looking just at ethnopolitical conflicts, Ted Gurr notes that in 1994 eighteen out of twenty-three wars were based on internal communal challenges to states, producing nearly twenty-seven million refugees. Eight out of thirteen UN peacekeeping missions were dealing with civil conflict. See Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 350.
44. Loss of political office docs not always lead to increased speaking royalties and book tours, but to imprisonment or worse. These concerns manifest themselves even in advancing democracies like South Korea as the indictments of former presidents Chun and Roh illustrate.
45. An omnialignment framework docs not preclude international neutrality or "hiding" as an alignment outcome that flows from balancing or bandwagoning dynamics. On hiding see Paul W. Schioeder, "Historical Reality versus Neo-Realist Theory," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 117-18. On neutrality as an alignment outcome see Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 1988).
46. An omnialignment framework docs not preclude international neutrality or "hiding" as an alignment outcome that flows from balancing or bandwagoning dynamics. On hiding see Paul W. Schioeder, "Historical Reality versus Neo-Realist Theory," International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 117-18. On neutrality as an alignment outcome see Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 1988).
47. David's use of the term interrelated threat was accurate descriptively, but it was not distinct analytically. He argued that alignment is explained by reference to a primary threat (internal or external). Therefore, his discussion of secondary threats adds to the descriptive understanding of a case, but docs not change the explanation. We consider interrelated threats distinct. The combined strategy they require is different than alignment strategies responding to internal or external primary threats. The prefix "omni" captures the sense of reactions to multiple challenges and thus is useful in highlighting alignments against interrelated threats. We will use the terms internal balancing and internal bandwagoning to address alignment responses to internal threats.
48. For a brief comparison see Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," in International Politics, 3rd ed., ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 70-78.
49. David, Choosing Sides, 7.
50. David conceptualized omnibalancing as alignment with or against the cold war superpowers. We contend that regional powers, and their interrelationship with internal sources of threat, also may lead to omnialignment behavior. For more on the importance of regional powers in international relations see W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); and Richard J. Harknett, "Searching for Conceptual Clarity: A Review Essay," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 20, no. 2 (1994): 171-76.
51. David conceptualized omnibalancing as alignment with or against the cold war superpowers. We contend that regional powers, and their interrelationship with internal sources of threat, also may lead to omnialignment behavior. For more on the importance of regional powers in international relations see W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); and Richard J. Harknett, "Searching for Conceptual Clarity: A Review Essay," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 20, no. 2 (1994): 171-76.
52. Laurie Brand has posited that alignment behavior is driven more by internal economic concerns than traditional external security threats. Brand makes a persuasive argument for "budget security" as the predominate dynamic underlying international alignment in the Third World, characterizing it as a form of "economic omnibalancing." Our conception of omnialignment would not exclude economic threats to elite/leadership, but emphasizes that in many countries that fit the conditions discussed below, regime security often means the physical survival of the leadership rather than simply budgetary solvency. Moreover, as Brand discusses, budget security does not explain fully alignment decisions when there is an immediate pressing threat as was the case for Jordan. See Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances"; Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 15-38; 284-95; and Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions: The Bases of Jordan's 1990-91 Gulf Crisis Policy," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (1991):1-46.
53. Laurie Brand has posited that alignment behavior is driven more by internal economic concerns than traditional external security threats. Brand makes a persuasive argument for "budget security" as the predominate dynamic underlying international alignment in the Third World, characterizing it as a form of "economic omnibalancing." Our conception of omnialignment would not exclude economic threats to elite/leadership, but emphasizes that in many countries that fit the conditions discussed below, regime security often means the physical survival of the leadership rather than simply budgetary solvency. Moreover, as Brand discusses, budget security does not explain fully alignment decisions when there is an immediate pressing threat as was the case for Jordan. See Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances"; Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 15-38; 284-95; and Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions: The Bases of Jordan's 1990-91 Gulf Crisis Policy," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (1991):1-46.
54. Laurie Brand has posited that alignment behavior is driven more by internal economic concerns than traditional external security threats. Brand makes a persuasive argument for "budget security" as the predominate dynamic underlying international alignment in the Third World, characterizing it as a form of "economic omnibalancing." Our conception of omnialignment would not exclude economic threats to elite/leadership, but emphasizes that in many countries that fit the conditions discussed below, regime security often means the physical survival of the leadership rather than simply budgetary solvency. Moreover, as Brand discusses, budget security does not explain fully alignment decisions when there is an immediate pressing threat as was the case for Jordan. See Brand, "Economics and Shifting Alliances"; Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 15-38; 284-95; and Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions: The Bases of Jordan's 1990-91 Gulf Crisis Policy," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13, no. 4 (1991):1-46.
55. At a recent conference on NATO expansion, the Rumanian ambassador to the United States noted an internal bandwagoning dynamic working in Bucharest. He remarked that the best way to ensure that democratic leaders remained in power was to allow Romania to join NATO. He cautioned that reformist leaders, in order to stay in power and check opposition forces, would have quickly to change course and move toward an alignment with Russia if faced with a NATO rebuff. The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington Discussion Series Conference, 19 June 1995, Washington, D.C. (author's notes).
56. These conditions are based on David's discussion of the general characteristics of Third World states in chap. 1 of Choosing Sides. It is our contention that these characteristics can usefully serve more than just a descriptive purpose. They delineate the set of conditions under which internal threats are more likely to be present. For the conditions associated with the traditional theories of balance of power and bandwagoning, see Walt, Origins of Alliances, 28-33.
57. David, Choosing Sides, 14. David lists all four as conditions for his theory of omnibalancing. We see the fourth condition, in conjunction with the other three, as the basis for the distinct form of interrelated (as opposed to internal) threat.
58. David, Choosing Sides, 12.
59. It is possible to hypothesize that even the Russian Republic, or more specifically, the Yeltsin government is engaged in internal balancing against a nationalist-communist opposition. Coordination with the West seems to be driven by the assessment of whether or not such aid can protect against the dual internal threats of economic collapse and political extremism.
60. Domestic source approaches tend to ignore the first and assume a degree of domestic legitimacy and order that precludes examination of the second.
61. Internal balancing, internal bandwagoning and omnialignments require an in-depth study of the preferences and relative strengths of internal threats along the same lines that Walt suggests studying the intentions and capabilities of external foes. Wc should expect internal bandwagoning under conditions similar to those which promote external bandwagoning; that is, the absence of a balancing ally, the relative weakness of a regime to withstand a threat alone, and when the intentions of the domestic opposition allow for appeasement. Our decision to use omnialignment to distinguish interrelated threats was aided by comments offered by Karl Mueller.
62. Although an external alignment may help appease an internal threat, the domestic opposition's demands may or may not voice a preference for a particular alignment. It is the assistance an alignment brings, rather than the alignment itself that may be important. See discussion of Sadat and Siad Barre below.
63. For the detailed case studies see David, Choosing Sides, chaps. 3, 4, and 5; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, 50-146, 287-88. Because of the traditional predominance of systemic theories, there are countless case studies of strategic balancing and bandwagoning and we need not repeat them here. The formation of NATO is a good example of strategic balancing and the case of Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union is classic strategic bandwagoning. Two of David's cases discussed here are refined by applying an omnialignment explanation. In correspondence with the author, David agreed.
64. For the detailed case studies see David, Choosing Sides, chaps. 3, 4, and 5; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, 50-146, 287-88. Because of the traditional predominance of systemic theories, there are countless case studies of strategic balancing and bandwagoning and we need not repeat them here. The formation of NATO is a good example of strategic balancing and the case of Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union is classic strategic bandwagoning. Two of David's cases discussed here are refined by applying an omnialignment explanation. In correspondence with the author, David agreed.
65. David, Choosing Sides, 101.
66. The unwillingness of the USSR to support Sadat further narrowed the options he had available for dealing with the growing internal menace. Beyond this, there were reports that by the mid-1970s the Soviets were looking to support an overthrow of Sadat. Thus, the alignment with the United States can be seen as a balance against an indirect external threat as well.
67. Wasif Abboushi, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970), 267.
68. In his autobiography, the king often seems to associate his survival with the continued existence of Jordan as a state. Hussein, for example, characterizes the tumultuous three-year period between 1955 and 1958 as a time in which "Jordan as a country nearly perished" (Hussein, King of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head [London: Heinemann, 1962], 83). Actually, it would be more accurate to say that King Hussein or the monarchy nearly perished, for it was Hussein who was the primary focus of the civil unrest and the personal target of a failed coup d'état attempt led by his chief of staff and a former prime minister.
69. For more on the creation and early history of Transjordan, see Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ann Dearden, Jordan (London: Robert Hale, 1958); Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan 1920-1949: The Making of a State (Boulder Westview, 1984); and Ma'an Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, vol. 1 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989).
70. For more on the creation and early history of Transjordan, see Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ann Dearden, Jordan (London: Robert Hale, 1958); Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan 1920-1949: The Making of a State (Boulder Westview, 1984); and Ma'an Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, vol. 1 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989).
71. For more on the creation and early history of Transjordan, see Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ann Dearden, Jordan (London: Robert Hale, 1958); Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan 1920-1949: The Making of a State (Boulder Westview, 1984); and Ma'an Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, vol. 1 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989).
72. For more on the creation and early history of Transjordan, see Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ann Dearden, Jordan (London: Robert Hale, 1958); Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan 1920-1949: The Making of a State (Boulder Westview, 1984); and Ma'an Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, vol. 1 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989).
73. For more on the creation and early history of Transjordan, see Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ann Dearden, Jordan (London: Robert Hale, 1958); Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan 1920-1949: The Making of a State (Boulder Westview, 1984); and Ma'an Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, vol. 1 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989).
74. For more on the creation and early history of Transjordan, see Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ann Dearden, Jordan (London: Robert Hale, 1958); Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Transjordan 1920-1949: The Making of a State (Boulder Westview, 1984); and Ma'an Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, vol. 1 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989).
75. Abboushi, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century, 267. In this regard, the borders of many African countries are similar.
76. Dearden, Jordan, 56.
77. For the purposes of this study, the term "Jordanians" will refer to all those who live in the post-June 1967 borders of Jordan, including both Palestinians and East Bankers. Official Jordanian censuses do not distinguish demographically between "Jordanians" and "Palestinians." One reliable American source writes that "the exact number of Palestinians living on the East Bank was unknown. Estimates usually ranged from 60 to 70 percent of the total population." Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Jordan: A Country Study (Washington: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1991), 73. Other authors employ general estimates such as "Palestinians make up a little more than half the population of Jordan today." Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 56. The return of a large number of Palestinians from Kuwait after Iraq's invasion may have elevated the figure up to 70 percent.
78. For the purposes of this study, the term "Jordanians" will refer to all those who live in the post-June 1967 borders of Jordan, including both Palestinians and East Bankers. Official Jordanian censuses do not distinguish demographically between "Jordanians" and "Palestinians." One reliable American source writes that "the exact number of Palestinians living on the East Bank was unknown. Estimates usually ranged from 60 to 70 percent of the total population." Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Jordan: A Country Study (Washington: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1991), 73. Other authors employ general estimates such as "Palestinians make up a little more than half the population of Jordan today." Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 56. The return of a large number of Palestinians from Kuwait after Iraq's invasion may have elevated the figure up to 70 percent.
79. United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) statistics cited in Metz, Jordan: A Country Study, 90.
80. For more on the problem of competing allegiances in Jordan, see Clinton Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political History (Boulder: Westview, 1984); Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert B. Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank (New York: Praeger, 1986); and Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank.
81. For more on the problem of competing allegiances in Jordan, see Clinton Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political History (Boulder: Westview, 1984); Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert B. Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank (New York: Praeger, 1986); and Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank.
82. For more on the problem of competing allegiances in Jordan, see Clinton Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political History (Boulder: Westview, 1984); Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert B. Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank (New York: Praeger, 1986); and Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank.
83. For more on the problem of competing allegiances in Jordan, see Clinton Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political History (Boulder: Westview, 1984); Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert B. Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank (New York: Praeger, 1986); and Arthur Day, East Bank/West Bank.
84. Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 210.
85. One of the consequences of King Hussein's Persian Gulf crisis policies was that he was able to use his increased measure of legitimacy with his own population, particularly among Palestinians, to reach a peace agreement with Israel. It is unlikely that the post-Gulf war environment would have been as propitious for peace negotiations had the king followed an alignment strategy dominated by traditional balance of power considerations.
86. For more on Black September, see Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge; Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography (Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1972); Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan; and James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (New York: Morrow, 1989).
87. For more on Black September, see Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge; Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography (Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1972); Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan; and James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (New York: Morrow, 1989).
88. For more on Black September, see Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge; Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography (Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1972); Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan; and James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (New York: Morrow, 1989).
89. For more on Black September, see Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenge; Peter Snow, Hussein: A Biography (Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1972); Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan; and James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (New York: Morrow, 1989).
90. As the king relays the story in his autobiography, his grandfather had insisted that Hussein wear his military uniform to the Haram al-Sharif that fateful day. After the assailant shot Abdullah, he turned and fired at Hussein, striking him in the chest. The bullet, however, ricocheted off a medal on his uniform, saving his life. A relative of the Palestinian Mufti of Jerusalem was found guilty of the murder of Abdullah and hanged. In Uneasy Lies the Head, 1-20. See also Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, and Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) .
91. As the king relays the story in his autobiography, his grandfather had insisted that Hussein wear his military uniform to the Haram al-Sharif that fateful day. After the assailant shot Abdullah, he turned and fired at Hussein, striking him in the chest. The bullet, however, ricocheted off a medal on his uniform, saving his life. A relative of the Palestinian Mufti of Jerusalem was found guilty of the murder of Abdullah and hanged. In Uneasy Lies the Head, 1-20. See also Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, and Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) .
92. As the king relays the story in his autobiography, his grandfather had insisted that Hussein wear his military uniform to the Haram al-Sharif that fateful day. After the assailant shot Abdullah, he turned and fired at Hussein, striking him in the chest. The bullet, however, ricocheted off a medal on his uniform, saving his life. A relative of the Palestinian Mufti of Jerusalem was found guilty of the murder of Abdullah and hanged. In Uneasy Lies the Head, 1-20. See also Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, and Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) .
93. Raphael Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 90.
94. In the fall of 1993, the king allowed political patties to participate openly in parliamentary elections for the first time in twenty-six years.
95. As Uriel Dann argues, the Hashemites have been a "target to be hunted down and destroyed" by the "popular forces of the age at all times." Dann, King Hussein's Strategy of Survival (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 2.
96. Day, East Bank/West Bank, 157.
97. Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 74.
98. King I Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 83-93.
99. Ibid, 89.
100. In the king's words, "...all hell broke loose. Riots such as we had never seen before...disrupted the entire country." Ibid., 92.
101. This alliance placed Jordan's armed forces under Egyptian control in case of a war against Israel. The other signatories were Syria and Saudi Arabia. For more on the Arab Solidarity Pact, see George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 483-85, and Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 39-52.
102. This alliance placed Jordan's armed forces under Egyptian control in case of a war against Israel. The other signatories were Syria and Saudi Arabia. For more on the Arab Solidarity Pact, see George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 483-85, and Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 39-52.
103. Walt lists Jordan's behavior as bandwagoning toward the increased power of Egypt. The locus of his analysis is on the growing strength of Nasser. He notes the vulnerability of Jordan to Nasser's intimidation. The Origins of Alliances, 60-66. From an omnialignment perspective, it was the danger to King Hussein posed by the interrelated threats of Egyptian strength and domestic opposition that precipitated Jordanian alignment. Without an internal source of threat to manipulate, Nasser would not have had sufficient leverage. It was not until internal instability, flamed by Nasser, became intense that Jordan began shifting toward Egypt. The king's response was a counteraction to both sets of threats. This case also high-lights the importance of focusing on elite leadership rather than the state as the unit of analysis.
104. The problem of interrelated threats, of course, is a constant one for the Hashemites. In June of 1996 it was reported that Jordanian security had thwarted thirty-six terrorist attempts in three months, including an assassination attempt on Crown Prince Hassan. Official sources disclosed that the threats were supported by Syria. The Star (Amman), 6 June 1996 and 27 June 1996.
105. Ann Mosely Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians," Middle East Journal 45 (winter 1991): 31-50.
106. "Iraq Threat Counters Israeli One," Jerusalem Post, 6 April 1990, news section.
107. Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians," 33. Lesch frames the alignment behavior of King Hussein in traditional balance of power terms despite providing convincing support for an omnialignment approach. She writes, for example, that "Jordan was cornered strategically and economically. Caught between Iraq and Israel, it feared being crushed in a war between two behemoths" (ibid., 45). She concludes that "the king's internal popularity was at its height just as he faced the greatest external challenge in his 38-year reign" (ibid., 46). His popularity, however, was in large part a result of the king's successful decision to double bandwagon toward the external threat and with one of the greatest internal challenges of his long tenure.
108. Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians," 33. Lesch frames the alignment behavior of King Hussein in traditional balance of power terms despite providing convincing support for an omnialignment approach. She writes, for example, that "Jordan was cornered strategically and economically. Caught between Iraq and Israel, it feared being crushed in a war between two behemoths" (ibid., 45). She concludes that "the king's internal popularity was at its height just as he faced the greatest external challenge in his 38-year reign" (ibid., 46). His popularity, however, was in large part a result of the king's successful decision to double bandwagon toward the external threat and with one of the greatest internal challenges of his long tenure.
109. Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians," 33. Lesch frames the alignment behavior of King Hussein in traditional balance of power terms despite providing convincing support for an omnialignment approach. She writes, for example, that "Jordan was cornered strategically and economically. Caught between Iraq and Israel, it feared being crushed in a war between two behemoths" (ibid., 45). She concludes that "the king's internal popularity was at its height just as he faced the greatest external challenge in his 38-year reign" (ibid., 46). His popularity, however, was in large part a result of the king's successful decision to double bandwagon toward the external threat and with one of the greatest internal challenges of his long tenure.
110. Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions," 32-35.
111. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 6 May 1996.
112. New York Times, 21 October 1990.
113. Sana Atiych, "Observers: Jordanians resigned to war in region," UPI, 31 December 1990.
114. Reported in Jordan Times, in FBIS-NES, 9 August 1990. Mohammad al-Rashdan, secretary general of the Jordanian Committee for Support of Kuwait (a pro-Iraqi organization), said that he expected "up to ten thousand tomorrow...the popular response has been overwhelming. One man called in today and said tomorrow I am bringing in passports of hundreds of relatives of mine."
115. Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions," 34.
116. Daniel Williams, "Angry Jordan Arabs Demonstrate Against Bush as Another Crusader," Los Angeles Times, 11 August 1990.
117. Amman Petra-JNA, 12 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 13 August 1990.
118. Quoted in Jordan Times, as reported in FBIS-NES, 13 August 1990.
119. Paris AFP 16 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 17 August 1990.
120. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 7 May 1996.
121. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 7 May 1996.
122. Dr. Jawad Anani, former minister of state for prime ministry affairs, interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 20 May 1996.
123. Pazner paraphrased in Jerusalem Post, 14 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 15 August 1990. Ben-Eli'ezer's quotation from an interview on the Israel Television Network August 14, as reported in FBIS-NES, 15 August 1990. Ben-Eli'ezer also stated that "As things look in the present, the king has totally lost control over events in Jordan. I cannot recall any other period in which the king has made so many mistakes as he has in this very brief period. He has allowed demonstrations; he has allowed the opening of offices where Jordanians are recruited for Iraq. He has in fact become Jordan's [as heard] agent and propaganda minister." On Egyptian and U.S. embassy actions see Wafa Amr, "Foreign Women in Jordan Appeal for Peaceful Resolution of Crisis," Los Angeles Times, 21 August 1990, international section; "Saddam Supporters Demonstrate, Enlist in Iraqi Army," United Press International, BC cycle, 13 August 1990.
124. Pazner paraphrased in Jerusalem Post, 14 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 15 August 1990. Ben-Eli'ezer's quotation from an interview on the Israel Television Network August 14, as reported in FBIS-NES, 15 August 1990. Ben-Eli'ezer also stated that "As things look in the present, the king has totally lost control over events in Jordan. I cannot recall any other period in which the king has made so many mistakes as he has in this very brief period. He has allowed demonstrations; he has allowed the opening of offices where Jordanians are recruited for Iraq. He has in fact become Jordan's [as heard] agent and propaganda minister." On Egyptian and U.S. embassy actions see Wafa Amr, "Foreign Women in Jordan Appeal for Peaceful Resolution of Crisis," Los Angeles Times, 21 August 1990, international section; "Saddam Supporters Demonstrate, Enlist in Iraqi Army," United Press International, BC cycle, 13 August 1990.
125. Quoted in Paris AFP 16 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 17 August 1990.
126. The 10 September rally reported in Amatzia Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment," Middle East Journal 45 (winter 1991): 68. Irbid demonstration on Jordan Television Network, 28 September, as reported in FBIS-NES, 3 October 1990.
127. The 10 September rally reported in Amatzia Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment," Middle East Journal 45 (winter 1991): 68. Irbid demonstration on Jordan Television Network, 28 September, as reported in FBIS-NES, 3 October 1990.
128. Quotation from Deputy Prime Minister Taher al-Masri, interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 7 May 1996.
129. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 7 May 1996.
130. Stanley Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," Foreign Affairs 69 (winter 1990): 28. See also Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations, 291.
131. Stanley Reed, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis," Foreign Affairs 69 (winter 1990): 28. See also Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations, 291.
132. Quotation from Deputy Prime Minister Taher al-Masri. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 7 May 1996.
133. For a detailed explication of the king's proclaimed crisis policy and its rationale, released in August 1991, see the Jordanian government's white paper. Jordan and the Guff Crisis, August 1990-March 1991.
134. In the words of King Hussein's younger brother Crown Prince Hassan, "Let me make it explicitly clear that Jordan docs not recognize or condone the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq." In the same editorial, however, Hassan goes on to say that "no useful purpose would be served by severing contact with or isolating Baghdad." Washington Post, 2 September 1990.
135. Judith Miller, "King Hussein on Kuwait and Dashed Hopes," New York Times, 16 October 1990.
136. Paris AFP, as reported in FBIS-NES, 15 August 1990, 37.
137. London Press Association, as reported in FBIS-NES, 20 August 1990, 27.
138. Paris AFP, as reported in FBIS-NES, 20 August 1990, 27.
139. Quoted in Reuters AM Cycle, 26 October 1990.
140. Quotations from House Report 103-25, "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1994," 10 June 1993.
141. Hearing on H.R. 4803, "The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1992," Serial No. 102-21.
142. Interview on Jordan Television Network, 4 August 1990, as reported in FBIS-NES, 6 August 1990, 54.
143. Quoted in Amman Domestic Service, 12 August 1990, as reported in FBIS-NES, 14 August 1990. 1-2.
144. In a speech on Baghdad radio, Saddam Hussein argued that Israel's withdrawal from "the oldest occupation" should take place first and that "all issues of occupation...be resolved in accordance with the same principles...set by the UN Security Council." Quoted in Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis," 37-38.
145. Quote from King Hussein's speech at the emergency Arab League meeting in Cairo by Paris AFP, 12 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 12 August 1990, 64. The difference in this stance and King Hussein's 1996 policy turn against Iraq, including allowing American soldiers in Jordan, illustrates the forceful internal pressure that existed during the gulf crisis of 1990. For more see Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg, "Democratization and Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt," (Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, forthcoming).
146. See for example, Boston Globe, 1 September,
147. Los Angeles Times, 11 September;
148. and Wall Street Journal, 24 August. Although Israel may have had motives for presenting disinformation, U.S. intelligence reports of other military cooperation and the prewar relationship between the airforces of Jordan and Iraq seem in accord with the Israeli information.
149. The declassified military annex to the GAO report is cited in House Report, 103-25.
150. Kenneth Waltz, "The New World Order," Millennium: The Journal of International Studies 22, no. 2 (1993): 187-95.
151. Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 18.
152. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 22-26. Saddam had an offensive missile capability to destroy Amman. Given his past willingness to hit an enemy's capital (Teheran) this offensive power had to be taken seriously. This threat was backed up by the sheer size of his ground forces even though at the time they were deployed to the south. A decision to defy Saddam had to consider his ability to hold a grudge (as he revealed with the Kuwaitis) and therefore the immediate threat of offensive action may not have been as important as the mere possibility of such an attack over time.
153. It is important to note that aid from all three sources had been reduced in 1989 and 1990. This made the decision even more critical since alignment with the coalition would have likely reversed this trend.
154. Dann, King Hussein's Strategy of Survival, 3.
155. University of Jordan political scientist Nasir Tahboub. Interview with VanDenBerg, Amman, 28 March 1996.
156. Quotation from response to our state alignment behavior survey by an official involved in the Bush administration's Jordan policy during the Gulf crisis.
157. Although it is commonplace for politicians to vary the emphases of public comments with different audiences, in a time of international crisis and war, speeches and interviews carry heightened international ramifications. In this case, the king was aware that his anti-Coalition rhetoric at home would have negative consequences for Jordan's foreign relations. The expulsion of Jordanian diplomats from Saudi Arabia and the cut-off of Saudi oil to Jordan following the king's 14 August speech to parliament was one significant example of the international importance of public discourse at the time.
158. Daniel Williams, "Jordan Shifts Closer to Iraq, Denounces Western Presence," Las Angeles Times, 14 August 1990.
159. Jordan Television Network, 16 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 17 August 1990.
160. Full text of King Hussein's speech in FBIS-NES, 19 November 1990.
161. Jordan Television Network, 17 December, as reported in FBIS-NES, 18 December 1990.
162. Lamis Andoni, "Jordan's Hussein Balances Nationalist, U.S. Pressures," Christian Science Monitor, 16 August 1990. Hussein's revival of the term Sharif also angered the Saudis, since it relates to the Hashemite's historical claim to the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia.
163. Quoted in Daniel Williams, "2 PLO Radicals Join in Threat to 'Strike U.S. Interests,'" Lot Angeles Times, 18 September 1990.
164. Quotation by a young female militia member, Selwa Farhan, in Joel Brinkley, "Divided Loyalties." New York Times Magazine, 16 December 1990, 38.
165. Ibid, 38.
166. Quoted in Jordan Times, as reported in FBIS-NES, 12 October 1990.
167. Brinkley, "Divided Loyalties," 108.
168. Telephone conversation with an assistant to a senior Bush administration official, on the condition of anonymity, 14 February 1995 (author's notes).
169. Without exception, the respondents to our state alignment behavior survey agreed with the statement that "the continued reign of King Hussein in Jordan was considered by the Bush administration to be in the national interest of the United States."
170. Interview with the king on NBC television, 5 August, as reported in FBIS-NES, 7 August 1990.
171. For a complete listing of all UN Security Council resolutions and statements dealing with the Persian Gulf conflict, see Karel C. Wellens, ed., Resolutions and Statements of the United Nations Security Council (1946-1992): A Thematic Guide (Dordrecht Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 507-77.
172. Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1990.
173. Washington Post, 21 September 1990.
174. Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1990.
175. Quoted by Carol Giacomo in Reuters, 2 October 1990.
176. Findings in "Jordan: Suspension of U.S. Military Assistance During Gulf Crisis," U.S. General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, September, 1992.
177. State Department briefing reported by the Federal News Service, 19 November 1990.
178. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 29 November 1992.
179. Quotation of White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater in Reuters, 2 October 1990.
180. Quoted in Richard Benedetto, "U.S.-Jordan Relations OK," Gannett News Service, 12 February 1991.
181. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1991.
182. Quotation in Jerusalem Post, 10 February 1991.
183. House Report, 103-25.
184. Los Angeles Times, 21 Match 1991.
185. Information from a CBS interview with King Hussein, as reported in FBIS-NES, 6 August 1990.
186. Telephone interview on condition of anonymity, 14 February 1995 (author's notes).
187. Information from several administration officials in survey responses. See also Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 133.
188. In fact, some observers have assumed that Jordan's alignment behavior during the Persian Gulf crisis was dominated by an systemic bandwagoning dynamic. Eric Labs, for example, wrote that "in the most recent case available, Jordan bandwagoned with the Middle East's 1990 aggressor, Iraq." Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" 386.
189. Richard K. Herrmann, "The Middle East and the New World Order: Rethinking U.S. Political Strategy After the Gulf War," International Security 16 (fall 1991): 43.