Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 433-444

  Hong, Lu ^a  

^a SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21344449490     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00182853     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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2. Hong L (1994) Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets, mimeo
3. Hong L, Page S (1994) Reducing information costs in endowment mechanisms. Econ Design 1: 103-117
4. Hurwicz L, Maskin E, Postlewaite A (1984) Feasible implementation of social choice correspondences by Nash equilibria, mimeo
5. Jackson M (1991) Bayesian implementation. Econometrica 59: 461-477
6. Maskin E (1977) Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, mimeo
7. Mookherjee D, Reichelstein S (1990) Implementation via augmented revelation mechanisms. Rev Econ Studies 57: 453-475
8. Myerson R (1979) Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problems. Econometrica 47: 61-73
9. Palfrey T, Srivastava S (1987) On Bayesian implementable allocations. Rev Econ Studies 54: 193-208
10. Palfrey T, Srivastava S (1989) Implementation with incomplete information in exchange economies. Econometrica 57: 115-134
11. Postlewaite A (1979) Manipulation via endowments. Rev Econ Studies 46: 255-262
12. Postlewaite A, Schmeidler D (1986) Implementation in differential information economies. J Econ Theory 39: 14-33