Backward induction is not robust: The parity problem and the uncertainty problem

Theory and Decision

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 263-289

  Brams, Steven J ^a   Kilgour, D Marc ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Backward induction; Bounded rationality; Continuation probability; Infinite horizon; Parity; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000290076     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005038921033     Document Type: Article

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