Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric Firms

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-21

  Belleflamme, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NAMUR   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Coalitions; Oligopoly; Open membership

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005507871     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0708     Document Type: Article

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