An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium

Economics Letters

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 269-273

  Kukushkin, Nikolai S ^a  

^a RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

Coalition proof equilibrium; Public and private objective; Strategic game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031578585     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00232-2     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Bernheim, B.D., Peleg, B., Whinston, M.D., 1987. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I. Concepts. Journal of Economic Theory 42, 1-12.
2. Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M.D., 1987. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II. Applications. Journal of Economic Theory 42, 13-29.
3. Germeier, Yu.B., Vatel', I.A., 1974. On games with a hierarchical vector of interests. Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR. Tekhnicheskaya Kibernetika 3, 54-69 (in Russian; English translation in Engineering Cybernetics, V.12).
4. Kukushkin, N.S., 1992. On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives. International Journal of Game Theory 20, 295-303.
5. Kukushkin, N.S., 1994. A condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with public and private objectives. Games and Economic Behavior 7, 177-192.
6. Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1996. Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities. Games and Economic Behavior 17, 113-128.
7. Moreno, D., Wooders, J., 1996. Coalition-proof equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior 17, 80-112.
8. Ray, I., 1996. Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: A definition. Games and Economic Behavior 17, 56-79.