NATO's metamorphosis and its new members

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 32-43

  Nelson, Daniel N ^a   Szayna, Thomas S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002336403     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.1998.11655797     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. That Germany's effort to fulfill a larger security provider role in Euro-Atlantic affairs may be troublesome to some countries and populations has been discussed in detail by Daniel N. Nelson, "Germany and the Balance Between Threats and Capacities in Europe," International Politics 34, no. 1 (March 1997): 63-78.
2. As demonstrated by the European neutrals, per-capita expenditures on defense tend to be higher in countries outside the alliance framework, since these countries are forced to be more self-reliant in defense.
3. Henry L. Hinton, "NATO Enlargement: Cost Implications for the United States Remain Unclear," testimony before the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, October 23, 1997.
4. A revealing discussion of such burden-sharing debates is in European Working Group on Multilateral Operations, "Post-SFOR and the Leadership Issue," paper delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 8, 1997.
5. Philip H. Gordon, "Will Anyone Really Pay to Enlarge NATO - And if So, Who?" International Herald Tribune (April 30, 1997). As more information about the state of infrastructure and the militaries of the candidate members has become available, the cost estimates have fallen. In any event, it is important to separate the costs of equipping.current members for power-projection missions from the costs of enlargement, since the former costs are tied not to enlargement per se but to the changing mission of the alliance. These costs stem from the post-cold war restructuring of the alliance and would be paid whether or not the alliance enlarged. Failure to allow for the separation of these costs, combined with a series of worst-case estimates, has led to some preposterous estimates of the "costs of enlargement." For perhaps the best analysis of the assumptions underlying the various cost estimates, see Reiner K. Huber and Gernot Friedrich, "A Zero-Cost Option for NATO Enlargement: Arguments for a Comprehensive Approach," Potomac Papers (McLean, VA: Potomac Foundation, August 1997).
6. Edward N. Luttwak, "Add Poland, and NATO Is No More,"Los Angeles Times (April 16, 1997), and Patrick J. Buchanan, "Expand NATO, Push Russia to World War," Los Angeles Times (March 10, 1998).
7. Edward N. Luttwak, "Add Poland, and NATO Is No More,"Los Angeles Times (April 16, 1997), and Patrick J. Buchanan, "Expand NATO, Push Russia to World War," Los Angeles Times (March 10, 1998).
8. For a sophisticated exposition of the Polish rationale for joining NATO, see Andrzej Ananicz, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, and Henryk Szlajfer, "Poland-NATO," Report of the Discussions at the Euro-Atlantic and Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, September 1995. As early as 1993, the Poles had prepared a detailed plan dealing with the mechanics of joining the alliance. See Krystian Piatowski, "Outline and Timetable for Integration of Poland into NATO," European Security (autumn 1994): 501-28.
9. For a sophisticated exposition of the Polish rationale for joining NATO, see Andrzej Ananicz, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, and Henryk Szlajfer, "Poland-NATO," Report of the Discussions at the Euro-Atlantic and Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, September 1995. As early as 1993, the Poles had prepared a detailed plan dealing with the mechanics of joining the alliance. See Krystian Piatowski, "Outline and Timetable for Integration of Poland into NATO," European Security (autumn 1994): 501-28.
10. Adopting a reorganization plan for the Ministry of Defense and ending General Tadeusz Wilecki's tenure as chief of staff in early 1997 are the two principal accomplishments that improved Polish civil-military relations and helped to clear the path to NATO. But transforming civil-military relations is a process dating back to important steps taken by the Solidarity governments. Agnieszka Gogolewska, "Civilian Control of the Army and Post-1989 Changes in Polish Legislation," Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 5, no. 1 (winter 1996): 61-82.
11. Radek Sikorski, "How We Lost Poland: Heroes Do Not Make Good Politicians," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September/October 1995): 15-22.
12. Surveys conducted by a variety of Polish and foreign polling organizations show a consistently high level of support for NATO membership among the public and the elite. A large majority of Poles (strongly favored or somewhat favored) support NATO membership and sending Polish troops to defend other NATO countries. Poles, unlike any other population in Central Europe, also accept (by a smaller majority) overflights by NATO aircraft and the stationing of NATO troops in Poland. The New European Security Architecture, II (Washington, DC: United States Information Agency [USIA] Office of Research and Media Reaction, September 1996). See also Claire Wallace and Christian Haepfer, "Changing Attitudes Towards Internal and External Security in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," unpublished manuscript, 1998 (based on a 1997 New Democracies Barometer survey, which continued to find 86 percent of Poles favoring NATO membership).
13. Wojciech Zajaczkowski, "Polish-Lithuanian Relations: The Complexities of Geopolitics," and Oleksandr Paviliuk, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations: A Pillar of Regional Stability," in The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Monika Wohlfield (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the West European Union, Chaillot paper no. 26, June 1997).
14. Wojciech Zajaczkowski, "Polish-Lithuanian Relations: The Complexities of Geopolitics," and Oleksandr Paviliuk, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations: A Pillar of Regional Stability," in The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Monika Wohlfield (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the West European Union, Chaillot paper no. 26, June 1997).
15. For a look at some Polish projections of defense budgets in light of NATO integration, see Elzbieta Firlej and Pawel Wieczorek, "Economic and Financial Aspects of Integration of Poland with NATO Structures," Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 5, no. 1 (winter 1996): 27-44.
16. Polska Zbrojna (September 19, 1997), translated in World News Connection, Daily Report: Eastern Europe (September 23, 1997).
17. Polska Zbrojna (September 19, 1997), translated in World News Connection, Daily Report: Eastern Europe (September 23, 1997).
18. Frantisek Turnovec, "Votes, Seats, and Power: 1996 Parliamentary Elections in the Czech Republic," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30, no. 3 (September 1997): 289-305.
19. The New European Security Architecture, II, pp. 10 and 27. Surveys in 1997 showed an increase in support by about 10 to 15 percent - close to or slightly above 60 percent - after substantial public affairs emphasis by the government and elites between late 1996 and mid-1997. "NATO Enlargement: Views from the European Continent" (Washington: USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, 1997). Also see Wallace and Haepfer, who found about 62 percent of Czechs saying that "becoming a member of NATO would be beneficial." However, since the end of the educational campaign, support seems to be falling again.
20. Thomas S. Szayna's discussions with Czech officials, Prague, May 1997.
21. Data from 1996 are from Steve Kull, "The American Public, Congress, and NATO Enlargement," NATO Review (January 1997): 109. For 1994 and 1995, see The New European Security Architecture, I (Washington, DC: USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, 1995).
22. Data from 1996 are from Steve Kull, "The American Public, Congress, and NATO Enlargement," NATO Review (January 1997): 109. For 1994 and 1995, see The New European Security Architecture, I (Washington, DC: USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, 1995).
23. "NATO Enlargement," 5. This report found 57 percent of Hungarians to favor entry into NATO.
24. New European Security Architecture, II,pp. 10, 25, and 27.
25. Nepszbadsag (June 13, 1997).
26. See, for example, the rather exaggerated warnings in Ted Galen Carpenter and Pavel Kislitsyn, "NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 2: The Border Between Hungary and Serbia," CATO Foreign Policy Briefing, no. 45 (November 24, 1997).
27. Tomas Valasek, "Keep Control of Expansion: New Members Could Draw NATO into Local Disputes," Defense News (February 2-8, 1998): 13.
28. Hungarian analyst Sebastian Gorka estimates that the forces designated for NATO/Combined Joint Task Force cooperation will eventually number about 12,000. Sebastian Gorka, "Hungary Reinvents Its Defence Force," Jane s Intelligence Review 9, no. 5 (May 1997): 200.
29. Lest the Hungarian military be portrayed in too desperate a condition, some smart steps have helped Budapest modernize some weapons without large budgetary investments. Hungarians have utilized a debt swap with Russia, for example, to add 28 MiG-29s to their air force. Hungary's modernized T-72 tanks (a recent purchase from Belarus), are better than the Greek, Turkish, or Spanish fleets.
30. Dale Herspring, "After NATO Expansion: The East European Militaries," Problems of Post-Communism 45, no. 1 (January-February 1998): 10-20.
31. Christopher Donnelly, "Defense Transformation in the New Democracies," NATO Review (November 1996): 23.
32. Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 156-79; Patricia A. Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (autumn 1997): 156-93; Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
33. Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 156-79; Patricia A. Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (autumn 1997): 156-93; Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
34. Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 156-79; Patricia A. Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (autumn 1997): 156-93; Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 445-75.
35. The Military Balance 1996-97 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).