Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 525-547

  Cressman, Ross ^a  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Backwards induction procedure; Dynamic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031322484     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01813889     Document Type: Article

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