Fictitious play in extensive form games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 177-202

  Hendon, Ebbe ^a   Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen ^a   Sloth, Birgitte ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030210914     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0065     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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